This paper empirically investigates the impact of the first announcement of TARP, the announcement of revised TARP, respective capital infusions under TARP–CPP and capital repayments on changes in shareholder value and the risk exposure of supported US banks. Our analysis reveals a light and a dark side of TARP. While announcements as well as capital repayments may provoke positive wealth effects and a decrease in bank risk, equity capital injections to banks are observed to be a severe impediment to restore market confidence and financial stability. Furthermore, while TARP announcements and capital injections may increase systemic risk, no significant effect on systemic risk is found for capital repayments.

I use an applied general equilibrium model to quantify the influence of a new, theoretical channel for carbon leakage effects, as identified by Fullerton, Karney and Baylis (2012). I first produce parameterizations of the model that generate a close correspondence with the theory, isolating the quantitative effect of this channel. I then produce parameterizations that allow for an examination of net leakage rates in a model with a more comprehensive set of leakage channels. I find that the new channel exerts a negative influence on net leakage rates but that positive forces of leakage dominate in the comprehensive assessment.

We analyze gains from intercorporate sales of mutual fund subsidiaries, using mandated SEC disclosures to assess the performance of mutual funds transferred by these transactions. Sellers are financial conglomerates (banks) using equity-based deals to transfer poorly performing funds to highly focused asset management companies. The transferred funds experience significant improvements in risk-adjusted returns, efficiency, and asset growth. These improvements are closely correlated with the gains in wealth to buyers and sellers at deal announcements, indicating the market efficiently capitalizes expected performance improvements. Our results provide evidence that these transactions transfer assets to acquirers better able to manage them, generating gains for fund holders and buyer and seller shareholders.

Abstract Executive pay disparity, as measured by chief executive officer (CEO) pay slice (CPS), is positively associated with the implied cost of equity, even after controlling for other determinants of the cost of equity. The difference in the cost of equity can explain 43% of the difference in the valuation effect attributable to CPS reported by Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). Further analysis shows that the positive association is stronger when agency problems of free cash flow are more severe and when CEO succession planning is more important. Our evidence suggests that a large CPS is associated with CEO entrenchment and high succession risk.

We propose exact simulation-based procedures for: (i) testing mean-variance efficiency when the zero-beta rate is unknown, and (ii) building confidence intervals for the zero-beta rate. On observing that this parameter may be weakly identified, we propose LR-type statistics as well as heteroskedascity and autocorrelation corrected (HAC) Wald-type procedures, which are robust to weak identification and allow for non-Gaussian distributions including parametric GARCH structures. In particular, we propose confidence sets for the zero-beta rate based on "inverting" exact tests for this parameter; these sets provide a multivariate extension of Fieller's technique for inference on ratios. The exact distribution of LR-type statistics for testing efficiency is studied under both the null and the alternative hypotheses. The relevant nuisance parameter structure is established and finite-sample bound procedures are proposed, which extend and improve available Gaussianspecific bounds. Furthermore, we study the invariance to portfolio repacking property for tests and confidence sets proposed. The statistical properties of available and proposed methods are analyzed via aMonte Carlo study. Empirical results on NYSE returns show that exact confidence sets are very different from the asymptotic ones, and allowing for non-Gaussian distributions affects inference results. Simulation and empirical results suggest that LR-type statistics - with p-values corrected using the Maximized Monte Carlo test method - are generally preferable to their Wald-HAC counterparts from the viewpoints of size control and power.

Although firm-initiated clawbacks reduce accounting manipulation, they also induce managers to engage in suboptimal activities (e.g., reduce research and development (R&D) expenses) to achieve earnings targets. To assess the effectiveness of clawback provisions, we examine their impact from debtholders' point of view. We find that banks use more financial covenants and performance pricing provisions in the loan contracts and decrease interest rates after firms initiate clawbacks. Moreover, we also find that loan maturity increases and loan collateral decreases subsequent to clawback adoption. Taken together, our findings indicate that firm-initiated clawback provisions enhance financial reporting quality, thereby reducing the information uncertainty that financing providers face.

Abstract We assess the importance of interpersonal income comparisons using data on suicide deaths. We examine whether suicide risk is related to others' income, holding own income and other individual and environmental factors fixed. We estimate models of the suicide hazard using two independent data sets: the National Longitudinal Mortality Study and the National Center for Health Statistics' Multiple Cause of Death Files combined with the 5% Public Use Micro Sample of the 1990 decennial census. Results from both data sources show that, controlling for own income and individual characteristics, individual suicide risk rises with others' income.

Advances in information-processing technology have eroded the advantages of small scale and proximity to customers that traditionally enabled small lenders to thrive. Nonetheless, the membership and market share of US credit unions have increased, though their average size has also risen. We investigate changes in the efficiency and productivity of US credit unions during 1989–2006 by benchmarking the performance of individual firms against an estimated order-α quantile lying “near” the efficient frontier. We construct a cost analog of the Malmquist productivity index, which we decompose to estimate changes in cost and scale efficiency, and changes in technology. We find that cost-productivity fell on average across all credit unions but especially among smaller credit unions. Smaller credit unions confronted a shift in technology that increased the minimum cost required to produce given amounts of output. All but the largest credit unions also became less scale efficient over time.

When a firm cross-lists its shares in segmented markets, the price of the first issued share, as a reference, plays both an informational and anchoring role in pricing the second issued share. We develop a model illustrating the dual-role. Empirically, we examine a group of Chinese firms that first issue foreign shares and then domestic A-shares, for which the anchoring effect adds to the A-share underpricing. Consistent with the model predictions, we find that the A-share underpricing is positively related to the difference in costs of capital in the two segmented markets, and that this positive association is weaker when participants are less likely to resort to the anchoring heuristic and when the A-share valuation involves less uncertainty.