ABSTRACT: Research in budgeting suggests that subordinates may exhibit economically significant degrees of honesty, in spite of pecuniary incentives to do otherwise. This study continues the exploration of honesty in budgeting along two dimensions. First, unlike prior experiments, we measure the incremental effect of honesty by manipulating whether budget requests are made in the form of a factual assertion. Second, prior designs may have emphasized the ethical dimension of budgeting by granting the subordinate wide discretion over setting the budget, whereas we manipulate whether the subordinate or the superior has final authority over setting the budget. We find that less slack is created when budget communication requires a factual assertion in the subordinate authority treatment, but not when the superior has final authority. Hence, we find an incremental effect of honesty only when the subordinate has final authority. We conjecture, and provide some evidence, that this is due to subordinates framing the superior authority situation as one of negotiation where each party acts in his or her self-interest, rather than as an ethical dilemma. This view, that budgeting is essentially devoid of ethical considerations, is consistent with some recent characterizations of budget practices.

We study how the use of judgment or “add-factors” in macroeconomic forecasting may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when agents learn using recursive methods. We examine the possibility of a new phenomenon, which we call exuberance equilibria, in the New Keynesian monetary policy framework. Inclusion of judgment in forecasts can lead to self-fulfilling fluctuations in a subset of the determinacy region. We study how policymakers can minimize the risk of exuberance equilibria. (JEL E17, E31, E52)

ABSTRACT We focus on public‐market investor participation to analyze the firm's decision to stay public or go private. The liquidity of public ownership is both a blessing and a curse: It lowers the cost of capital, but also introduces volatility in a firm's shareholder base, exposing management to uncertainty regarding shareholder intervention in management decisions, thereby affecting the manager's perceived decision‐making autonomy and curtailing managerial inputs. We extract predictions about how investor participation affects stock price level and volatility and the public firm's incentives to go private, providing a link between investor participation and firm participation in public markets.