The ubiquity of networks in our social lives has long been recognized, and their importance in our economic lives is increasingly recognized as well. Yet the literature synthesized in Matthew O. Jackson's Social and Economic Networks, which covers the theory of how networks form, decay, and shape behavior at a general level, has had little influence on either applied theory or empirical work in this area. This is partly because of limitations of network theory as it has evolved in this literature. After describing the network theory presented in the book, I discuss these limitations and make some tentative suggestions as to how they might be overcome. (JEL D85, L14, Z13)

This is a review article of Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance (Princeton University Press 2004) by Avinash K. Dixit.

The first two main sections survey the roles of transnational networks in alleviating problems of contract enforcement and providing information about trading opportunities, respectively. The next section covers how domestic networks influence international trade through their impact on domestic market structure. Two overarching questions unify these sections: how do networks affect efficiency, and will networks grow or shrink in importance for international trade over time. The last main sections develop research agendas for two less studied areas: the role of intermediaries who can connect foreign agents to domestic networks and the ability of transnational production networks to facilitate technology transfer.

This paper examines the progressive development of the new institutional economics over the past quarter century. It begins by distinguishing four levels of social analysis, with special emphasis on the institutional environment and the institutions of governance. It then turns to some of the good ideas out of which the NIE works: the description of human actors, feasibility, firms as governance structures, and operationalization. Applications, including privatization, are briefly discussed. Its empirical successes, public policy applications, and other accomplishments notwithstanding, there is a vast amount of unfinished business.

This paper is a selective survey of fiscal federalism. It begins with a brief review and some reflections on the traditional theory of fiscal federalism: the assignment of functions to levels of government, the welfare gains from fiscal decentralization, and the use of fiscal instruments. It then explores a series of important topics that are the subject of current research: laboratory federalism, interjurisdictional competition and environmental federalism, the political economy of fiscal federalism, market-preserving federalism, and fiscal decentralization in the developing and transitional economies.

For more than a decade, there has been a great debate in the profession concerning the proper base for personal and business taxation. This debate has focused on the choice of the base versus the (or consumption) base. The concept of used in these debates is a comprehensive accretion measure often referred to as HaigSimons income, after the work of Robert M. Haig (1921) and Henry C. Simons (1938). This is the standard concept of income that has been used (with several variations) in tax policy analysis in the postwar period. However, it appears not to be widely recognized that, although Haig did ultimately settle on accretion income as the best feasible tax base, he definitely saw this as a second-best measure of true income. As will become clear, reexamination of Haig's famous article reveals that Haig actually felt that consumption expenditure would be a better measure of true income than accretion income, and he would have preferred a tax on this base-that is, he preferred what today would be called a consumption tax. He felt that