Most auithors have divided this number by the increase in doniestic production obtain the percenttage of growth in the sector accounted for, due to, or attributable to import substitution.2 Because of its narrow definition of imports, however, Clhenery's original approach misses much of what can be meaningfully considered as import substitution. In this paper we examine the nature of this bias and attempt correct it by expanding our concept of imports include the intermediate demands generated by import substitutioin. We then compare our measure one proposed by Chenery, Shuntaro Shishido, and Tsunehiko Watanabe which included intermediates in a rather different fashion. Finally, we present calculations for Brazil 1949-64 give some idea of the magnitude of the bias of the original Chenery measure for a semi-industrialized LDC. These results, together with a brief examination of import substitution in other countries, suggest that for long periods of industrialization and/or for international cross sections, import substitution measures which do not incorporate intermediate demwands can be very misleading even as descriptive tools.

Executive compensation, Employee stock option, Calculation, Option pricing model

The implications for portfolio behavior and asset prices of transaction costs are central to the analysis of numerous issues in economics. For example, questions involving the demand for the financial contracts issued by financial intermediaries are intimately tied to the existence of transaction costs. Thus the analysis of questions involving the nature of the demand for mutual fund shares, insurance contracts, mortgage loans, etc., and the form those contracts take require the explicit inclusion of transaction costs.

For corporations facing tax‐function convexity, hedging lowers expected tax liabilities, thereby providing an incentive to hedge. We use simulation methods to investigate convexity induced by tax‐code provisions. On average, the tax function is convex (although in approximately 25 percent of cases it is concave). Carrybacks and carryforwards increase the range of income with incentives to hedge; other tax‐code provisions have minor impacts. Among firms facing convex tax functions, average tax savings from a five percent reduction in the volatility of taxable income are about 5.4 percent of expected tax liabilities; in extreme cases, these savings exceed 40 percent.

For corporations facing tax‐function convexity, hedging lowers expected tax liabilities, thereby providing an incentive to hedge. We use simulation methods to investigate convexity induced by tax‐code provisions. On average, the tax function is convex (although in approximately 25 percent of cases it is concave). Carrybacks and carryforwards increase the range of income with incentives to hedge; other tax‐code provisions have minor impacts. Among firms facing convex tax functions, average tax savings from a five percent reduction in the volatility of taxable income are about 5.4 percent of expected tax liabilities; in extreme cases, these savings exceed 40 percent.

The authors provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Their evidence offers strong support for the contracting-cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long-term debt in their capital structure. The authors find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. The authors find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.

The authors provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Their evidence offers strong support for the contracting-cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long-term debt in their capital structure. The authors find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. The authors find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.

We provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Our evidence offers strong support for the contracting‐cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long‐term debt in their capital structure. We find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short‐term debt. We find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.