The aim of this paper is to develop an intersectoral price model in a social accounting matrix. Traditionally, the emphasis of the social accounting methodology has been on quantity oriented models and their income effects. In contrast, the authors use the social accounting matrix to develop a price model that captures the interdependence among activities, households, and factors and provides a complete set of accounting prices. Furthermore, they use decomposition techniques to trace underlying general equilibrium effects. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.

Abstract Examines the impact of product mix heterogeneity (PMH) on manufacturing overhead costs (MOHC) in three plants of a textile firm. Adaption of an approach for measuring PMH; Identification of seven forms of PMH for woven fabrics; Difficulties in establishing the relationship between variable MOHC and PMH using time series data.

Most discussions of corporate capital structure effectively assume that all debt is the same. Yet debt differs by maturity, covenant restrictions, conversion rights, call provisions, and priority. Here, the authors examine priority structure across a sample of 4995 COMPUSTAT industrial firms from 1981 to 1991. They analyze the variation in the use of capital leases, secured debt, ordinary debt, subordinated debt, and preferred stock both as a fraction of the firm's market value and as a fraction of total fixed claims. The authors' evidence provides consistent support for contracting cost hypotheses, mixed support for tax hypotheses, and little support for the signaling hypothesis.

The authors provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Their evidence offers strong support for the contracting-cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long-term debt in their capital structure. The authors find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. The authors find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.

ABSTRACT Most discussions of corporate capital structure effectively assume that all debt is the same. Yet debt differs by maturity, covenant restrictions, conversion rights, call provisions, and priority. Here, we examine priority structure across a sample of 4995 COMPUSTAT industrial firms from 1981 to 1991. We analyze the variation in the use of capital leases, secured debt, ordinary debt, subordinated debt, and preferred stock both as a fraction of the firm's market value and as a fraction of total fixed claims. Our evidence provides consistent support for contracting cost hypotheses, mixed support for tax hypotheses, and little support for the signaling hypothesis.

The authors provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Their evidence offers strong support for the contracting-cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long-term debt in their capital structure. The authors find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. The authors find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity. Copyright 1995 by American Finance Association.

ABSTRACT We provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Our evidence offers strong support for the contracting‐cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long‐term debt in their capital structure. We find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short‐term debt. We find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.

[Experienced auditors tend to structure their knowledge of financial statement errors with audit objective as the primary organizing dimension and transaction cycle as secondary. Yet, many audit tasks are structured in the opposite manner, requiring auditors to assess whether objectives are met for each transaction cycle. Our paper reports the results of an experiment which indicates that this mismatch between knowledge structure and task structure may hinder auditors' ability to draw on previous experiences when making conditional probability judgments and when allocating audit hours to various objectives within cycles. These results suggest one instance where knowledge structures that are often functional may have adverse effects when they do not match the task structure to which they are applied.]