This study examines whether stock returns provide forecasts of changes in interest rates and inflation. In contrast to earlier work that indicated that changes in expected inflation negatively affect stock returns, we find a statistically significant positive relation between stock returns and future inflation rate changes as well as a significant positive relation between stock returns and future interest rate changes. Real estate investment trusts, which are particularly interest- and inflation-sensitive securities, provide better forecasts than a broad market index. Finally, we find that most of the evidence supporting the forecasting ability of stock returns occurs in the October 1979 to October 1982 period when the Federal Reserve Board chose not to counteract interest rate changes.

This paper examines how cash flows, investment expenditures, and stock price histories affect debt ratios. Consistent with earlier work, we find that these variables have a substantial influence on changes in capital structure. Specifically, stock price changes and financial deficits (i.e., the amount of external capital raised) have strong influences on capital structure changes, but in contrast to previous conclusions, we find that over long horizons their effects are partially reversed. These results indicate that although firms’ histories strongly influence their capital structures, over time their capital structures tend to move towards target debt ratios that are consistent with the tradeoff theories of capital structure.

This paper examines how cash flows, investment expenditures and stock price histories affect debt ratios. Consistent with earlier work, we find that these variables have a substantial influence on changes in capital structure. Specifically, stock price changes and financial deficits (i.e., the amount of external capital raised) have strong influences on capital structure changes, but in contrast to previous conclusions, we find that over long horizons their effects are partially reversed. These results indicate that although firms' histories strongly influence their capital structures, over time their capital structures tend to move towards target debt ratios that are consistent with the tradeoff theories of capital structure.

We provide a simple argument that suggests that better-informed hedge funds choose to have less exposure to factor risk. Consistent with this argument, we find that hedge funds that exhibit lower R-squareds with respect to systematic factors have higher Sharpe ratios, higher information ratios, and higher alphas. They also exhibit higher manipulation-proof performance measures and charge higher fees.

This article examines information and incentive problems that can exist in the market for commercial mortgages that are pooled and repackaged as commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBSs). We find that mortgages that are originated by institutions with large negative stock returns in the quarters prior to the origination date tend to have higher credit spreads and default more than other mortgages with similar observable characteristics. Properties financed with these mortgages also exhibit weaker post-securitization operating performance. In addition, stock price loser institutions are anxious to securitize mortgages they originate more quickly. Finally we find that credit rating agencies require higher levels of subordination for CMBS pools (i.e., view these pools as riskier) that include more mortgages originated by underperforming originators. This evidence is consistent with reputation models in which poorly performing originators have less incentive to carefully evaluate the credit quality of prospective borrowers, thereby letting relatively riskier mortgages pass through their weaker screening standards.

Portfolio strategies that buy stocks with high returns over the previous 3–12 months and sell stocks with low returns over this same time period perform well over the following 12 months. A recent article by Conrad and Kaul (1998) presents striking evidence suggesting that the momentum profits are attributable to cross-sectional differences in expected returns rather than to any time-series dependence in returns. This article shows that Conrad and Kaul reach this conclusion because they do not take into account the small sample biases in their tests and bootstrap experiments. Our unbiased empirical tests indicate that cross-sectional differences in expected returns explain very little, if any, of the momentum profits.

This article examines the contribution of stock price overreaction and delayed reaction to the profitability of contrarian strategies. The evidence indicates that stock prices overreact to firm-specific information, but react with a delay to common factors. Delayed reactions to common factors give rise to a size-related lead-lag effect in stock returns. In sharp contrast with the conclusions in the extant literature, however, this article finds that most of the contrarian profit is due to stock price overreaction and a very small fraction of the profit can be attributed to the lead-lag effect.

We present a dynamic model that links characteristic‐based return predictability to systematic factors that determine the evolution of firm fundamentals. In the model, an economy‐wide disruption process reallocates profits from existing businesses to new projects and thus generates a source of systematic risk for portfolios of firms sorted on value, profitability, and asset growth. If investors are overconfident about their ability to evaluate the disruption climate, these characteristic‐sorted portfolios exhibit persistent mispricing. The model generates predictions about the conditional predictability of characteristic‐sorted portfolio returns and illustrates how return persistence increases the likelihood of observing characteristic‐based anomalies.

The book‐to‐market effect is often interpreted as evidence of high expected returns on stocks of “distressed” firms with poor past performance. We dispute this interpretation. We find that while a stock's future return is unrelated to the firm's past accounting‐based performance, it is strongly negatively related to the “intangible” return, the component of its past return that is orthogonal to the firm's past performance. Indeed, the book‐to‐market ratio forecasts returns because it is a good proxy for the intangible return. Also, a composite equity issuance measure, which is related to intangible returns, independently forecasts returns.