We solve a multi-period model of strategic trading with long-lived information in multiple assets with correlated innovations in fundamental values. Market makers in each asset can only condition their pricing functions on trading in each asset. Using daily non-public data from the New York Stock Exchange, we test the model's predictions on the conditional and unconditional lead–lag relations of institutional order flow and returns within portfolios. We find support for the model prediction of positive autocorrelations in portfolio returns as well as the predictions for how informed order flow positively predicts future returns and future informed order flow. We show that these relations strengthen for portfolios formed from assets within the same industry, which likely have higher correlation of fundamental values. Furthermore, we discuss issues that arise when testing implications of strategic models with imperfect proxies for the underlying strategic behaviour.

Missing values are endemic in the data sets available to econometricians. This paper suggests a semiparametrically efficient likelihood-based approach to deal with general non-ignorable missing data problems for discrete choice models. Our concern is when the dependent variable and/or covariates are unobserved for some sampling units. A supplementary random sample of observations on all covariates may be available. The key insight of this paper is the recognition of non-response as a modification of choice-based (CB) samples. Semiparametrically efficient generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation appropriate for CB samples is then adapted for the non-response framework considered in this paper. Simulation results for various GMM estimators proposed here are very encouraging.

Drastic changes in central bank operations and monetary institutions in recent years have made previously standard approaches to explaining the determination of the price level obsolete. Recent expansions of central bank balance sheets and of the levels of richcountry sovereign debt, as well as the evolving political economy of the European Monetary Union, have made it clear that fiscal policy and monetary policy are intertwined. Our thinking and teaching about inflation, monetary policy, and fiscal policy should be based on models that recognize fiscal-monetary policy interactions. (JEL E31, E52, E58, E62, H63)

We study the effectiveness of nonexperimental strategies in adjusting for comparison group differences when using data from several programs, each implemented at a different location, to compare their effect if implemented at alternative locations. First, we adjust for individual characteristics differences simultaneously across all groups using unconfoundedness-based and conditional difference-in-difference methods for multiple treatments. Second, we adjust for differences in local economic conditions and stress their role after program participation. Our results show that it is critical to have sufficient overlap across locations in both dimensions and illustrate the difficulty of adjusting for local economic conditions that differ greatly across locations.

There exists large and persistent variation in not only how, but when employees are paid, a fact unexplained by existing theory. This paper develops a simple model of optimal pay timing for firms. When workers have self-control problems, they under-save and experience volatile consumption between paychecks. Thus, pay whose delivery matches the timing of workers' consumption needs will reduce wage costs. The model also explains why pay timing should be regulated (as it is in practice): although the worker benefits from a timing profile that smoothes her consumption, her lack of self-control induces her to attempt to undo the arrangement, either by renegotiating with her employer or by taking out payday loans. Regulation of pay timing and consumer borrowing is required to counter these efforts, helping the worker help herself.

This paper investigates mega hedge fund management companies that collectively manage over 50% of the industry's assets, incorporating previously unavailable data from those that do not report to commercial databases. We find similarities among mega firms that report performance to commercial databases compared with those that do not. We show that the largest divergences between the performance of reporting and nonreporting mega firms can be traced to differential exposure to credit markets. Thus, the performance of hard-to-observe mega firms can be inferred from observable data. This conclusion is robust to delisting bias and the presence of serially correlated returns.

Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence politicians through non-electoral means. In weakly institutionalized polities where such non-electoral influences, particularly by the better organized elite, are a major concern, voters may prefer a political system without checks and balances as a way of insulating politicians from these influences. When they do so, they are effectively accepting a certain amount of politician (presidential) rents in return for redistribution. We show that checks and balances are less likely to emerge when the elite is better organized and is more likely to be able to influence or bribe politicians, and when inequality and potential taxes are high (which makes redistribution more valuable to the majority). We also provide case study evidence from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela consistent with the model.

Using eight measures of liquidity, and addressing the potential endogeneity of initial returns, we find underpricing generally increases the secondary market liquidity of IPOs over the first year of trading, irrespective of the horizon over which liquidity is measured. For two model specifications over the eight measures, fifteen regressions display signs consistent with higher underpricing increasing liquidity and thirteen of these are statistically significant. We also find higher initial returns are significantly negatively correlated with the probability of informed trade. Furthermore, the liquidity effects of underpricing survive the lockup date, suggesting they are not quickly dissipated.