The National Association of Security Dealers alleges that professional-trader use of the Small Order Execution System (SOES) causes greater security price volatility. We docu? ment bidirectional Granger causality between a proxy for professional SOES trading (the frequency of maximum-sized SOES trades) and a measure of stock price volatility. We find that high levels of volatility precede high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades, suggesting that volatility causes more frequent large SOES trades. Likewise, over a one-minute time interval, high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades cause high volatility. Over longer periods, however, intense maximum-sized SOES trading causes lower volatility. Inter? preted in conjunction with Harris and Schultz (1997), these results suggest that high levels of maximum-sized SOES trades lead to more efficient price discovery. In light of these results, we believe that efforts to eliminate SOES based on volatility considerations are unwarranted.

The concept of adaptively rational equilibrium (A.R.E.) is introduced. Agents adapt their beliefs over time by choosing from a finite set of different predictor or expectations functions. Each predictor is a function of past observations and has a performance or fitness measure which is publicly available. Agents make a rational choice concerning the predictors based upon their past performance. This results in a dynamics across predictor choice which is coupled to the equilibrium dynamics of the endogenous variables. As a simple, but typical, example we consider a cobweb type demand-supply model where agents can choose between rational and naive expectations. In an unstable market with (small) positive information costs for rational expectations, a high intensity of choice to switch predictors leads to highly irregular equilibrium prices converging to a strange attractor. The irregularity of the equilibrium time paths is explained by the existence of a so-called homoclinic orbit and its associated complicated dynamical phenomena. Thus local instability and global complicated dynamics may be a feature of a fully rational notion of equilibrium.

Ever since Nelson and Plosser (1982) found evidence in favor of the unit-root hypothesis for 13 long-term annual macro series, observed unit - root behavior has been equated with persistence in the economy. Perron (1989) questioned this interpretation, arguing instead that the "observed" behavior may indicate failure to account for structural change. Zivot and Andrews (1992) restored confidence in the unit-root hypothesis by incorporating an endogenous break point into the specification. By allowing for the possibility of two endogenous break points, we find more evidence against the unit-root hypothesis than Zivot and Andrews, but less than Perron.

This paper considers whether it is possible to devise a nonexperimental procedure for evaluating a prototypical job training programme. Using rich nonexperimental data, we examine the performance of a two-stage evaluation methodology that (a) estimates the probability that a person participates in a programme and (b) uses the estimated probability in extensions of the classical method of matching. We decompose the conventional measure of programme evaluation bias into several components and find that bias due to selection on unobservables, commonly called selection bias in econometrics, is empirically less important than other components, although it is still a sizeable fraction of the estimated programme impact. Matching methods applied to comparison groups located in the same labour markets as participants and administered the same questionnaire eliminate much of the bias as conventionally measured, but the remaining bias is a considerable fraction of experimentally-determined programme impact estimates. We test and reject the identifying assumptions that justify the classical method of matching. We present a nonparametric conditional difference-in-differences extension of the method of matching that is consistent with the classical index-sufficient sample selection model and is not rejected by our tests of identifying assumptions. This estimator is effective in eliminating bias, especially when it is due to temporally-invariant omitted variables.

We study changes in the real estate industry among organizational forms with varying degrees of restrictiveness and document the associated changes in profitability, free cash flow, debt, dividends, and investment policies. All troubled firms in our sample move to a more flexible organizational structure, with subsequent reductions in dividends, improvements in performance, and increases in asset sales and investments. Healthy firms that move to a tighter structure have larger free cash flows before the change; they increase dividends, reduce free cash flows and improve profitability after the change. We document evidence of tax considerations in organizational changes.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over terminal consumption can be inferred from wealth on a single sample path when markets are complete and returns follow a known law in a neo-classical investment problem in either a discrete-time i.i.d. binomial model or a continuous-time diffusion model with a Gaussian state variable. Numerical results suggest that useful information about preferences can be obtained from even a single noisy sample of monthly observations of a portfolio over 5 years.

The authors compare initial offer prices in privatizations to initial prices in public offerings of private companies. The evidence indicates that government officials in the United Kingdom underprice initial public offerenings (IPOs) significantly more than their private company counterparts. In Canada and Malaysia, however, the opposite is true. There does not appear to be a general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced to a greater degree than private company IPOs. The authors provide additional evidence on the determinants of privatization initial returns. Their findings indicate that initial returns are significantly higher in relatively primitive capital markets and for privatized companies in regulated industries.

This article develops a model of international equity portfolio investment flows based on differences in informational endowments between foreign and domestic investors. It is shown that, when domestic investors possess a cumulative information advantage over foreign investors about their domestic market, investors tend to purchase foreign assets in periods when the return on foreign assets is high and to sell when the return is low. The implications of the model are tested using data on U.S. equity portfolio flows.

We compare initial offer prices in privatizations to initial prices in public offerings of private companies. The evidence indicates that government officials in the United Kingdom underprice IPOs significantly more than their private company counterparts. In Canada and Malaysia, however, the opposite is true. There does not appear to be a general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced to a greater degree than private company IPOs. We provide additional evidence on the determinants of privatization initial returns. Our findings indicate that initial returns are significantly higher in relatively primitive capital markets and for privatized companies in regulated industries.

We compare initial offer prices in privatizations to initial prices in public offerings of private companies. The evidence indicates that government officials in the United Kingdom underprice IPOs significantly more than their private company counterparts. In Canada and Malaysia, however, the opposite is true. There does not appear to be a general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced to a greater degree than private company IPOs. We provide additional evidence on the determinants of privatization initial returns. Our findings indicate that initial returns are significantly higher in relatively primitive capital markets and for privatized companies in regulated industries.