Capital investment decisions must recognize the limitations on the firm's ability to later sell or expand capacity. This paper shows how opportunities for future expansion or contraction can be valued as options, how their valuation relates to the q theory of investment, and their effect on the incentive to invest. Generally, the option to expand reduces the incentive to invest, while the option to disinvest raises it. We show how these options determine the effect of uncertainty on investment, how they are changed by shifts of the distribution of future profitability, and how the q-theory and option pricing approaches are related.

This paper compares the intra-day patterns on the NYSE and AMEX of volatility, trading volume and bid-ask spreads for European and Japanese dually-listed stocks with American stocks of comparable average trading volume and volatility. It is shown that the intra-day patterns for these stocks are remarkably similar even though public information flows differ markedly across these stocks during the trading day. In the early morning, all stocks have higher volatility than later in the day, but this phenomenon is most pronounced for Japanese stocks and affects American stocks the least. We argue that these patterns are consistent with markets reacting to the overnight accumulation of public information but are inconsistent with the view that early morning volatility can be attributed to monopolistic specialist behavior.

We examine whether the predictability of future returns from past returns is due to the market's underreaction to information, in particular to past earnings news. Past return and past earnings surprise each predict large drifts in future returns after controlling for the other. Market risk, size, and book-to-market effects do not explain the drifts. There is little evidence of subsequent reversals in the returns of stocks with high price and earnings momentum. Security analysts' earnings forecasts also respond sluggishly to past news, especially in the case of stocks with the worst past performance. The results suggest a market that responds only gradually to new information.

ABSTRACT We examine whether the predictability of future returns from past returns is due to the market's underreaction to information, in particular to past earnings news. Past return and past earnings surprise each predict large drifts in future returns after controlling for the other. Market risk, size, and book–to–market effects do not explain the drifts. There is little evidence of subsequent reversals in the returns of stocks with high price and earnings momentum. Security analysts' earnings forecasts also respond sluggishly to past news, especially in the case of stocks with the worst past performance. The results suggest a market that responds only gradually to new information.

ABSTRACT A cash‐in‐advance model of a monetary economy is used to derive a money‐based CAPM (M‐CAPM), which allows us to implement tests of asset pricing restrictions without consumption data. A test as in Fama and MacBeth of the model suggests that the money betas have some explanatory power for the cross‐sectional variation of expected returns; however, the model is rejected using conditional information. Consistent with our predictions, estimates of the curvature parameter are lower than those of the consumption CAPM (C‐CAPM) and pricing errors of the M‐CAPM tend to be smaller than those of the C‐CAPM.

A cash-in-advance model of a monetary economy is used to derive a money-based capital asset pricing model (M-CAPM), which allows the authors to implement tests of asset pricing restrictions without consumption data. A test as in Eugene F. Fama and James D. Macbeth (1973) of the model suggests that the money betas have some explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation of expected returns; however, the model is rejected using conditional information. Consistent with their predictions, estimates of the curvature parameter are lower than those of the consumption capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM) and pricing errors of the M-CAPM tend to be smaller than those of the C-CAPM.

The authors test the hypothesis that, when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as 'losers' will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be 'winners.' An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth-oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid-year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid-year winners. Furthermore, the authors show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.