In a recent article in this Review, Stephen Ross and Michael Wachter (R-W) have argued that in an economy consisting of a competitive sector and a partially noncompetitive sector, there should be a positive relationship between the long-run unemployment rate and the long-run inflation rate if that inflation rate is positive, and a negative relationship if the inflation rate is negative. The purposes of this comment are: 1) to point out that this relationship is not the necessary result of the introduction of noncompetitive elements as is claimed by the authors, but depends instead upon the rather curious use of the planning horizon attributed to the R-W noncompetitive firms; and 2) the model faces serious problems with regard to the existence and attainment of stable equilibrium and the congruence of its predictions with past experience. R-W construct an economy consisting of two sectors. The competitive sector is characterized by nominal wages and prices which can continuously change and a real wage which is fixed. Firms in the noncompetitive sector are capable of changing wages wa and prices pa independently but choose to do so only at regular intervals. Given the perceived market structure facing the noncompetitive firms a choice of

Under the assumption of single peaked preferences, the majority rule equilibrium considered as a correspondence from the voters' preference is shown to be continuous. We also complement the work of Fishburn [6], who first presented a general location theorem for majority rule equilibriums, by dropping the assumptions that the alternative set is finite and that voters' preferences are strict partial orders. SINCE THE WORK of Black [3] on simple majorities and single-peaked preferences, much work has been done in deriving conditions for which some state achieves a majority over all other states. It is also well known that the equilibrium in many cases is the median of the distribution of most preferred states of the voters. (See [3, pp. 14-18].) We present here a result concerning the continuity of the majority rule equilibria. Specifically, we show that in the case of single-peaked preferences, the majority rule equilibrium depends only on the peaks of the voters' preferences and not on the transitivity properties of these preferences. We then show that the equilibrium, viewed as a correspondence of these peaks, is continuous (i.e., both upper and lower semicontinuous). This result is especially important when one tries to prove the existence of an equilibrium in a political-economic system. Most existence theorems are based on fixed point theorems which require at least upper semicontinuity of the correspondences being studied. The theorem proved here shows that the majority rule equilibrium is continuous in voters' peaks. If these are in turn continuous functions of other parameters such as prices, then our result might aid one in deriving general existence theorems for social equilibria. (See [3 or 4].) The only related work seems to be that of Kelly [10] who investigates the existence of a continuous numerical representation of the social preference relation generated by majority rule. He shows that one cannot expect continuity even if the social preference relation has other properties, such as transitivity. Specifically, he presents a case in which a majority of voters are indifferent between two points. In a neighborhood of one of these points, this majority rules between points in the neighborhood and the other point, but a minority (since the majority is indifferent) rules between the two given points. Hence one cannot expect continuity of the

The problem of allocating a fixed set of time-phased investment allowances among competing investment projects and proposals has received great attention in the literature since Weingartner [11] established a linear/integer programming formulation. Reviews of the literature can be found in Weingartner [12], Hunter [6], Hodges [5], and Bernhard [2].

In the process of managing a financial institution there are decisions that require special considerations beyond those in other firms. In this paper dividend disbursal practices in the banking firms will be analyzed. The central issue is what part of profits should be distributed and what part should be retained within firms as an addition to the banks' net worth.