For a “genuine” small open economy that has experienced both dictatorship and democracy, we find support for the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman (1994) “Protection for Sale” model. In contrast to previous studies, we use various protection measures (including tariffs, the direct measure of the theoretical model) and perform both single-year and panel regressions. Using Turkish industry-level data, the government's weight on welfare is estimated to be much larger than that on contributions. More importantly, we find that this weight is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship.

Richard J. Butler, James B. McDonald, Ray D. Nelson, Steven B. White, Robust and Partially Adaptive Estimation of Regression Models, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 72, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 321-327

Are market experts prone to heuristics, and do these heuristics transfer across buying and selling domains? We investigate this question using a unique data set of institutional investors with portfolios averaging $573 million. A striking finding emerges: While there is evidence of skill in buying, selling decisions underperform substantially, even relative to random‐selling strategies. This holds despite the similarity between the two decisions in frequency, substance, and consequences for performance. Evidence suggests an asymmetric allocation of cognitive resources such as attention can explain the discrepancy: We document a systematic, costly heuristic process for selling but not for buying.

We examine the relation between insiders’ investment horizon and the information content of their trades with respect to future stock returns. We conjecture that an insider's investment horizon establishes a benchmark for expected patterns of continued trading behavior and thus helps identify unexpected insider trades, which should be more informative in efficient markets. Consistent with this conjecture, the trades of short‐horizon insiders are both more unexpected and more informed, on average, than those of long‐horizon insiders. Short‐horizon insiders and their firms also tend to display characteristics that are associated with a greater focus on short‐termism.

We present a simple rational model to highlight the effect of investors' participation costs on the response of mutual fund flows to past fund performance. By incorporating participation costs into a model in which investors learn about managers' ability from past returns, we show that mutual funds with lower participation costs have a higher flow sensitivity to medium performance and a lower flow sensitivity to high performance than their higher‐cost peers. Using various fund characteristics as proxies for the reduction in participation costs, we provide empirical evidence supporting the model's implications for the asymmetric flow‐performance relationship.

This paper offers a model in which asset prices reflect both covariance risk and misperceptions of firms' prospects, and in which arbitrageurs trade against mispricing. In equilibrium, expected returns are linearly related to both risk and mispricing measures (e.g., fundamental/price ratios). With many securities, mispricing of idiosyncratic value components diminishes but systematic mispricing does not. The theory offers untested empirical implications about volume, volatility, fundamental/price ratios, and mean returns, and is consistent with several empirical findings. These include the ability of fundamental/price ratios and market value to forecast returns, and the domination of beta by these variables in some studies.

Complex disclosures have long been a major source of borrowers’ poor understanding of mortgages. We examine the effect of simplifying mortgage disclosures in a difference-in-differences design around a significant disclosure rule mandated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2015. We find that inexperienced borrowers (first-time home buyers) pay significantly lower interest rates after the disclosure regulation than experienced borrowers (repeat buyers), suggesting that simplifying these disclosures reduces mortgage interest costs. Additional tests show that the reduction in interest costs is not accompanied with more upfront noninterest costs paid by borrowers. Our cross-sectional analyses reveal two mechanisms through which simplifying disclosures lowers interest costs: curbing predatory lending and facilitating borrower shopping. We further find that disadvantaged borrowers (Black, Hispanic, and single female) benefit more from simplified disclosures. Last, we do not find that simplifying disclosures affects mortgage loan performance.

We examine whether cost structure influences tax-motivated income shifting. We predict and find that U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) with a less rigid cost structure engage in greater levels of tax-motivated income shifting relative to MNCs with a more rigid cost structure. This result is consistent with a less rigid cost structure providing greater flexibility to enable MNCs to take advantage of income-shifting opportunities. Further, we find that this relation is more pronounced when firms face greater costs in adjusting their operations, have less transfer pricing flexibility, and operate in a more uncertain environment. These results suggest that firms with less rigid cost structures possess the strategic operating and accounting flexibility necessary to take advantage of income-shifting opportunities. We provide evidence suggesting that a firm’s cost structure, a fundamental attribute of a firm’s business model, is a distinct and incrementally important determinant of tax-motivated income shifting. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available.

Based on prospect theory's value function, we predict how reference points adapt to influence individuals' tax evasion choices during and after experiencing temporary tax changes. Results from a multi-round experiment indicate reactions to temporary changes depend jointly on the direction of the change and expectations. Specifically, individuals experiencing a tax increase evade more while the increase is in effect. More interestingly, knowing, versus not knowing, a tax decrease is temporary prevents an increase in evasion after the temporary change expires, and may lead individuals to reduce evasion during the change. In a supplemental condition, we induce uncertainty by repeatedly extending a tax decrease. We find when uncertainty is introduced, both benefits of knowing the temporal nature of the decrease are lost. Overall results are consistent with individuals failing to adapt to a loss state and adapting quickly to a gain state unless they are certain the gain state is temporary.