Audit standards require auditors to conduct fraud brainstorming sessions on every audit. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has raised concerns about auditors’ fraud judgments and the quality of their brainstorming sessions. We develop a measure of brainstorming quality to examine how it affects auditors’ fraud decision-making processes. We test our measure using field survey data of auditors’ actual brainstorming sessions for 179 audit engagements. Respondents report considerable variation in the quality of brainstorming in practice. We find some evidence that high-quality brainstorming improves the relations between fraud risk factors and fraud risk assessments. We also determine that brainstorming quality positively moderates the relations between fraud risk assessments and fraud-related testing. Our results suggest that the benefits of brainstorming do not apply uniformly, because low-quality sessions likely incur the costs of such interactions without receiving the attendant benefits. By documenting best practices from high-quality brainstorming sessions, our findings can inform auditors on how to improve their consideration of fraud.

We investigate why firms choose to evaluate a tax department as a profit center (“contributor to the bottom line”) as opposed to as a cost center and the association between this choice and effective tax rates (ETRs). Using data from a confidential survey taken in 1999 of Chief Financial Officers, we develop and test a theory for choosing between these two methods of evaluating a tax department. We find that the likelihood of evaluating the tax department as a profit center is increasing in firm decentralization characteristics and tax-planning opportunities. We then employ instrumental variables to investigate whether evaluating a tax department as a profit center provides an effective incentive for the tax department to contribute to net income through lower ETRs. We find that our instrument for profit center firms is associated with significantly lower ETRs than cost center firms.

We analyze a sample of 330 firms making unaudited disclosures required by Section 302 and 383 firms making audited disclosures required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We find that Section 302 disclosures are associated with negative announcement abnormal returns of −1.8 percent, and that firms experience an abnormal increase in equity cost of capital of 68 basis points. We conclude that Section 302 disclosures are informative and point to lower credibility of disclosing firms' financial reporting. In contrast, we find that Section 404 disclosures have no noticeable impact on stock prices or firms' cost of capital. Further, we find that auditor quality attenuates the negative response to Section 302 disclosures and that accelerated filers—larger firms required to file under Section 404—have significantly less negative returns (−1.10 percent) than non-accelerated filers (−4.22 percent). The findings have implications for the debate about whether to implement a scaled securities regulation system for smaller public companies: material weakness disclosures are more informative for smaller firms that likely have higher pre-disclosure information uncertainty.

We find that equity returns associated with credit risk changes are attenuated by the debt value effect of the credit risk changes, as Merton (1974) predicts. We find that the relation between credit risk changes and equity returns is significantly less negative for firms with more debt—controlling for asset value changes, credit risk increases (decreases) are associated with equity value increases (decreases). This result obtains across credit risk levels. The relation is associated with changes in both expected cash flows and systematic risk, as reflected in analyst earnings forecasts and equity cost of capital. By inverting the Merton (1974) model, we provide descriptive evidence that if unrecognized debt value changes were recognized in income, but not unrecognized asset value changes, most credit upgrade (downgrade) firms would recognize lower (higher) income. These potentially counterintuitive income effects primarily are attributable to incomplete recognition of contemporaneous asset value changes. However, for a substantial majority of downgrade firms we find that recognized asset write-downs exceed unrecognized gains from debt value decreases. This mitigates concerns that income effects from recognizing changes in debt values would be anomalous for such firms.

We investigate the risk relevance of the standard deviation of three performance measures: net income, comprehensive income, and a constructed measure of full-fair-value income for a sample of 202 U.S. commercial banks from 1996 to 2004. We find that, for the average sample bank, the volatility of full-fair-value income is more than three times that of comprehensive income and more than five times that of net income. We find that the incremental volatility in full-fair-value income (beyond the volatility of net income and comprehensive income) is positively related to marketmodel beta, the standard deviation in stock returns, and long-term interest-rate beta. Further, we predict and find that the incremental volatility in full-fair-value income (1) negatively moderates the relation between abnormal earnings and banks' share prices and (2) positively affects the expected return implicit in bank share prices. Our findings suggest full-fair-value income volatility reflects elements of risk that are not captured by volatility in net income or comprehensive income, and relates more closely to capital-market pricing of that risk than either net-income volatility or comprehensiveincome volatility.

We examine how fair-value-income measurement affects commercial bank equity analysts' risk and value judgments. Normatively, holding information and other underlying economics constant, bank analysts' risk and valuation assessments should distinguish between banks with different risks, but should not depend on how banks measure income. In our experiment, we vary income measurement—full-fair-value (all fair-value changes recognized in income) versus piecemeal-fair-value (some fair-value changes recognized in income, others disclosed in the notes). We also vary interest-rate-risk exposure (exposed versus hedged). We find that bank analysts' risk and value judgments distinguish banks' exposure to interest-rate risk only under full-fair-value-income measurement. Our evidence contributes to research concerned with financial performance reporting, risk, and fair-value accounting by demonstrating that differences in income measurement affect fundamental judgments of specialist analysts. Our findings are striking because they: (1) point toward an important role for measurement and recognition of fair-value gains and losses in income, and (2) suggest that note disclosure is not a substitute for financial-statement recognition (even for professional analysts specializing in banks and working in a context that involves assessment of core operations of a bank). These results should be of interest to accounting standard setters as they evaluate whether to require full-fair-value-income measurement.

This study examines how different types of performance measures were weighted in a subjective balanced scorecard bonus plan adopted by a major financial services firm. Drawing upon economic and psychological studies on performance evaluation and compensation criteria, we develop hypotheses regarding the weights placed on different types of measures. We find that the subjectivity in the scorecard plan allowed superiors to reduce the “balance” in bonus awards by placing most of the weight on financial measures, to incorporate factors other than the scorecard measures in performance evaluations, to change evaluation criteria from quarter to quarter, to ignore measures that were predictive of future financial performance, and to weight measures that were not predictive of desired results. This evidence suggests that psychology-based explanations may be equally or more relevant than economicsbased explanations in explaining the firm's measurement practices. The high level of subjectivity in the balanced scorecard plan led many branch managers to complain about favoritism in bonus awards and uncertainty in the criteria being used to determine rewards. The system ultimately was abandoned in favor of a formulaic bonus plan based solely on revenues.

This paper examines the factors influencing the relative weights placed on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus con- tracts. We find that the use of non-financial measures increases with the level of regulation, the extent to which the firm follows an innovation-oriented strategy, the adoption of strategic quality initiatives, and the noise in financial measures. We find no evidence that the choice of performance measures in bonus contracts is associated with the level of financial distress or the value of CEO equity holdings relative to salary and bonus. Our results also provide no support for the hypothesis that CEOs with greater influence over the board of directors are more likely to be compensated based on non-financial measures.

Using the geographic location data of 218,554 commercial bank branches in China, we find that an increasing number of bank branches in the vicinity of enterprises, namely bank competition, leads to higher corporate employment, particularly for non-SOEs and SOEs with less government influence. Channel analyses reveal that better access to banking facilitates information extraction and eases credit constraints for surrounding firms, which thus increases labor investment. In addition, fintech development moderates the positive effect of bank competition on corporate employment. An exogenous policy shock as well as two instrumental variables, are used to correct for endogeneity and our results remain consistent. The findings are also robust to alternative samples, proxies, and different fixed effects. Further analyses show that bank competition improves firms’ labor investment efficiency and upgrades their employment structures. Lastly, increased employment improves the firm performance of non-SOEs.

Experimental research in behavioral economics focuses on consumer behaviors. Similar experimental research on profit-maximizing producers is rare. In three field experiments involving commercial agricultural producers in the United States, we detect evidence of anchoring in competitive auctions for conservation contracts related to nutrient and pest management that were worth, on average, nearly $9,000. In these auctions, the value of the starting cost-share bid was randomized to be either 0% or 100%. When the starting value was 100%, final bids were 46% higher, on average. We find weak evidence that experience with conservation contracts may modestly attenuate the anchoring effect.