Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise: Comment by Bruce A. Blonigen, Ronald B. Davies and Keith Head. Published in volume 93, issue 3, pages 980-994 of American Economic Review, June 2003

This paper proposes a new simulation‐based approach for optimal portfolio allocation in realistic environments with complex dynamics for the state variables and large numbers of factors and assets. A first illustration involves a choice between equity and cash with nonlinear interest rate and market price of risk dynamics. Intertemporal hedging demands significantly increase the demand for stocks and exhibit low volatility. We then analyze settings where stock returns are also predicted by dividend yields and where investors have wealth‐dependent relative risk aversion. Large‐scale problems with many assets, including the Nasdaq, SP500, bonds, and cash, are also examined.

Some Evidence on Race, Welfare Reform, and Household Income by Marianne P. Bitler, Jonah B. Gelbach and Hilary W. Hoynes. Published in volume 93, issue 2, pages 293-298 of American Economic Review, May 2003

The Mismatch Between Life Insurance Holdings and Financial Vulnerabilities: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study by B. Douglas Bernheim, Lorenzo Forni, Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Published in volume 93, issue 1, pages 354-365 of American Economic Review, March 2003

We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed “watchdogs” can implement institutionally preferred policies. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. Our model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. However, penalties for dissent appeared to have little impact on the experimental outcomes.