We examine the relation between the use of collateral and financial reporting conservatism for a sample of Chinese firms. In the absence of flexibility in risk pricing through interest rates and strong contract enforcement in China, we find that lenders reduce collateral requirements from more conservative borrowers and that this negative relation is significantly moderated by borrowers’ poor credit quality and low asset tangibility. Our finding that conservatism can result in a tangible benefit in the form of lower collateral requirements indicates that lenders value financial reporting conservatism. However, the benefit from financial reporting conservatism is muted as lenders become more concerned about borrowers’ default risk or ability to pledge tangible assets as collateral against loans.

We highlight a lesser-known consequence of China’s integration into the world economy: the rise of services trade. We demonstrate how the United States’ trade deficit in goods cycles back as a surplus in U.S. exports of education services. Focusing on China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, we show that Chinese cities more exposed to trade liberalization sent more students to U.S. universities. Growth in housing income and wealth allowed Chinese families to afford U.S. tuition, and more students financed their studies using personal funds. Our estimates suggest that recent trade wars could cost U.S. universities around $1.1 billion in annual tuition revenue.

We present a new method for solving asset pricing models, which yields an analytic price-dividend function of one state variable. To illustrate our method we give a detailed analysis of Abel's asset pricing model. A function is analytic in an open interval if it can be represented as a convergent power series near every point of that interval. In addition to allowing us to solve for the exact equilibrium price-dividend function, the analyticity property also lets us assess the accuracy of any numerical solution procedure used in the asset pricing literature. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.

This study considers the effects of the relative size of hedger and speculator open interests and the potential impact of implementing position limits on the price discovery process in both JPY–USD and EUR–USD futures markets. Hedging trading exerts a negative impact, regardless of its size, on price discovery in futures markets. Hedgers are less likely to be information motivated, so their trading uniformly delays the price discovery process. However, there is a positive and nonlinear impact of speculators’ trade size on price discovery, the contribution of which depends on the relative size of the speculative open interest. Contrary to conventional wisdom among regulators, speculative trading does not harm the market in terms of market efficiency; as long as the percentage of speculators’ open interest is below an endogenously determined threshold (approximately 20% for EUR–USD and 16.3% for JPY–USD), speculative trading even improves futures market efficiency.

Stock price increases associated with addition to the S&P 500 Index have been interpreted as evidence that demand curves for stocks slope downward. A key premise underlying this interpretation is that Index inclusion provides no new information about companies' future prospects. We examine this premise by analyzing analysts' earnings per share (eps) forecasts around Index inclusion and by comparing postinclusion realized earnings to preinclusion forecasts. Relative to benchmark companies, companies newly added to the Index experience significant increases in eps forecasts and significant improvements in realized earnings. These results indicate that S&P Index inclusion is not an information‐free event.

To deter financial misstatements, many companies have recently adopted compensation recovery policies—commonly known as ‘‘clawbacks’’—that authorize the board to recoup compensation paid to executives based on misstated financial reports. Clawbacks have been shown to reduce financial misstatements and increase investors’ confidence on earnings information. We show that the benefits come with an unintended consequence of certain firms substituting for accruals management with real transactions management (e.g., reduce research and development [R&D] expenditures), especially firms with strong incentives to achieve short-term earnings targets, such as firms with high growth or high transient institutional ownership. As such, the total amount of earnings management does not decrease subsequent to clawback adoption. We further show that although real transactions management temporarily boosts those clawback adopters’ short-term profitability and stock performance, this trend reverses after three years. In summary, clawbacks may have unexpected effects for a subset of firms whose managers are under greater pressure to meet earnings goals.

ABSTRACT We examine how managers' ethnic cultural background affects their communication with investors. Using earnings conference calls with executives from 42 countries, we find that managers from ethnic groups that have a more individualistic culture use a more optimistic tone and exhibit greater self-reference. Managers' ethnic culture has a lasting effect and persists for executives whose work experience later exposes them to different ethnic cultures. The effect of ethnic heritage is observed in dialogues that reflect real-time interactions (i.e., Q&A ) and is less pronounced in the scripted, less spontaneous portion of the calls (i.e., management discussion). Analysts respond positively to optimistic tone, but only those who share the manager's ethnic background adjust their earnings forecasts for the cultural component of managerial tone. The findings suggest that managers' ethnic background has a significant effect on how they communicate with the capital market and how the market responds to the disclosure.

ABSTRACT This paper empirically examines the interactive effect of competition intensity and competition type on the use of customer satisfaction measures in executives' annual bonus contracts. Specifically, we predict a stronger association between competition intensity in an industry and the use of customer satisfaction measures in executives' annual bonus contracts when the competition is non-price-based than when the competition is price-based. Using hand-collected data from Standard & Poor's (S&P) 1500 firms' disclosures of the use of customer satisfaction measures in executive bonus contracts in 2006 and 2010 proxy statements, we find results consistent with our prediction. Our results are robust to alternative measures of competition type and competition intensity. We also find similar results when we use the weight on customer satisfaction measures in executive bonus contracts as the dependent variable. Our study extends the literature on the effect of competition on the design of managerial incentives by distinguishing between competition intensity and competition type, and providing the first large-sample empirical evidence on the joint effect of these two dimensions of competition on the incentive use of an important nonfinancial performance measure. Data Availability: Data used in this study are obtained from publicly available sources.

This paper develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model of payments to study the impact of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on intermediation of private banks. If banks have market power in the deposit market, a CBDC can enhance competition, raising the deposit rate, expanding intermediation, and increasing output. A calibration to the US economy suggests that a CBDC can raise bank lending by 1.57% and output by 0.19%. These crowding-in effects remain robust, albeit with smaller magnitudes, after taking into account endogenous bank entry. We also assess the role of a non-interest-bearing CBDC as the use of cash declines.

Open banking (OB) empowers bank customers to share their financial transaction data with fintechs and other banks. New cross-country data shows 49 countries adopted OB policies, privacy preferences predict policy adoption, and adoption spurs fintech entry. UK microdata shows that OB enables: (i) consumers to access both financial advice and credit; (ii) SMEs to establish new lending relationships. In a calibrated model, OB universally improves welfare through entry and product improvements when used for advice. When used for credit, OB promotes entry and competition by reducing adverse selection, but higher prices for costlier or privacy-conscious consumers partially offset these benefits.