We investigate whether and when firms manage the tone of words in earnings press releases, and how investors react to tone management. We estimate abnormal positive tone, ABTONE, as a measure of tone management from residuals of a tone model that controls for firm quantitative fundamentals such as performance, risk, and complexity. We find that ABTONE predicts negative future earnings and cash flows, is positively associated with upward perception management events, such as, just meeting/beating thresholds, future earnings restatements, SEO, and M&A, and is negatively associated with a downward perception management event, stock option grants. ABTONE has a positive stock return effect at the earnings announcement and a delayed negative reaction in the one and two quarters afterward. Balance sheet constrained firms and older firms are more likely to employ tone management over accruals management. Overall, the evidence is consistent with managers using strategic tone management to mislead investors about firm fundamentals.

Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question of why firms hire overconfident managers. Theoretical research suggests a reason: overconfidence can benefit shareholders by increasing investment in risky projects. Using options‐ and press‐based proxies for CEO overconfidence, we find that over the 1993–2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development expenditures. However, overconfident managers achieve greater innovation only in innovative industries. Our findings suggest that overconfidence helps CEOs exploit innovative growth opportunities.

We test whether earnings management spreads between firms via shared directors. We find that a firm is more likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a firm that is currently managing earnings and is less likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a non-manipulator. Earnings management contagion is stronger when the shared director has a leadership or accounting-relevant position (e.g., audit committee chair or member) on its board or the contagious firm's board. Irregularity contagion is stronger than error contagion. The board contagion effect is robust to controlling for endogenous matching of firms with directors, fixed firm/director effects, incidence of M&A, industry, and contagion via a common auditor or geographical proximity. These findings support the view that board monitoring plays a key role in the contagion and quality of firms' financial reports. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M49; G34; G39; D83. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

Recent studies propose that limited investor attention causes market underreactions. This paper directly tests this explanation by measuring the information load faced by investors. The investor distraction hypothesis holds that extraneous news inhibits market reactions to relevant news. We find that the immediate price and volume reaction to a firm's earnings surprise is much weaker, and post‐announcement drift much stronger, when a greater number of same‐day earnings announcements are made by other firms. We evaluate the economic importance of distraction effects through a trading strategy, which yields substantial alphas. Industry‐unrelated news and large earnings surprises have a stronger distracting effect.

Issuers of initial public offerings (IPOs) can report earnings in excess of cash flows by taking positive accruals. This paper provides evidence that issuers with unusually high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in the three years thereafter. IPO issuers in the most “aggressive” quartile of earnings managers have a three‐year aftermarket stock return of approximately 20 percent less than IPO issuers in the most “conservative” quartile. They also issue about 20 percent fewer seasoned equity offerings. These differences are statistically and economically significant in a variety of specifications.

We study how public firm misvaluation affects private peer firm investments. An economic competition hypothesis predicts a negative relation because misvaluation-induced new investment by public firms crowds out investment by private peers that share common input or output markets. An alternative shared sentiment hypothesis predicts a positive relation because private firm stakeholders share in the sentiment associated with misvaluation in public markets. Misvaluation is proxied using both the price-to-fundamental ratio and an exogenous instrument obtained from mutual fund flows. The evidence is consistent with the shared sentiment hypothesis, and robust to alternative treatments for growth opportunities. Private firms finance misvaluation-induced investment primarily internally or externally with debt, not equity. Finally, misvaluation-induced investment increases future return on investment for private firms, in contrast with public firms. Overall, these findings suggest that overvaluation in public markets increases private firm investments and has beneficial effects on private firm investments by relaxing financing constraints. JEL Classifications: G32; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Using machine learning–based algorithms, we measure key impressions about sell‐side analysts using their LinkedIn photos. We find that impressions of analysts’ trustworthiness ( TRUST ) and dominance ( DOM ) are positively associated with forecast accuracy, especially after recent in‐person meetings between analysts and firm managers. High TRUST also enhances stock return sensitivity to forecast revisions, especially for stocks with high institutional ownership. In contrast, the impression of analysts’ attractiveness ( ATTRACT ) is only positively associated with accuracy for new analysts or when a firm has a new CEO or CFO. Furthermore, while high DOM helps male analysts’ chances of attaining All‐Star status, it reduces female analysts’ accuracy and the likelihood of winning the All‐Star award. In addition, the relation between TRUST and accuracy is modulated by the disclosure environment and is attenuated by Regulation Fair Disclosure. Our results suggest that face impressions influence analysts’ access to information and the perceived credibility of their reports.

We introduce a novel Big Data analytics model to detect upward revenue misreporting. The model uses freely available Google searches of firm products to provide external entity business state (EBS) evidence. The veracity of the reported numbers is enhanced when auditors can obtain external EBS evidence congruent with the reported numbers. The Google search volume index (SVI) of firm products is a good candidate for such EBS evidence because it nowcasts (i.e. predicts present) firm sales and is independent of management control. A large discrepancy such as a high sales growth together with a large decline in the SVI suggests possible manipulation upwards of revenues. We find that an indicator variable, MUP, of a firm in the top sales growth quartile and bottom ΔSVI quartile in each industry-quarter predicts revenue misstatements incrementally to the F_Score, Discretionary-Revenues model, two alternative upward revenue manipulation identifiers, and analyst and media coverages. MUP predictability is stronger in end-user industries and in interim quarters relative to the fourth quarter. We also find corroborating evidence that MUP firms have lower sales growth persistence, larger increases in accounts receivables, and lower allowances for bad debts, consistent with their lower revenue quality.

This paper uses pre‐offer market valuations to evaluate the misvaluation and Q theories of takeovers. Bidder and target valuations (price‐to‐book, or price‐to‐residual‐income‐model‐value) are related to means of payment, mode of acquisition, premia, target hostility, offer success, and bidder and target announcement‐period returns. The evidence is broadly consistent with both hypotheses. The evidence for the Q hypothesis is stronger in the pre‐1990 period than in the 1990–2000 period, whereas the evidence for the misvaluation hypothesis is stronger in the 1990–2000 period than in the pre‐1990 period.

This study tests whether nai¨ve trading by individual investors, or some class of individual investors, causes post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Inconsistent with the individual trading hypothesis, individual investor trading fails to subsume any of the power of extreme earnings surprises to predict future abnormal returns. Moreover, individuals are significant net buyers after both negative and positive extreme earnings surprises, consistent with an attention effect, but not with their trades causing PEAD. Finally, we find no indication that trading by individuals explains the concentration of drift at subsequent earnings announcement dates.