For a sample of U.S. firm years from 1980 through 1996 we document a positive association between the excess value of diversification as defined by Berger and Ofek [1995] and security analyst ratings of voluntary disclosure as developed by the Association for Investment Management and Research. We also examine an alternative proxy for disclosure quality that captures the degree of segment disaggregation and document a positive association between this measure and excess value. Our results are robust to controls for firm performance and information environment. Taken together, these phenomena suggest that disclosure plays a monitoring role in disciplining management's investment decisions. However, tests of the association between disclosure and the value of firms' investment spending yield mixed results.

We empirically analyze the dynamics of executives' pay‐to‐performance sensitivities. Option pay‐to‐performance sensitivities become weaker as options fall underwater, often leading to pressures to reprice options or restore pay‐to‐performance sensitivity in other ways. Building a detailed data set on executives' portfolios of stock and options, we find that the responsiveness of pay‐to‐performance sensitivities (created by all executive holdings of stock and options) to changes in stock price is large. The elasticity of pay‐to‐performance sensitivities with respect to stock price decreases is about 0.7 and is larger for high‐option executives and for executives with high percentages of options already underwater. The dominant mechanism through which companies offset declines in option pay‐to‐performance sensitivities is larger option grants following stock price declines; on average, these larger grants restore approximately 40% of the stock‐price‐induced pay‐to‐performance sensitivity declines. Option repricings are inconsequential in this regard, despite the attention they have attracted. In looking at positive returns, we find the reverse: higher returns both directly increase pay‐to‐performance sensitivities and lead to larger option grants, which raise pay‐to‐performance sensitivities further. Thus, option grants to executives tend to be largest following large stock price increases or large stock price decreases.

Using a sample of UK firms for the period 1996‐98, we provide empirical evidence on the relation between nonaudit services (NAS) purchase and three proxies for earnings management: (1) the likelihood that client firm accounting practices during the sample period were publicly criticized or subject to regulatory investigation; (2) the likelihood that client firms were required to restate prior financial statements or adjust current year results upon adoption of Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) No. 12, which was intended to curb opportunistic use of provisions; and (3) the mean absolute value of client discretionary working capital accruals over the sample period. The level of NAS purchase is measured, alternatively, as (1) the ratio of nonaudit to total auditor fees, (2) the natural log of NAS fees, and (3) the decile rank of a particular client's NAS fees given all NAS fees received by the audit firm practice office. With one exception, we find that all three measures of earnings management are positively and significantly associated with the three measures of NAS purchase.

We examine the market reaction to a sample of 403 restatements announced from 1995 to 1999. We document an average abnormal return of about −9 percent over a 2-day announcement window. We find that more negative returns are associated with restatements involving fraud, affecting more accounts, decreasing reported income and attributed to auditors or management (but not the Securities and Exchange Commission). There appears to be an additional penalty for announcements that do not quantify the restatement. Finally, we provide evidence on the relation between restatement announcements and analyst earnings forecast dispersion, bid–ask spreads and subsequent revisions in analyst earnings forecasts.

To evaluate early embryo development, 248 good to excellent bovine morulae were cultured in Ham's F-10 medium, supplemented with 10% steer serum, uterine flushings from Days 6, 10 or 15 following estrus (0.01, 0.1, 1.0 and 10% protein; 64 mg protein/ml), and 1.0% uterine flushings and 10% steer serum. Final development scores for embryos in steer serum were significantly higher (range across experiments was: 4.06 to 4.37) than for embryos cultured in uterine flushings alone (-0.23 to 0.52). Treatment means were not different (P >0.05) when 10% steer serum was added to 1.0% uterine flushings. A higher percentage of embryos in 10% steer serum (92%) than in 10% steer serum plus 1.0% uterine flushing from Day 6 (33%), Day 10 (45%) and Day 15 (50%) developed to hatched blastocysts. Embryos cultured in 1.0% Day 6 uterine flushings plus 10% steer serum required more time to attain the early blastocyst and blastocyst stages, while embryos in 1.0% Day 15 uterine flushings and 10% steer serum developed at the same rate as controls to the expanded blastocyst stage, but hatched sooner (72.8 vs 96.5 h). These results suggest substance(s) in uterine secretions can have inhibitory and stimulatory influences on early bovine embryo development.

The actions of the federal government can have a profound impact on financial markets. As prominent participants in the government decision making process, U.S. Senators are likely to have knowledge of forthcoming government actions before the information becomes public. This could provide them with an informational advantage over other investors. We test for abnormal returns from the common stock investments of members of the U.S. Senate during the period 1993–1998. We document that a portfolio that mimics the purchases of U.S. Senators beats the market by 85 basis points per month, while a portfolio that mimics the sales of Senators lags the market by 12 basis points per month. The large difference in the returns of stocks bought and sold (nearly one percentage point per month) is economically large and reliably positive.

This paper examines the price dynamics in the S&P 500 and Nasdaq-100 index futures contracts. By utilizing transactions data with attached trader type identification codes, we are able to analyze price dynamics for trades initiated by exchange locals and off-exchange customers. The empirical results show that price discovery appears to be initiated in the E-mini index futures contracts and that trades initiated by exchange locals seem to be more informative than those initiated by off-exchange traders. Furthermore, results show that exchange locals appear to make informed trades on the E-mini contracts around large trades that occur on the open outcry floor. We maintain that the exchange locals' ability to observe pit dynamics may contribute toward explaining the price leadership of the Emini contracts. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that exchange locals are informed traders who derive their informational advantage from the proximity to order flow.

Our paper re-examines the profitability of relative strength or momentum trading strategies (buying past strong performers and selling past weak performers). We find that standard relative strength strategies require frequent trading in disproportionately high cost securities such that trading costs prevent profitable strategy execution. In the cross-section, we find that those stocks that generate large momentum returns are precisely those stocks with high trading costs. We conclude that the magnitude of the abnormal returns associated with these trading strategies creates an illusion of profit opportunity when, in fact, none exists.