This paper examines the interaction between default risk and interest-rate risk in determining the term structure of credit default swap spreads at different industry sectors and credit-rating classes. The paper starts with a parsimonious three-factor interest-rate dynamic term structure and projects the credit spread at each industry sector and rating class to these interest-rate factors while also allowing the projection residual dynamics to depend on the level of the interest-rate factors. Estimation shows that credit risk exhibits intricate dynamic interactions with the interest-rate factors

Does the ability of suppliers of corporate debt capital to hedge risk through credit default swap (CDS) contracts impact firms' capital structures? We find that firms with traded CDS contracts on their debt are able to maintain higher leverage ratios and longer debt maturities. This is especially true during periods in which credit constraints become binding, as would be expected if the ability to hedge helps alleviate frictions on the supply side of credit markets. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press

Leverage represents both a fundamental component of equity volatility and a long-run selection variable. Based on this premise, we investigate the influence of leverage on the long-run cross-sectional predictability of future realized equity volatility. Leverage makes equity volatility significantly less predictable than underlying firm asset volatility, a result that is robust to different predictors of future realized volatility: credit default swap implied, historical, and option implied volatility. A simple model of optimal capital structure, wherein companies maximize tax benefits subject to a common maximum default probability (minimum credit rating) target, helps explain this finding

Corporate bond mutual funds increased their selling of credit protection in the credit default swaps (CDS) market during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This trading activity was primarily in multi-name CDS, greater among larger and established funds, and directed toward counterparty dealers in financial distress. Funds that sold credit protection during the crisis experienced greater credit market risk and superior post-crisis performance, consistent with higher expected returns from liquidity provision. Funds using Lehman Brothers as a counterparty experienced abnormal outflows and returns of –2% immediately following Lehman's bankruptcy, suggesting that funds’ opportunistic trading in CDS exposed investors to counterparty risk

Prices observed in the European sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market have severely increased since the beginning of the financial crisis. We document that the state of a country’s financial system and, since the beginning of the crisis, also the state of the world financial system have strong explanatory power for the behavior of CDS spreads, and the magnitude of this impact depends on the importance of a country’s financial system pre-crisis. Furthermore, Economic and Monetary Union member countries exhibit higher sensitivities to the health of the financial system. Our results suggest the presence of a private-to-public risk transfer through which market participants incorporate their expectations about financial industry bailouts

Under standard assumptions the reduced-form credit risk model is not capable of accurately pricing the two fundamental credit risk instruments – bonds and credit default swaps (CDS) – simultaneously. Using a data set of euro-denominated corporate bonds and CDS our paper quantifies this mispricing by calibrating such a model to bond data, and subsequently using it to price CDS, resulting in model CDS spreads up to 50% lower on average than observed in the market. An extended model is presented which includes the delivery option implicit in CDS contracts emerging since a basket of bonds is deliverable in default. By using a constant recovery rate standard models assume equal recoveries for all bonds and hence zero value for the delivery option. Contradicting this common assumption, case studies of Chapter 11 filings presented in the paper show that corporate bonds do not necessarily trade at equal levels following default. Our extension models the implied expected recovery rate of the cheapest-to-deliver bond and, applied to data, largely eliminates the mispricing. Calibrated recovery values lie between 8% and 47% for different obligors, exhibiting strong variation among rating classes and industries. A cross-sectional analysis reveals that the implied recovery parameter depends on proxies for the delivery option, primarily the number of available bonds and bond pricing errors. No evidence is found for a direct influence of the bid-ask spread, notional amount, coupon, or rating used as proxies for bond market liquidity

We develop a framework to analyse the credit default swap (CDS) market as a network of risk transfers among counterparties. From a theoretical perspective, we introduce the notion of flow-of-risk and provide sufficient conditions for a bow-tie network architecture to endogenously emerge as a result of intermediation. This architecture shows three distinct sets of counterparties: (i) Ultimate Risk Sellers (URS), (ii) Dealers (indirectly connected to each other), (iii) Ultimate Risk Buyers (URB). We show that the probability of widespread distress due to counterparty risk is higher in a bow-tie architecture than in more fragmented network structures. Empirically, we analyse a unique global dataset of bilateral CDS exposures on major sovereign and financial reference entities in 2011–2014. We find the presence of a bow-tie network architecture consistently across both reference entities and time, and that the flow-of-risk originates from a large number of URSs (e.g. hedge funds) and ends up in a few leading URBs, most of which are non-banks (in particular asset managers). Finally, the analysis of the CDS portfolio composition of the URBs shows a high level of concentration: in particular, the top URBs often show large exposures to potentially correlated reference entities

This article provides evidence that equity returns lead credit protection returns at daily and weekly frequencies, whereas credit protection returns do not lead equity returns. Our results indicate that informed traders are primarily active in the equity market rather than the credit default swap (CDS) market. These findings are consistent with standard theories of market selection by informed traders in which market selection is determined partially by transaction costs. We also find that credit protection returns respond more quickly during salient news events (earnings announcements) compared to days with similar equity returns and turnover. This evidence provides support for explanations related to investor inattention

Rather than assuming a fixed recovery rate in estimation, we estimate recovery rates from credit default swap spreads, using 3 years of daily data on 152 corporations. We use a quadratic pricing model, which ensures nonnegative default probabilities and recovery rates. The estimated cross section of recovery rates is plausible, with an average recovery rate of 54% and substantial cross-sectional variation. Estimated 5-year default probabilities are on average 67% higher than default probabilities obtained using the standard 40% recovery assumption. This finding critically impacts the valuation of structured credit products. Larger firms and firms with more tangible assets have higher recovery rates

How do markets for debt cash flow rights, with and without accompanying control rights, affect the efficiency of lending? A bank makes a loan, learns if it needs monitoring, and then decides whether to lay off credit risk. The bank can transfer credit risk by either selling the loan or buying a credit default swap (CDS). With a CDS, the originating bank retains the loan's control rights; with loan sales, control rights pass to the loan buyer. Credit risk transfer leads to excessive monitoring of riskier credits and insufficient monitoring of safer credits. Increases in banks' cost of equity capital exacerbate these effects. For riskier credits, loan sales typically dominate CDS but not for safer credits. Once repeated lending and consequent reputation concerns are modeled, although CDSs remain dominated by loan sales for riskier credits, for safer credits they can dominate loan sales, supporting better monitoring (albeit to a limited extent) while allowing efficient risk sharing. Restrictions on the bank's ability to sell the loan expand the range in which CDSs are used and monitoring is too low