The earliest known commercial use of the English term was in 15711 although the idea which it conveys is probably much older. Yet when Francis More read a paper2 on goodwill3 to the Chartered Accountants' Students' Society of Edinburgh in 1891, he felt the need to preface his remarks on valuation with an apology. He regretted his inability to quote any authorities on the subject; he was unaware of any previous writings on goodwill valuation. The earlier writings on goodwill had concentrated on legal aspects, particularly the protection of attendant property rights. If anyone had considered the effect of different factors on price and how goodwill might be valued in the absence of the direct evidence of a market transaction, his opinion seems to have remained unpublished. Twenty-three years after the appearance of More's paper, P. D. Leake first published his views on the valuation of goodwill in a paper4 read to the Leicester Chartered Accountants' Students' Society. In the intervening period, however, the subject seems to have aroused considerable interest, and several writings included a discussion of it. Many factors contributed to this surge of interest. An increasing number of accountants were joining professional societies, many of which had been founded in the decade or so before 1891. There followed more organised oppor-

We examine the extent to which a fund's cash flows are affected by the stellar performance of other funds in its family -- and consequences of such spillovers. We show that star performance results in greater cash inflow to the fund and to other funds in its family. Moreover, families with higher variation in investment strategies across funds are shown to be more likely to generate star performance. We argue that spillovers may induce lower ability families to pursue star-creating strategies. Consistent with our conjecture, families with high variation in investment strategies across funds significantly underperform low-variation families.

This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.

I develop a normative theory of political influence on bank lending and capital structure. Legislators want banks to make politically-favored loans that reduce bank profits but generate social or political benefits. The regulator uses asset-choice regulation and capital requirements to induce the lending desired by legislators. There are four main results. First, if regulators dislike bank fragility, then credit-allocation regulation should be accompanied by higher capital requirements. Second, banks will resist higher capital requirements, which will be lower when banks have more bargaining power. Third, when politics matters more in bank regulation, the banking sector is larger and more competitive, with higher capital requirements. Fourth, the optimal reporting mechanism, in which banks report their privately-known profitability and the regulator endogenously determines capital requirements and stringency of credit-allocation regulation in response, shows that political influence is stronger when banks are more profitable.

This paper is a review of the literature on fintech and its interaction with banking. Included in fintech are innovations in payment systems (including cryptocurrencies), credit markets (including P2P lending), and insurance, with Blockchain-assisted smart contracts playing a role. The paper provides a definition of fintech, examines some statistics and stylized facts, and then reviews the theoretical and empirical literature. The review is organized around four main research questions. The paper summarizes our knowledge on these questions and concludes with questions for future research.

This paper develops a theory of how risk is assessed and priced through the business cycle by developing an intuitive model in which there is uncertainty about whether outcomes depend on the risk-management skills of banks or are just based on luck, in the spirit of Piketty’s (1995) model of “left-wing” and “right-wing” dynasties. Periods of sustained banking profitability cause all agents to rationally elevate their estimates of bankers’ skills, despite the uncertainty about what is driving outcomes. Everybody consequently becomes sanguine about bank risk, credit spreads decline, and banks choose increasingly risky assets. Conditional on subsequently observing unexpectedly high defaults, beliefs can endogenously shift to put more weight on outcomes being luck-driven, and this causes credit spreads to widen and may be enough to trigger a crisis. Regulatory implications of the analysis are extracted.

This paper develops a theory of strategic information disclosure with disagreement. Managers of firms are voluntarily communicating subjective information, and prior beliefs about the strategy to maximize project value are rational but heterogeneous, potentially generating fundamental disagreement. Three main results are derived. First, not all firms disclose (subjective) information about strategy. Second, more valuable firms, and those whose strategies investors are more likely to agree with, disclose less information in equilibrium. Third, improved corporate governance leads to lower executive compensation and less information disclosure. An implication of the analysis for banks is that greater strategic information disclosure may increase the probability of bank runs—banks may choose to be opaque because transparency makes them fragile.