Periodic demand forecasts are the primary planning and coordination mechanism within organizations. Because most demand forecasts incorporate human judgment, they are subject to both unintentional error and intentional opportunistic bias. We examine whether a disaggregation of the forecast into various sources of demand reduces forecast error and bias. Using proprietary data from a manufacturing organization, we find that absolute demand forecast error declines following the implementation of a disaggregated forecast system. We also find a favorable effect of forecast disaggregation on finished goods inventory without a corresponding increase in costly production plan changes. We further document a decline in positive forecast bias, except for products whose production is limited owing to scarce production resources. This implies that disaggregation alone is not sufficient to overcome heightened incentives of self-interested sales managers to positively bias the forecast for the very products that an organization would like to avoid tying up in inventory. Data Availability: Data are the property of the research partner and may not be redistributed by the authors.

Prior research finds that unrealized gains/losses on cash flow hedges are negatively associated with future earnings, and that investors and analysts fail to anticipate this association. These studies speculate that this mispricing is due to either poor derivatives disclosures or the accounting model for cash flow hedges. We examine whether enhanced mandatory derivatives disclosures set forth in FAS 161 improve users' understanding of firms' hedging activities and offer three main findings. First, we find that this mispricing does not persist after FAS 161. Second, we find that the correction of mispricing is greatest when disclosure might help investors most. Finally, we find that analyst forecast accuracy improves after FAS 161. Overall, our results suggest that the enhanced mandatory derivative disclosures required by FAS 161 improved users' understanding of the effects of derivative and hedging activities on future firm performance and firm value—and consequently mitigated investor mispricing.

This study evaluates the impact of earnings on credit risk in the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market using levels, changes, and event study analyses. We find that earnings (cash flows, accruals) of reference firms are negatively and significantly correlated with the level of CDS premia, consistent with earnings (cash flows, accruals) conveying information about default risk. Based on the changes analysis, a 1 percent increase in ROA decreases CDS rates significantly by about 5 percent. We also find that (1) CDS premia are more highly correlated with below-median earnings than with above-median earnings and (2) CDS premia are more highly correlated with earnings of low-rated firms than with earnings of high-rated firms. Evidence indicates further that short-window earnings surprises are negatively and significantly correlated with CDS premia changes in the three-day window surrounding the preliminary earnings announcement, although the impact is concentrated in the shorter maturities.

Using the Vuolteenaho (2002) variance decomposition methodology, this study assesses the relative value relevance of cash flow, accrual, and expected return news on SEC and preliminary earnings filing dates, as measured by their contribution to the volatility of unexpected returns. Cash flow news is found to be more valuerelevant than accrual news. Although expected return (risk) news is the least valuerelevant, it is significantly correlated with changes in betas and returns at the preliminary and SEC filing dates, indicating association with changes in firm risk and discount rates. This study also documents that these informational components contain less (more) value-relevant information at the SEC filing date for firms with a higher proportion of long-term (short-term) sophisticated investors after controlling for other dimensions of the information environment.

We analyze a sample of firms accused of fraudulently overstating their earnings and examine the extent, if any, to which they paid additional income taxes on the allegedly fraudulent earnings. Based on restatements of current tax expense adjusted for the tax benefits of stock options, the evidence indicates that many firms included the overstated financial accounting income on their tax returns, thus overpaying their taxes in the process of inflating their accounting earnings. We estimate that the median firm sacrificed eight cents in additional income taxes per dollar of inflated pretax earnings. In aggregate, we estimate that the firms in our sample paid $320 million in taxes on overstated earnings of about $3.36 billion. These results indicate how far managers of firms are willing to go when allegedly inflating earnings.

The article focuses on a report of the Committee on Establishment of an Accounting Commission. The charge to this committee, as formulated by the American Accounting Association Executive Committee at its August 1970 meeting, is to consider the feasibility and desirability of establishing a Commission to study and recommend an organizational structure for advancing the formulation and modification of generally accepted accounting principles and the issuance of authoritative pronouncements concerning the application of such principles. If the committee recommends that such a Commission should be formed, the committee also should recommend the objectives, method of selecting members, and means of financing the work of the Commission. At the present time, accounting principles are formulated largely by the Accounting Principles Board. Inevitably, therefore, any dissatisfaction with methods of formulating principles is tantamount to dissatisfaction with the Board. High on its agenda for 1971 are other problems which currently obscure the effective disclosure of financial performance, such as the treatment of inter-corporate investments, financial reporting by diversified companies and others.

In connection with its continuing study of the concrete meaning of "business entity," the Committee on Concepts and Standards of the American Accounting Association has selected the area of consolidated financial statements as one of importance. The basic principles of consolidated financial statements include that firstly, in the absence of special circumstances, consolidated statements are useful representations of financial position and results of operations when a dominant central financial interest in two or more companies exists and is accompanied by administrative control of their activities and resources. Secondly, in so far as practicable, the consolidated data should reflect the underlying assumption that they represent the operations, resources, and equities of a single entity. The first principle is a statement of policy, of objective, defining broadly the entity or area of consolidation, the second principle sets forth a general guide to the procedures of consolidation.

Oligopoly models of price competition predict that strategic firms exercise market power and generate inefficiencies. However, heterogeneity in firms’ strategic ability also generates inefficiencies. We study the Texas electricity market where firms exhibit significant heterogeneity in how they deviate from Nash equilibrium bidding. These deviations, in turn, increase the cost of production. To explain this heterogeneity, we embed a cognitive hierarchy model into a structural model of bidding and estimate firms’ strategic sophistication. We find that firm size and manager education affect sophistication. Using the model, we show that mergers which increase sophistication can increase efficiency despite increasing market concentration.

In the US Senate, roll calls are held in alphabetical order. We document that senators early in the order are less likely to vote with the majority of their own party than those whose last name places them at the end of the alphabet. To speak to the mechanism behind this result, we develop a simple model of sequential voting, in which forward-looking senators rely on backward induction in order to free ride on their colleagues. Estimating our model structurally, we find that this form of strategic behavior is an important part of equilibrium play. We also consider, but ultimately dismiss, alternative explanations related to learning about common values and vote buying.

Medicare's prospective payment system for long-term acute-care hospitals (LTCHs) provides modest reimbursements at the beginning of a patient's stay before jumping discontinuously to a large lump-sum payment after a prespecified number of days. We show that LTCHs respond to the financial incentives of this system by disproportionately discharging patients after they cross the large-payment threshold. We find this occurs more often at for-profit facilities, facilities acquired by leading LTCH chains, and facilities colocated with other hospitals. Using a dynamic structural model, we evaluate counterfactual payment policies that would provide substantial savings for Medicare.