We examine theories of leverage and debt maturity, focusing on the impact of firms' investment opportunity sets and regulatory environments in determining these policies. Using results on strategic complementarities, we identify sufficient conditions for the theory to have testable implications for reduced-form and structural-equation regression coefficients. Obtaining testable implications for structural equations requires less from the theory but more from the data than the reduced-form specification because it requires an instrumental-variables approach. We examine this trade-off between theory and statistical methods and provide tests using two decades of data for over 5000 industrial firms.

This paper examines the linkages between discretionary accruals (DAs), managerial share ownership, management compensation, and audit fees. It draws on the theory that managers of firms with high management ownership are likely to use DAs to communicate value‐relevant information, while managers of firms with high accounting‐based compensation are likely to use DAs opportunistically to manage earnings to improve their compensation. OLS regression results of 648 Australian firms show that (1) there is a positive association between DAs and audit fees; (2) managerial ownership negatively affects the positive relationship between DAs and audit fees; and (3) this negative impact is further found to be weaker for firms with high accounting‐based management compensation.

We consider the problem of constructing a portfolio of finitely many assets whose returns are described by a discrete joint distribution.We propose mean-risk models that are solvable by linear programming and generate portfolios whose returns are nondominated in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. Next, we develop a specialized parametric method for recovering the entire mean-risk efficient frontiers of these models and we illustrate its operation on a large data set involving thousands of assets and realizations.

We consider the problem of constructing a portfolio of finitely many assets whose returns are described by a discrete joint distribution.We propose mean-risk models that are solvable by linear programming and generate portfolios whose returns are nondominated in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. Next, we develop a specialized parametric method for recovering the entire mean-risk efficient frontiers of these models and we illustrate its operation on a large data set involving thousands of assets and realizations.

Recent advances in information technology allow firms to provide broader access to their disclosures. We examine the determinants and effects of the decision to provide unlimited real-time access to conference calls (i.e., “open” conference calls). Our evidence suggests that the decision to provide open calls is associated with the composition of a firm's investor base and, to some degree, the complexity of its financial information. We also find that open calls are associated with a greater increase in small trades (consistent with individuals trading on information released during the call) and higher price volatility during the call period.

This paper examines the performance of Swiss banks from 1996 to 1999. Using a broad definition of bank output, we find evidence of large relative cost and profit inefficiencies in Swiss banks. A more narrow definition that focuses on only traditional activities leads to efficiency estimates that are even lower. We also find evidence of economies of scale for small and mid-size banks, but little evidence that significant scale economies remain for the very largest banks. Finally, evidence on scope economies is weak for the largest banks that are involved in a wide variety of financial activities. Taken together, these results suggest few obvious benefits from the trend toward larger, universal banks in Switzerland.

We examine the costs and benefits of the global integration of initial public offering (IPO) markets associated with the diffusion of U.S. underwriting methods in the 1990s. Bookbuilding is becoming increasingly popular outside the United States and typically costs twice as much as a fixed-price offer. However, on its own, bookbuilding only leads to lower underpricing when conducted by U.S. banks and/or targeted at U.S. investors. For most issuers, the gains associated with lower underpricing outweighed the additional costs associated with hiring U.S. banks or marketing in the United States. This suggests a quality/price trade-off contrasting with the findings of Chen and Ritter, particularly since non-U.S. issuers raising US20 million-US80 million also typically pay a 7% spread when U.S. banks and investors are involved.

Chen, Sean Chen, and Harry Sharma. We also benefited from discussions with our colleagues Ivan Brick, Oded Palmon, Emilio Venezian, and John Wald. We are particularly indebted to the anonymous referee and the editor, Paul Malatesta, for their valuable suggestions that greatly improve the paper. All errors are our own.

This paper uses a unique data set on corruption containing quantitative information on bribe payments of Ugandan firms. The data have two striking features: not all firms report that they need to pay bribes, and there is considerable variation in reported graft across firms facing similar institutions/policies. We propose an explanation for these patterns, based on differences in control rights and bargaining strength across firms. Consistent with the control rights/bargaining hypotheses, we find that the incidence of corruption can be explained by the variation in policies/regulations across industries. How much must bribe-paying firms pay? Combining the quantitative data on corruption with detailed financial information from the surveyed firms, we show that firms' "ability to pay" and firms' "refusal power" can explain a large part of the variation in bribes across graft-reporting firms. These results suggest that public officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, and that prices of public services are partly determined in order to extract bribes.