We study the frequency of prime rate changes. We model the prime rate as a time-series variable that can be changed only at some cost. This yields a logit model in which the probability of a prime rate change is a function of market variables. We test this model using data from a micro data set that gives the dating of prime rate changes. The results indicate that adjustment costs are important to the prime rate adjustment process, and that changes in exogenous variables have a significantly larger effect on the probability of a prime rate increase than decrease.

Jeffrey Englin, J. S. Shonkwiler, Estimating Social Welfare Using Count Data Models: An Application to Long-Run Recreation Demand Under Conditions of Endogenous Stratification and Truncation, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 104-112

Thomas J. George, Chuan-Yang Hwang, Transitory Price Changes and Price-Limit Rules: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 313-327

The paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the private demand for STD testing and for protection against infection with emphasis on testing for the AIDS virus (HIV) and on the effects of public subsidies for such testing on the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases. We discuss the theoretical conditions under which subsidizing testing either increases or decreases disease incidence and provide evidence on the empirical significance of those conditions.

Experiments on privately provided public goods generally find that subjects are far more cooperative than predicted, while experiments on oligopolies and the commons almost always obtain the Nash-equilibrium predictions, despite being very similar games. This paper examines whether this difference could be due to the fact that with public goods there is a positive externality, while with the others the externality is negative. The result of the experiments is that subjects are more willing to cooperate when the externality is positive, even though the potential outcomes are the same. This suggests a behavioral asymmetry between the warm-glow of doing something good and cold-prickle of doing something bad.

We examine daily prices of eight goods at seventeen retail stores collected in Ann Arbor, Michigan, over a four-month period from November 1 to February 28. We focus on weekly and seasonal price patterns, and on the frequency of price markdowns or “sales.” There were frequent markdowns in the intensive shopping period prior to Christmas, and a tendency for such sales to occur on weekends. We interpret these findings as evidence that a significant number of markdowns are timed to occur when shopping intensity is exogenously high. We complement the imperfect information-based motives for sales in the literature by contributing an additional element based on the role of bulk shopping and increasing returns in the shopping technology.

We develop a measurement theory of market integration, based on two notions of “integrated markets”. First, two markets cannot be perfectly integrated in any sense if one can construct two portfolios, one from each market, that have identical payoffs but different prices. In that case, the law of one price is violated across the markets. Second, they cannot be integrated in a stronger sense if there are cross-market arbitrage opportunities. Two measures of market integration are developed, respectively reflecting these notions. The smaller the measures, the more closely integrated (in the respective senses) the markets. Among other things, they are interpreted as measuring pricing discrepancy between markets.

[In this article we provide econometric tools for the evaluation of intertemporal asset pricing models using specification-error and volatility bounds. We formulate analog estimators of these bounds, give conditions for consistency, and derive the limiting distribution of these estimators. The analysis incorporates market frictions such as short-sale constraints and proportional transactions costs. Among several applications we show how to use the methods to assess specific asset pricing models and to provide nonparametric characterizations of asset pricing anomalies.]

Analysts, Analysts reports, Investor behavior

The evidence reported in this paper suggests that institutional investors capture a large fraction of the short-run profits associated with IPOs. The favored status enjoyed by institutional investors in underpriced offerings appears, however, to carry a quid pro quo expectation that they will participate in less-attractive issues as well. This finding conforms with the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) prediction that U.S. underwriters behave strategically in the allocation of IPOs.