This study examines U.S. auditors' observations of the PCAOB inspection process, and its impact on their work, in order to understand the current U.S. regulatory audit climate. Using 20 interviews with experienced auditors, we consider behavioral factors (e.g., perceived power of and trust in the PCAOB) that can impact the level and form of auditor compliance according to theory from the slippery slope framework on audit regulation (Kirchler et al. 2008; Dowling et al. 2018). Our participants described an audit climate with a powerful regulator. They reported that their desire to receive “clean” inspection reports has had a substantial impact on audit procedures and quality control. However, our participants do not appear to have high trust in the PCAOB, as they questioned aspects of the inspection process and its expectations. Accordingly, we conclude that U.S. public company auditors operate in an antagonistic environment in which auditors perceive the PCAOB has high coercive power. In other words, they comply due to fear of enforcement rather than agreement with the PCAOB's views on audit quality. Some auditors also indicated that they consider both the costs and benefits of compliance. Theoretical intuition implies that any future increases to perceived costs relative to perceived benefits of compliance could ultimately decrease the PCAOB's coercive power and reduce U.S. auditor compliance. Our findings have implications for regulators and researchers interested in understanding behavioral factors that may influence regulatory compliance

Reported deficiencies continue to persist in audits of fair value measurements and other complex accounting estimates (hereafter, “FVMs”), despite improvements in auditor performance observed by regulators. The persistence of reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs suggests that factors underlying this trend may be more complicated and multidimensional than previously suggested by regulators and academic research, which has focused largely on auditors' unsatisfactory performance as the principal source of reported deficiencies. Drawing from the judgment and decision‐making expertise literature, we gather field‐based data from audit experts to identify additional factors that are likely to be contributing to differences of opinion between audit and inspection experts and the persistence of reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs. We find evidence that audit experts interpret standards and evaluate audit evidence differently than inspectors, and thus perceive there to be a gap between what auditors and inspectors regard as sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support audits of FVMs (hereafter, “FVM gap”). Moreover, results highlight several areas in audits of FVMs where differences of opinion exist between auditor and inspector experts regarding what constitutes a reported deficiency. Within the contexts we examine, our results identify additional factors, beyond deficient auditor performance, that may contribute to the FVM gap. We also report audit partners' recommendations for ways to reduce the FVM gap and suggest avenues for future research. Gaining a more complete understanding of sources contributing to reported deficiencies will help regulators, standard setters, audit firms, and academics to identify ways to reduce the FVM gap and reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs

Gatekeepers in financial markets have the power to provide the institutional stability, fortitude, and direction necessary for the development and the smooth functioning of capital markets. At the same time, they are often motivated by their own private incentives. This along with the tradeoffs they face, and the at‐times unintended consequences of the regulations they propose and enforce, can undermine their effectiveness. A thorough understanding of gatekeepers and their roles can thus illuminate academics, the financial community, and regulators on how such gatekeepers can be the most effective and generate the greatest benefits for capital markets. Since gatekeeping roles and the literature they have inspired encompass a wide array of institutions and agencies, our overview concentrates on those that the conference papers appearing in this volume focus on. We conclude that collectively, the papers contribute to significant progress, and point out some crucial areas that call for further investigation and offer opportunities for future research

We document intracity spatial persistence and its causes. Streetcars dominated urban transit in Los Angeles County from the 1890s to the early 1910s, and were off the road entirely by 1963. However, we find that streetcars' influence remains readily visible in the current pattern of urban density and that this influence has not dissipated in the sixty years since the streetcar's removal. We examine land use regulation as both a consequence of streetcars and a mechanism for the persistent effect of streetcars. Our evidence suggests that the streetcar influences modern behavior through the mutually reinforcing pathways of regulation and agglomerative clustering

In this paper, we examine the links among banking supervision, the volatility of financial flows, and economic growth. In particular, we explore whether banking regulation mitigates the adverse effects of capital flows volatility on economic growth. Using cross-country data over four decades, we find that banking supervision promotes economic growth by dampening the negative impact of volatile capital flows. The findings hold for both aggregate capital flows and its various components, and for both its net and gross counterparts, while they are also robust for various indicators of regulatory policies. The results support the argument that bank regulatory policy rules designed to ensure financial stability are beneficial to long-run economic growth

Using a sample of 625 microfinance institutions (MFI) across 40 countries from 2010 to 2015, we empirically examine the effect of buffer capital on the performance of MFIs and how this effect varies with loan portfolio quality. We find a negative relationship between buffer capital and MFIs’ performance. We further document that loan portfolio quality positively moderates the buffer capital-MFI performance relationship. We demonstrate that the buffer capital-loan portfolio quality relationship does not vary for deposit-taking, profit-making, and regulated MFIs. Our findings shed new light on the value relevance of capital in microfinance institutions. We use a novel approach to evaluate our results in light of the effects of omitted variable bias

We experimentally investigate how jargon affects investment willingness for investors with different industry knowledge, and whether such effects vary with good or bad jargon. We find that for investors without industry knowledge, jargon decreases investment willingness because it decreases understanding. However, for investors with some but low industry knowledge, jargon increases investment willingness because it increases perceived product premium. Such effects exist whether good or bad jargon is used. Finally, investors with high industry knowledge differentiate between good and bad jargon, and reduce investment willingness only when bad jargon is used. These findings have implications for regulators, managers, and investors

I provide evidence that loan loss accounting affects procyclical lending through its impact on regulatory actions. Regulators are more likely to place banks with inadequate loan loss allowances under enforcement actions that restrict lending, leading these banks to lend less during downturns. Further, I find that banks with lower regulatory ratings lend less when they have more timely provisions, consistent with research theorizing that timely provisions increase transparency and inhibit regulatory forbearance. This regulatory action mechanism expands on prior research that has focused on the effect of loan loss recognition on regulatory capital adequacy during economic downturns

UK companies have been making large contributions to reduce the deficits of their pension funds, and are believed to fund such contributions in part by reducing dividends. Using data from 2003 to 16, we find little evidence that large deficit-reduction contributions are associated with reductions in regular dividends, though we find some restraint in dividend increases and total payout. Most companies make large contributions when they have healthy cash flows and strong profitability, or inflows from disposals of assets. This suggests that the Pensions Regulator allows companies flexibility regarding the timing of contributions

Nearly 30% of US banks employ at least one board member who currently serves (or has previously served) the Federal Reserve in a public service role. Public service roles take the form of Federal Reserve directorships or memberships in Federal Reserve advisory councils. We show that connections between banks and the Federal Reserve are linked to decreases in the sensitivity of bank leverage to risk. Further, connected banks extract larger public subsidies by shifting risk to the financial safety-net. Jointly, our results suggest that interactions between banks and regulators reduce supervisory effectiveness