Bank capital ratios have increased steadily since the financial crisis. For a sample of 101 large banks from advanced and emerging economies, retained earnings account for the bulk of their higher risk-weighted capital ratios, with reductions in risk weights playing a lesser role. On average, banks continued to expand their lending in real terms, though lending contracted among European banks. Lower dividend payouts and (for advanced economy banks) wider lending spreads have contributed to banks’ ability to use retained earnings to build capital. Banks that came out of the crisis with higher capital ratios and stronger profitability were able to expand lending more.

We explore a new mechanism by which investors take correlated shortcuts and present evidence that managers—using sales management—take advantage of these shortcuts. Specifically, we exploit a regulatory provision wherein a firm's primary industry is determined by the highest sales segment. Exploiting this regulation, we provide evidence that investors classify operationally nearly identical firms as starkly different depending on their placement around this sales cutoff. Moreover, managers appear to exploit this by manipulating sales to be just over the cutoff in favorable industries. Further evidence suggests that managers engage in activities to realize large, tangible benefits from this opportunistic action.

[We demonstrate that a firm's ability to innovate is predictable, persistent, and relatively simple to compute, and yet the stock market appears to ignore the implications of past successes when valuing future innovation. We show that two firms that invest the same in R&D can have quite divergent, but predictably divergent, future paths based on their past track records. A long-short portfolio strategy that takes advantage of the information in past track records earns abnormal returns of roughly 11% annually. Importantly, these past track records also predict divergent future real outcomes in patents, patent citations, and new product innovations.]

[We investigate the relative importance of the twenty-four provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and included in the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick governance index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003). We put forward an entrenchment index based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. We find that increases in the index level are monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in firm valuation as well as large negative abnormal returns during the 1990-2003 period. The other eighteen IRRC provisions not in our entrenchment index were uncorrelated with either reduced firm valuation or negative abnormal returns.]

We investigate the relative importance of the twenty-four provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and included in the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick governance index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003). We put forward an entrenchment index based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. We find that increases in the index level are monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in firm valuation as well as large negative abnormal returns during the 1990–2003 period. The other eighteen IRRC provisions not in our entrenchment index were uncorrelated with either reduced firm valuation or negative abnormal returns.

I evaluate the effect of loyalty on individuals' portfolio choice using a unique dataset of retirement contributions. I exploit the statutory difference that, in 401(k) plans, stand-alone employees can invest directly in their division, while conglomerate employees must invest in the entire firm, including all unrelated divisions. Consistent with loyalty, employees of stand-alone firms invest 10 percentage points (75%) more in company stock than conglomerate employees. Support is also found using variation in loyalty between different groups of employees, across and within firms. The cost to employees of loyalty is large, amounting to nearly a 20% loss in retirement income.

Wesley M. Cohen, Steven Klepper, Firm Size and the Nature of Innovation within Industries: The Case of Process and Product R&D, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78, No. 2 (May, 1996), pp. 232-243

A4MONG the many problems raised by the X'Wactual construction of empirical input-output tables two key issues are often singled out: (1) what industrial classification scheme should be adopted and (2) how the data should be structured. Actually, these problems of industry definition and data structuring are two facets of a more fundamental problem: Given external constraints on data gathering (availability and format) which make the industry concept mostly unobservable, how can we best group the available data into an input-output table. Ideally, each industry would be defined by a single well-defined product and a separate industry should be used for different, but possibly 6closely related, products.1 A widely accepted notion of best grouping is one which minimizes the bias, i.e., the difference between the gross output forecast obtained with a disaggregated table and the forecast obtained with an aggregated table, for any final demand bill. Historically, a theoretical condition for zero aggregation bias was first derived by Hatanaka (1952).2 Briefly stated, let A denote the (n x n) disaggregated direct coefficient matrix; x denote the n-dimensional column vector of gross outputs; y denote the n-dimensional column vector of final demands; I denote the (n X n) unit matrix; S denote the aggregation operator where S is (M X n) and reads