In our 1990 paper, we showed that managers concerned with their reputations might choose to mimic the behavior of other managers and ignore their own information. We presented a model in which “smart” managers receive correlated, informative signals, whereas “dumb” managers receive independent, uninformative signals. Managers have an incentive to follow the herd to indicate to the labor market that they have received the same signal as others, and hence are likely to be smart. This model of reputational herding has subsequently found empirical support in a number of recent papers, including Judith A. Chevalier and Glenn D. Ellison’s (1999) study of mutual fund managers and Harrison G. Hong et al.’s (2000) study of equity analysts. We argued in our 1990 paper that reputational herding “requires smart managers’ prediction errors to be at least partially correlated with each other” (page 468). In their Comment, Marco Ottaviani and Peter Sorensen (hereafter, OS) take issue with this claim. They write: “correlation is not necessary for herding, other than in degenerate cases.” It turns out that the apparent disagreement hinges on how strict a definition of herding one adopts. In particular, we had defined a herding equilibrium as one in which agent B always ignores his own information and follows agent A. (See, e.g., our Propositions 1 and 2.) In contrast, OS say that there is herding when agent B sometimes ignores his own information and follows agent A. The OS conclusion is clearly correct given their weaker definition of herding. At the same time, however, it also seems that for the stricter definition that we adopted in our original paper, correlated errors on the part of smart managers are indeed necessary for a herding outcome—even when one considers the expanded parameter space that OS do. We will try to give some intuition for why the different definitions of herding lead to different conclusions about the necessity of correlated prediction errors. Along the way, we hope to convince the reader that our stricter definition is more appropriate for isolating the economic effects at work in the reputational herding model. An example is helpful in illustrating what is going on. Consider a simple case where the parameter values are as follows: p 5 3⁄4; q 5 1⁄4; z 5 1⁄2, and u 5 1⁄2. In our 1990 paper, we also imposed the constraint that z 5 ap 1 (1 2 a)q, which further implies that a 5 1⁄2. The heart of the OS Comment is the idea that this constraint should be disposed of—i.e., we should look at other values of a. Without loss of generality, we will consider values of a above 1⁄2, and distinguish two cases.

Many economic processes are influenced by externalities within groups. Educational outcomes depend on peer-group interactions between students, which may help explain the persistence of income inequality and the stability of subcultures and social classes.' Crime rates exhibit a geographic pattern that strongly suggests the presence of interactions between potential criminals. There is also substantial evidence that amenities are influenced by interactions between neighbors, and that interactions between firms influence labor productivity.2 This paper considers how social interactions affect the institutions of local government. Specifically, we show how social interactions encourage consumers to withdraw from the traditional public sector and join exclusive groups that regulate the activities of their members. Examples include familiar organizations like exclusive suburbs and private schools and new or newly popular institutions like private governments and charter schools. Each of these institutions mediates social interactions by excluding some agents and altering the actions of others. We view the formation of these institutions as a kind of secession, since members withdraw from the civic whole and limit their interactions to other group members. These new organizations are increasingly important, surprisingly powerful, and highly controversial. One of the most widespread innovations in local government in recent years has been the rise of residential private government, including common interest developments (CIDs) and homeowner associations (HOAs). Evan McKenzie (1996) reports that the number of CIDs in the United States grew from a few hundred in the 1960's to 150,000 in 1993, and that their populations now total at least 32 million people. CIDs and HOAs are generally formed by real estate developers, and are eventually governed by an elected board of members. CIDs limit interactions with the rest of the world in a number of ways, most notoriously by building walls (Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder, 1997). They tax their members to pay for the local public services they provide (primarily street maintenance, trash collection, and policing), collectively own and manage shared facilities (recreation centers, parks, and sometimes streets), and regulate both property use and individual conduct through covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs) established by the developer. The regulatory activities of CIDs are impressive. Activities that have been prohibited include flying the flag, delivering newspapers, parking pickup trucks in the driveway, kissing outside the front door, using one's own back door too much, building fences, painting the exterior certain colors, having pets, working from one's home, marrying people below a certain age, and even having children (McKenzie, 1996 p. 4). In spite of, or perhaps because of, these regulations, CIDs provide a higher level of amenities than is available in public developments. However, critics view them as undemocratic and discriminatory private governments operating outside the constitutional restrictions that public governments face. A primary goal of this paper is to provide a model that captures the common and general features of the new institutions of local government. To that end, we develop a model of local secession motivated by social interactions and supported by regulation. The model has three essential elements. First, heterogeneous agents belong to groups, and each takes an action that * Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, 2053 Main Mall, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2 Canada. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the University of British Columbia Centre for Real Estate and Urban Land Economics, and the Real Estate Foundation of British Columbia. We also appreciate the comments of David Wildasin, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the 1996 University of British Columbia Summer Symposium on Urban Land Economics. 1See Anita A. Summers and Barbara L. Wolfe (1977), J. Vernon Henderson et al. (1978), Roland B6nabou (1993, 1996), Steven N. Durlauf (1996), and George A. Akerlof (1997). 2 See Joseph Gyourko and Joseph Tracy (1991), Raaj Sah (1991), William N. Evans et al. (1992), Charles F. Manski (1993), Edward L. Glaeser et al. (1996), and John M. Ouigley (1998).

We develop a two‐tiered agency model that shows how rent‐seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. By rent‐seeking, division managers can raise their bargaining power and extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. And because the CEO is herself an agent of outside investors, this extra compensation may take the form not of cash wages, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is that it implies a kind of “socialism” in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker divisions get subsidized by stronger ones.

Most OECD economies, including that of Canada, experienced a slowdown in economic growth from the 1961–1973 period to the 1973– 1988 period, and to the 1988–1995 period. Consequently, progress in the standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita, also slowed down in most OECD countries over the three subperiods. This paper analyses the sources of output growth in 122 industries and in the private business sector to gain an additional perspective on the slowdown of the Canadian economy. We adopt the constant-quality indexes of capital and labor inputs introduced by Dale W. Jorgenson and Zvi Griliches (1967) and later used extensively in Jorgenson et al. (1987), Jorgenson (1995a, b), and Jorgenson and Eric Yip (2000) to identify the sources of growth. These measures allow us to take into account the changing composition of the labor force and the capital stock. At the industry level, we adjust for capital quality by aggregating the capital stock across five asset types by means of the rental prices of capital rather than the asset prices of capital. The use of rental prices allows us to incorporate differences in depreciation rates and tax treatment across different asset types for each industry. At the same time, we combine hours worked by each type of worker using the share of labor compensation to reflect labor quality. At the aggregate level, we apply the same framework by aggregating the capital stock across different asset types and hours worked across different types of workers. A number of studies have compared Canada’s economic growth performance with that of its competitors using this framework (Chrysostom Dougherty, 1991; Dougherty and Jorgenson, 1997; Jorgenson and Yip, 2000). However, this is the first attempt at using this framework to assess Canada’s economic performance at the industry level.

The French derivatives market, the Marché à Terme International de France (MATIF) or the French International Futures and Options Exchange is one of the major derivatives markets in the world. The efficiency of four financial contracts traded on the MATIF-CAC40 Index Futures, ECU Bond Futures, National Bond Futures, and PIBOR 3-Month Futures are examined in this paper. Test results from serial correlations, unit root tests, and variance ratio tests provide overwhelming evidence that the random walk hypothesis cannot be rejected for these contracts.

This paper examines policies and procedures put in place by corporations to regulate trading in the stock by the firm's own insiders. Over 92% of our sample companies have their own policies restricting trading by insiders, and 78% have explicit blackout periods during which the company prohibits trading by its insiders. Our data indicate that blackout periods successfully suppress trading, both purchases and sales, by insiders, and that the blackout period is associated with a bid–ask spread that's narrower by about two basis points. Consistent with this effect on the spread, allowed insider trades are modestly more profitable than insider trades made during prohibited blackout periods.

Diversified firms trade at a discount relative to comparable portfolios of stand-alone firms. One explanation is that these firms have inefficient internal capital markets. We examine the link between firm value and the value of internal capital markets using a new form of corporate restructuring called tracking stock. We present a model that illustrates that the announcement effect of a tracking stock equity restructuring conveys information about the market’s assessment of the value of a firm’s internal capital market. We develop a measure of the profitability of the internal capital market, and we find a strong positive relation between it and tracking stock announcement effects, a finding consistent with our model.

This paper seeks to identify the characteristics that make individual U.S. banks more likely to fail or be acquired. We use bank-specific information to estimate competing-risks hazard models with time-varying covariates. We use alternative measures of productive efficiency to proxy management quality, and find that inefficiency increases the risk of failure while reducing the probability of a bank's being acquired. Finally, we show that the closer to insolvency a bank is (as reflected by a low equity-to-assets ratio) the more likely is its acquisition.

A model of major league baseball is developed which distinguishes between league behavior and individual team behavior. The league is viewed as setting rules that restrict the team's willingness to pay and/or impose costs on the transfer of players between teams. Given these rules, teams then compete for player services. The model is estimated and tested. The evidence suggests that the restrictive effect of league rules on player salaries declined between 1986-1988 and 1989-1991, consistent with anecdotal evidence. Within the rules established by the league, however, teams appear to behave as competitive price-takers through the entire sample period.

We develop a procedure to rank-order objects using censored panel data sets. We illustrate this by ranking countries and commodities using disaggregated American import data and find evidence that countries and commodities can be ranked. Countries habitually begin to export goods to the United States according to an ordering; goods are also exported in order. We estimate these orderings using a methodology, that takes account of the fact that most goods are not exported by most countries in our sample. Our orderings seem sensible, robust, and intuitive, and they are correlated with macroeconomic phenomena such as productivity and growth rates.