An increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonus pay, commissions, or piece-rate contracts. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we show that compensation in performance-pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed and unobserved productive characteristics of workers than compensation in non-performance-pay jobs. We also find that the return to these productive characteristics increased faster over time in performance-pay than in non-performance-pay jobs. We show that this finding is consistent with the view that underlying changes in returns to skill due, for instance, to technological change induce more firms to offer performance-pay contracts and result in more wage inequality among workers who are paid for performance. Thus, performance pay provides a channel through which underlying changes in returns to skill get translated into higher wage inequality. We conclude that this channel accounts for 21% of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s and for most of the increase in wage inequality above the eightieth percentile over the same period.

The development of national accounts is one of the greatest innovations in economics. These accounts are the mainstay of macroeconomic analysis and economic policy and have been cited as one of the reasons for post-WWII stability in the United States and other developed economies. The national income and product accounts (NIPAs) in the United States and the national accounts of other countries were created in the aftermath of a major financial collapse and the Great Depression. However, they have focused on measuring growth and fluctuations in gross domestic product (GDP) or national income with limited linkages to financial flows and balance sheets. Despite the postwar explosion of theoretical, empirical, and policy work on the sources of economic growth, the national accounts have failed to develop integrated production accounts with inputs as well as outputs in current and constant prices. In addition, there has been little progress on linking national accounts to expanded measures of production. These would cover household production and the use of natural resources and the environment. Similarly, expanded measures of investment would cover R&D, intangibles, human capital, and other near-market goods and services. This paper presents a comprehensive and consistent macroeconomic framework, which we DATA WATCH: IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR THE US NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

The average cash-to-assets ratio for U.S. industrial firms more than doubles from 1980 to 2006. A measure of the economic importance of this increase is that at the end of the sample period, the average firm can retire all debt obligations with its cash holdings. Cash ratios increase because firms' cash flows become riskier. In addition, firms change: They hold fewer inventories and receivables and are increasingly R&D intensive. While the precautionary motive for cash holdings plays an important role in explaining the increase in cash ratios, we find no consistent evidence that agency conflicts contribute to the increase.

This paper provides evidence on the risk factors that are priced in bank equities. Alternative empirical models with precedent in the nonfinancial asset pricing literature are tested, including the single-factor CAPM, three-factor Fama–French model, and ICAPM. Our empirical results indicate that an unconditional two-factor ICAPM model that includes the stock market excess return and shocks to the slope of the yield curve is useful in explaining the cross-section of bank stock returns. However, we find no evidence that firm specific factors such as size and book-to-market ratios are priced in bank stock returns. These results have a number of important implications for the estimation of the banks’ cost of capital as well as regulatory initiatives to utilize market discipline to evaluate bank risk under Basel II.

ABSTRACT: We use experimental markets to examine stock-based compensation's impact on the objectivity of participants serving as audit committee members.We compare audit committee member reporting objectivity under three regimes: no stock-based compensation, stock-based compensation linked to current shareholders, and stock-based compensation linked to future shareholders. Our experiments show that student participants serving as audit committee members prefer biased reporting when compensated with stock-based compensation. Audit committee members compensated with current stock-based compensation prefer aggressive reporting, and audit committee members compensated with future stock-based compensation prefer overly conservative reporting. We find that audit committee members who do not receive stock-based compensation are the most objective. Our study suggests that stock-based compensation impacts audit committee member preferences for biased reporting, suggesting the need for additional research in this area.

We develop a model of audit production based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) using labor cost as input and hours spent on evidence-gathering activities that determine the level of assurance as output. Client characteristics are considered exogenous factors that affect audit production as a whole. We apply the model to a sample of U.S.-based engagements from an international accounting firm. Results indicate that a constrained DEA model using variable returns to scale is appropriate for modeling audit production. We find that audits are more efficient for clients that are larger, have a December year-end, and are highly automated. Audits are less efficient when the auditor relies on internal control, tax services are provided, and the client has subsidiaries. We also find that a well-specified regression-based production model can control for factors that influence auditor efficiency. Finally, we find that inefficiencies are impounded in fees for some industries and firm offices.

This manuscript is a “work of the United States Government ” within the meaning of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101. As such, the manuscript is not entitled to copyright protection, 17 U.S.C. § 105. Accordingly, the manuscript is in the public domain as a matter of law.

What caused the financial crisis that is sweeping across the world? What keeps asset prices and lending depressed? What can be done to remedy matters? While it is too early to arrive at definite answers to these questions, it is certainly time to offer informed conjectures, and these are the focus of this paper.

ABSTRACT: We test conjectures about the determinants of materiality judgments by examining a financial reporting choice made by firms that discover errors in prior years' financial statements. From late 2004 to mid-2006, more than 250 U.S. firms uncovered and corrected operating lease accounting errors either by formal restatement—required for errors deemed material—or by a less visible current-period “catch-up” adjustment. We test the role of materiality considerations outlined in SAB No. 99 as well as factors outside authoritative guidance in explaining the correction method chosen. Although both quantitative and qualitative materiality considerations cited in the guidance explain a large portion of the variation in firms' error correction decisions, we find that the prior actions of other firms also appear to play a major role. We also find that clerical considerations, but not strategic disclosure concerns, help explain cross-sectional variation in the timing of firms' error correction announcements.

ABSTRACT: This study examines whether peer reviews conducted under the AICPA's self-regulatory model have been effective at signaling audit quality. Prior research has examined whether peer-review reports are associated with perceived audit quality. We examine whether peer-review reports are associated with actual audit quality. Using a unique data set obtained from the files of an insurance company, we find that peer-review findings are indeed useful in predicting audit failure (i.e., malpractice claims alleging auditor negligence), and that certain types of findings are particularly useful in this regard. We also find that peer-review findings are associated with other firm-specific indicators of potentially weak quality control or risky practices within accounting firms. Taken together, we interpret our findings to indicate that self-regulated peer review as mandated by the AICPA does provide effective signals regarding audit-firm quality.