We show that firm demand-side factors are strong drivers of procyclical refinancing behavior over the credit cycle using novel data from the Shared National Credit program. Firms are more likely to refinance early when credit conditions are good to keep the effective maturity of their loans long and hedge against having to refinance in tight credit conditions. High credit quality firms are better able to hedge, making their refinancing propensity more sensitive to credit cycles than less creditworthy firms. There is a strong relationship between refinancing a loan, and subsequent growth in capital expenditure, especially when a loan is refinanced early.

We document average abnormal stock returns of 14% for international insurance firms designated as Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SII). These gains are associated with a fall in average default probability of 15.6%, and statistically weak and economically marginal increases in expected asset risk. Over the same event window, identical measures for other large insurance firms show no significant changes in equity returns or implied asset risk, but an increase in default probability of 27%. These results suggest that G-SII investors still perceive a net gain from TBTF protection, despite new compliance requirements and costs. Our evidence also suggests that these gains are driven primarily from reductions in default probability, as results are consistent with investor expectations that the new regulatory regime will limit moral hazard effects from the guaranty.

ABSTRACT The literature on the usefulness of analysts’ cash flow forecasts is unsettled, with Call et al. ( ), Mohanram ( ), and Radhakrishnan and Wu ( ) providing evidence in favor of their usefulness, and Givoly et al. ( ), Bilinski ( ), and Ecker and Schipper ( ) questioning this. Target prices provide a good setting to test the usefulness of cash flow forecasts because they are an ultimate output of an analyst's valuation process to which cash flow forecasts are an input. Moreover, studying the effect of cash flow forecasts on target prices is more relevant for assessing their usefulness than is studying their effect on earnings‐forecast accuracy, as the accuracy of target prices requires a comparison with market prices, which are less subject to management influence than reported earnings. By improving an analyst's understanding of unexpected accruals and permanent earnings, a cash flow forecast can increase an analyst's target price accuracy and signal an analyst's superior forecasting ability. We examine whether, conditional on their earnings forecasts, analysts’ cash flow forecasts improve their target price accuracy. We find that when analysts issue cash flow forecasts, their target price accuracy increases. We also find that this accuracy increases with the accuracy of their cash flow forecasts. Finally, we find that this increased target price accuracy is greater for more challenging‐to‐value firms. Our study provides confirmatory evidence of the usefulness of analysts’ cash flow forecasts.

Investments that are classified as Level 2 within the fair value hierarchy account for approximately 92 percent of US banks' fair value assets. We report an experiment that examines how experienced auditors apply current PCAOB guidance when auditing portfolios of these assets. We hypothesize and find that, depending on how overstatement is distributed within a portfolio, current PCAOB guidance leads auditors to make adjustments that are predictably larger or smaller than the aggregate overstatement in the portfolio. Auditors are more likely to follow PCAOB guidance when doing so leads to lower audit adjustments and higher client income. We also predict and find that auditors identify some patterns of overstatement as indicative of management bias, but not others. However, management-bias assessments do not affect auditors' adjustment decisions as standards imply they should, even when auditors are prompted to consider management bias. Together, these results highlight a potential deficiency in current auditing guidance that managers could exploit by strategically locating overstatements within securities with larger book values or by spreading those overstatements across many securities within a portfolio. We suggest changes to current PCAOB guidance which may reduce these effects.

We present new identification results for a class of nonseparable nonparametric simultaneous equations models introduced by Matzkin (2008). These models combine traditional exclusion restrictions with a requirement that each structural error enter through a “residual index.†Our identification results are constructive and encompass a range of special cases with varying demands on the exogenous variation provided by instruments and the shape of the joint density of the structural errors. The most important results demonstrate identification when instruments have only limited variation. Even when instruments vary only over a small open ball, relatively mild conditions on the joint density suffice. We also show that the primary sufficient conditions for identification are verifiable and that the maintained hypotheses of the model are falsifiable.

What is the driving force behind the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies? What is the relation between firms’ job-creation incentives and stock market valuations? We answer these questions in a model with time-varying risk, modeled as a small and variable probability of an economic disaster. A high probability implies greater risk and lower future growth, lowering the incentives of firms to invest in hiring. During periods of high risk, stock market valuations are low and unemployment rises. The model thus explains volatility in equity and labor markets, and the relation between the two. Received May 12, 2016; editorial decision October 26, 2017 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. Authors have furnished data, which are available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Managers are increasingly aware that strategic judgments need to be made in the context of risk assessments. It has been proposed that strategic performance management systems, such as the balanced scorecard (BSC), offer a useful framework for integrating strategic risk and performance information to provide managers with a more comprehensive overview of their strategy. In this study, we conduct an experiment to investigate whether integrating strategic risk information in a BSC affects managers' responses to different strategic risk profiles when making strategy evaluation and recommendation judgments. Specifically, we provide strategic risk information either as a stand-alone list (a stand-alone approach), or incorporated in a BSC (an integrated approach). We also vary the risk profile of the strategy provided, by manipulating whether the strategy has relatively higher risks associated with performance drivers (high performance driver risks) or relatively higher risks associated with performance outcomes (high performance outcome risks). Our results show that managers make less favorable strategy evaluation and recommendation judgments with high performance driver risks than with high performance outcome risks when strategic risk information is integrated in a BSC, but not when the strategic risks are presented as a stand-alone list. While we find a significant difference in strategic risk profile effects between the two presentation formats for strategy recommendation judgments, this difference is not significant for strategy evaluation judgments. Overall, our study shows that how organizations choose to combine the reporting of strategic risk and performance information is important for managers making strategic judgments.

We describe a symmetric continuous-time model of trading among relatively overconfident, oligopolistic informed traders with exponential utility. Traders agree to disagree about the precisions of their continuous flows of Gaussian private information. The price depends on a trader’s inventory (permanent price impact) and the derivative of a trader’s inventory (temporary price impact). More disagreement makes the market more liquid; without enough disagreement, there is no trade. Target inventories mean-revert at the same rate as private signals. Actual inventories smoothly adjust towards target inventories at an endogenous rate which increases with disagreement. Faster-than-equilibrium trading generates “flash crashes” by increasing temporary price impact. A “Keynesian beauty contest” dampens price fluctuations.

Globally many regulators adopted a rules-based approach to independent director appointments stipulating ‘independence’ criteria. This paper investigates whether partitioning a regulatory compliant sample of independent director appointments by prior affiliation to the board influences the relationship between ownership and control rights, and performance. We report a significant positive relationship between board independence and controlling shareholders' cash-flow rights for firms where the appointee had prior affiliation to the board, but no performance improvement. Firms where the regulatory compliant independent directors had no prior-affiliation to the board experienced significant improvement in firms' next period Return-on-Assets. Appointing affiliated directors is indicative diminished board quality, which is consistent with the empirical evidence that controlling shareholders determine board quality to accommodate tunneling to extract the private benefits of control to compensate for significant additional costs associated with concentrated ownership (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Luo et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2015). The positive association between performance and unaffiliated independent directors suggests a desire to introduce expertise to receive benefits via improved firm performance which is consistent with the literature, mostly from studies of emerging markets, reporting a causal link from independent directors to firm performance (Choi et al., 2007; Dahya et al. 2008; Liu et al., 2015).