In 2012, JPMorgan accumulated a USD 6.2 billion loss on a credit derivatives portfolio, the so-called “London Whale”, partly as a consequence of de-correlations of non-perfectly correlated positions that were supposed to hedge each other. Motivated by this case, we devise a factor model for correlations that allows for scenario-based stress testing of correlations. We derive a number of analytical results related to a portfolio of homogeneous assets. Using the concept of Mahalanobis distance, we show how to identify adverse scenarios of correlation risk. In addition, we demonstrate how correlation and volatility stress tests can be combined. As an example, we apply the factor-model approach to the “London Whale” portfolio and determine the value-at-risk impact from correlation changes. Since our findings are particularly relevant for large portfolios, where even small correlation changes can have a large impact, a further application would be to stress test portfolios of central counterparties, which are of systemically relevant size.

ABSTRACT We examine the importance of cross‐sectional asset pricing anomalies (alphas) for the real economy. To this end, we develop a novel quantitative model of the cross‐section of firms that features lumpy investment and informational inefficiencies, while yielding distributions in closed form. Our findings indicate that anomalies can cause material real inefficiencies, which raises the possibility that agents who help eliminate them add significant value to the economy. The model shows that the magnitude of alphas alone is a poor indicator of real outcomes, and highlights the importance of the alpha persistence, the amount of mispriced capital, and the Tobin's q of firms affected.

Abstract We study the impact of index investing on firm performance by examining the link between commodity indices and firms that use index commodities. Around 2004, commodity index investing dramatically increased. This event is referred to as the financialization of commodity markets. Following financialization, firms that use index commodities make worse production decisions, earn 40% lower profits, and have 6% higher costs. Consistent with a feedback channel in which market participants learn from prices, our results suggest that index investing distorts the price signal, thereby generating a negative externality that impedes firms’ ability to make production decisions. Received March 31, 2017; editorial decision July 5, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Employing a classic measure of technological closeness between firms, we show that the returns of technology-linked firms have strong predictive power for focal firm returns. A long-short strategy based on this effect yields monthly alpha of 117 basis points. This effect is distinct from industry momentum and is not easily attributable to risk-based explanations. It is more pronounced for focal firms that: (a) have a more intense and specific technology focus, (b) receive lower investor attention, and (c) are more difficult to arbitrage. Our results are broadly consistent with sluggish price adjustment to more nuanced technological news.

Abstract Can access to a few hundred dollars of liquidity affect the career choice of a recent college graduate? In a three-year field experiment with Teach For America (TFA), a prestigious teacher placement program, we randomly increase the financial packages offered to nearly 7,300 potential teachers who requested support for the transition into teaching. The first two years of the experiment reveal that although most applicants do not respond to a marginal $600 of grants or loans, those in the worst financial position respond by joining TFA at higher rates. We continue the experiment into the third year and self-replicate our results. For the highest-need applicants, an extra $600 in loans, $600 in grants, and $1,200 in grants increase the likelihood of joining TFA by 12.2, 11.4, and 17.1 percentage points (or 20.0%, 18.7%, and 28.1%), respectively. Additional grant and loan dollars are equally effective, suggesting a liquidity mechanism. A follow-up survey bolsters the liquidity story and also shows that those drawn into teaching would have otherwise worked in private-sector firms.

Failures and FDIC losses for community banks during the banking crises of the late 1980s and late 2000s are compared. Despite increases in risky commercial real estate (CRE) lending and more severe economic shocks in the recent crisis, failure rates were lower. We find that other changes in bank characteristics, like higher capital, made community banks more resilient to shocks. In contrast, FDIC losses on failed banks were higher. These are not explained by changes in CRE exposure or economic shocks. We find that an interest-receivable variable is predictive of failures and FDIC losses. Implications for prompt corrective action are discussed.

Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Search Site Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Citation Dan A. Simunic, Gary C. Biddle; The Big Four: The Curious Past and Perilous Future of the Global Accounting Monopoly. The Accounting Review 1 January 2019; 94 (1): 353–356. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10638 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentThe Accounting Review Search Advanced Search

This study presents a theoretical model that links chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to the value loss of corporate diversification. Consistent with the model's prediction, the findings show that diversified firms run by overconfident CEOs experience value loss compared to diversified firms run by their rational counterparts. Empirically, the value loss is economically significant and ranges between 12.5% and 14.1%. In addition, the model predicts heightened corporate refocusing activity by overconfident CEOs who pursued diversified investments in the past once realized returns fail to match initial expectations. The empirical odds of corporate refocusing decisions are 67% to 98% higher when past diversifications are undertaken by overconfident rather than rational CEOs. Another prediction of the model is that overconfident CEOs exhibit preference for diversified investments, especially in the presence of ample internal funds. This prediction is also strongly supported by the data. Overall, this study proposes CEO overconfidence as a unified and consistent explanation of why firms pursue value-destructive corporate diversification policies and later adopt refocusing policies aiming to restore value.

We estimate the term structures of risk-neutral forward variance and skewness, and examine their predictive power for equity market excess returns and variance. We use Partial Least Squares to extract a single predictive factor from each term structure that is motivated by the theoretical implications of affine no-arbitrage models. The empirical analysis shows that an increased forward variance factor, FVF (forward skewness factor, FSF) corresponds to a more negatively sloped forward variance (more U-shaped forward skewness) term structure, and significantly forecasts higher future market excess returns and variance. More importantly, FSF exhibits predictive power for market returns that is stronger than, and incremental to, that provided by FVF. However, it does not outperform FVF in terms of excess variance predictability.

Prior literature shows that high leverage is associated with losses in market share due to unfavorable actions by customers and competitors. Building on this literature, we investigate the effect of collectivism on the product market performance of highly leveraged firms. Using a sample of 46 countries over the 1989–2016 period, we find significantly lower costs of high leverage for countries with higher collectivism scores. Moreover, we find that the impact of collectivism on high leverage costs is more pronounced for firms with high product specialization and with financially healthy rivals. In additional analysis, we find that collectivism helps highly leveraged firms retain employees and obtain trade credit from suppliers. Our findings thus suggest that a country's culture affects corporate financial outcomes by influencing the actions of firm stakeholders.