We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the agent's risk aversion, two factors that are typically associated with the severity of the moral hazard problem. However, the value of the information about agent type first increases but ultimately decreases in the severity of adverse selection. The decrease comes about because the means available to the principal to induce effort—namely, the pay–performance sensitivity—must also be used to sort/screen agents, and these two goals conflict. This decline in value occurs despite the monotonically increasing importance of the information in determining the principal's expected profits. Further, we show that the peak value of information occurs at a predictable level of adverse selection. These results imply that over some range, the importance of the information will be increasing, and the value of the information will be simultaneously decreasing, in the severity of adverse selection.

We hypothesize and empirically establish that economic preferences for risk-taking in different subnational regions affect firm financing costs. We study this hypothesis by hand-matching firms' regions worldwide with the corresponding regional economic risk-taking preferences. We first show that higher regional risk-taking is positively associated with several measures of firm risk and investments. Subsequently, our baseline results show that credit and bond pricing increase when risk-taking preferences increase. For the loan of average size and maturity a one-standard-deviation increase in regional risk-taking increases interest expense by $0.54 million USD. We also find that these results are demand (firm)-driven and stronger for firms with more local shareholders.

We introduce an estimator that measures factor exposures and alphas of individual private equity funds, with minimal assumptions about the fund return data-generating process (DGP). Simulations using varying assumptions about the DGP indicate that our estimator exhibits lower mean-squared-error (bias plus variance) than competing time-series estimators. Applying our model to a newly available commercial dataset, PitchBook, we uncover new findings of economic importance: buyout managers have higher average skill levels than claimed by past studies; portfolios are marked with forward-looking and lagged multiples of factors; and skill and systematic exposures vary significantly over time.

We test whether small US commercial banks that use a traditional business model are more likely to survive than nontraditional banks during both good and bad economic climates. Our concept of bank survival is derived from Stigler (1958) and includes any bank that does not fail or is not acquired. We define traditional banking by four hallmark characteristics: relationship loans, core deposit funding, revenue streams from traditional banking services, and physical bank branches. Banks that adhered more closely to this business strategy were an estimated 8 to 13 percentage points more likely to survive from 1997 to 2012 compared to other small banks using less traditional business strategies. This survival advantage approximately doubled during the financial crisis period.

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.

In questioning Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi’s (2003) finding of an economically and statistically significant seasonal affective disorder (SAD) effect, Kelly and Meschke (2010) make errors of commission and omission. They misrepresent their empirical results, claiming that the SAD effect arises due to a “mechanically induced” effect that is non-existent, labeling the SAD effect a “turn-of-year” effect (when in fact their models and ours separately control for turn-of-year effects), and ignoring coefficient-estimate patterns that strongly support the SAD effect. Our analysis of their data shows, even using their low-power statistical tests, there is significant international evidence supporting the SAD effect. Employing modern, panel/time-series statistical methods strengthens the case dramatically. Additionally, Kelly and Meschke represent the finance, psychology, and medical literatures in misleading ways, describing some findings as opposite to those reported by the researchers themselves, and choosing selective quotes that could easily lead readers to a distorted understanding of these findings.

We focus on market-making costs by examining the daily bid–ask spreads for off-the-run, one-month Treasury bills around two liquidity-changing events. Event one, Salomon Brothers’ supply shock, results in a roughly 2.5-basis-point increase in the spread because of an increase in ask prices; and event two, the Long-Term Capital Management demand shock, results in a doubling of the spread because of a decrease in bid prices. Our results provide a benchmark for researchers examining bid–ask spreads of securities that include a liquidity premium, a risk premium, and an asymmetric information premium.

This comment discusses some errors in a recent paper by Jacobsen and Marquering [Jacobsen, B., Marquering, W., 2008. Is it the weather? Journal of Banking and Finance 32 (4), 526–540], in which the authors challenge our previous finding that stock market returns exhibit seasonal patterns consistent with the influence of seasonal affective disorder on investor risk aversion. We find that we cannot replicate the authors’ findings, even after corresponding with them. Furthermore, we document several problems with their methodology, including misspecification of their economic model, misspecification of their econometric model, and use of inappropriate data. While we agree that seasonal affective disorder is not an explanation for all variation in equity markets, we do maintain that careful analysis leads to economically and statistically significant evidence of the effect we originally documented.

In this paper we develop a strongly stable (L-stable) and highly accurate method for pricing exotic options. The method is based on Padé schemes and also utilizes partial fraction decomposition to address issues regarding accuracy and computational efficiency. Due to non-smooth payoffs, which cause discontinuities in the solution (or its derivatives), standard A-stable methods are prone to produce large and spurious oscillations in the numerical solutions which would mislead to estimating options accurately. The proposed method does not suffer these drawbacks while being easy to implement on concurrent processors. Numerical results are presented for digital options, butterfly spread and barrier options in one and two assets. In addition, the methods are tested on the Heston stochastic volatility model.