Complex disclosures have long been a major source of borrowers’ poor understanding of mortgages. We examine the effect of simplifying mortgage disclosures in a difference-in-differences design around a significant disclosure rule mandated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2015. We find that inexperienced borrowers (first-time home buyers) pay significantly lower interest rates after the disclosure regulation than experienced borrowers (repeat buyers), suggesting that simplifying these disclosures reduces mortgage interest costs. Additional tests show that the reduction in interest costs is not accompanied with more upfront noninterest costs paid by borrowers. Our cross-sectional analyses reveal two mechanisms through which simplifying disclosures lowers interest costs: curbing predatory lending and facilitating borrower shopping. We further find that disadvantaged borrowers (Black, Hispanic, and single female) benefit more from simplified disclosures. Last, we do not find that simplifying disclosures affects mortgage loan performance.

We investigate the joint effects of auditors' reporting choice and audit committee effectiveness on management disclosures about complex estimates. A new PCAOB standard requires auditors to report on Critical Audit Matters (CAMs): issues “communicated or required to be communicated to the audit committee” about accounts or disclosures that (1) “are material to the financial statements,” and (2) “involved especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment” (PCAOB 2017a, 11). Consistent with investor arguments, we find that audit committee effectiveness and more detailed CAM reporting encourage managers' disclosures of the risk underlying complex estimates. When the auditor's report is more informative about a complex estimate and the audit committee is more effective, management's related financial disclosures are more forthcoming. However, less informative auditor disclosures or more effective audit committees alone do not prompt greater management disclosure. Thus, expanded auditor reporting and more effective audit committees, together, can enhance the disclosures investors value.

We study how home-market reporting requirements and listing choices associate with ongoing SEC disclosures by foreign firms and the investor response. The SEC defers material event and interim financial disclosure obligations to foreign firms' home-market regulator or exchange. We find that a growing number of foreign firms incorporate in disclosure havens and have few or no event-driven disclosure obligations. These firms furnish fewer 6-K disclosures, but experience greater investor interest and market response to each filing. There is little evidence that the SEC substitutes for lower information flow with additional monitoring. Our results indicate that the SEC's one-size-fits-all approach to foreign firm disclosure has led to increasing disparity in information flow, despite the strong demand for and reaction to disclosures by firms from weaker regimes.