This paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset. Each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price, which in equilibrium serves as a ‘noisy’ aggregator of the total information observed by all traders. A closed-form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented. A counter-example to the existence of ‘fully revealing’ equilibrium is developed.

[If independent observations x are drawn from the distribution located at @m, f (x; @m)=c"3 exp[-g(x -@m)], and if g is symmetric and strictly convex, then the maximum likelihood estimate of μ lies between the smallest and largest folded sample observations. If the distribution has fatter tails than a normal distribution, then the maximum likelihood estimate lies between the smallest and largest means of trimmed subsamples. If the distribution is assumed to be symmetric and unimodal, the centers of tight clusters of observations can be maximum likelihood estimates. If observations are not independent, then there is no bound: given any example any number is a maximum likelihood estimate for some sampling distribution. Stationary is not sufficient to bound the estimate between the minimum and maximum observations.]

[This paper investigates the distribution of the least squares estimator of the coefficient α in the model @c"t = @a@c"t -"1 + @?"t where the @?"t where the @?"t are independently distributed N (O, @s extasciicircum2). The exact finite sample and limiting distributions are calculated when α ≥ 1 and finite sample distributions when α extless 1. These distributions are used to compute the power functions of tests of the random walk hypothesis α = 1 as well as the hypotheses.]

This paper formulates and estimates a structural intertemporal model of labor supply. Using theoretical characterizations derived from an economic model of lifetime behavior, a two-step empirical analysis yields estimates of intertemporal and uncompensated substitution effects which provide the information needed to predict the response of hours of work to life-cycle wage growth and shifts in the lifetime wage path.

[Effective marginal tax rates on labor income for the "representative" Swede have increased from roughly 50 percent in 1959 to 80 percent today. The effects of this increase in the level of taxation are examined using a two-sector model parameterized to correspond to the Swedish economy. The model contains a single household which allocates labor to either taxed (essentially market) or untaxed (largely household) uses. The estimated long-run effects are sufficient to explain up to 75 percent of the recent decline in the measured growth rate of the Swedish GNP. Calculations of total tax revenues are also derived from the model. These peak when the tax rate is approximately 70 percent, indicating that Sweden is presently on the downward-sloping portion of its "Laffer Curve."]