Suppose that engineers can demonstrate that air bags will reduce the risk of death in an automobile by 25 percent for any given frequency and severity of accidents. Would the installation of these devices necessarily reduce the fatality rate by 25 percent? The answer depends upon the response of drivers to the increased protection from dangerous accidents. If they increase their (speed, recklessness, driving while intoxicated, driving in unsafe conditions, etc.), they may realize substantially less than a 25 percent reduction in expected fatalities. Such offsetting behavior is not irrational: it merely represents a substitution of the marginal benefits of driving intensity for the reduced marginal cost of risk. If offsetting behavior actually occurs, it may be realized in increased risks for bicyclists, motorcyclists, and pedestrians. These externalities could be substantial unless there is a reduction in risk taking among these groups. As a result, the net effect of mandating air bags or any other safety device is far from obvious. There may be no net reduction in fatalities or serious injuries. These theoretical considerations are at the core of Sam Peltzman's classic study (1975) of automobile safety regulation. For policymakers, however, the key question is how much offsetting behavior actually occurs. As Peltzman (1977) acknowledges, offsetting behavior could be trivial or substantial. In this paper, we explore this issue, providing new empirical estimates of the effects of crashworthiness standards established for automobiles over the past fifteen years. These standards have required the installation of lapshoulder belts, energy-absorbing steering columns, head restraints, padded dashboards, crush-resistant passenger compartments, safer windshield mounting, more secure locks, and a variety of other features.

We analyze survey responses from nearly 600 tax executives to better understand corporate decisions about real investment location and profit repatriation. Our evidence indicates that avoiding financial accounting income tax expense is as important as avoiding cash income taxes when corporations decide where to locate operations and whether to repatriate foreign earnings. This result is important in light of the recent research about whether financial accounting affects investment and in light of the decades of research on foreign investment that examines the role of cash income taxes but heretofore has not investigated the importance of financial reporting effects. Our analysis suggests that financial reporting is an important factor to be considered in the policy debates focused on bringing investment to the United States.

There are two tax incentives for corporations to hedge: to increase debt capacity and interest tax deductions, and to reduce expected tax liability if the tax function is convex. We test whether these incentives affect the extent of corporate hedging with derivatives. Using an explicit measure of tax function convexity, we find no evidence that firms hedge in response to tax convexity. Our analysis does, however, indicate that firms hedge to increase debt capacity, with increased tax benefits averaging 1.1 percent of firm value. Our results also indicate that firms hedge because of expected financial distress costs and firm size.

Using a unique 10-year panel that includes more than 13,300 expected stock market return probability distributions, we find that executives are severely miscalibrated, producing distributions that are too narrow: realized market returns are within the executives’ 80% confidence intervals only 36% of the time. We show that executives reduce the lower bound of the forecast confidence interval during times of high market uncertainty; however, ex post miscalibration is worst during periods of high uncertainty. We also find that executives who are miscalibrated about the stock market show similar miscalibration regarding their own firms’ prospects. Finally, firms with miscalibrated executives seem to follow more aggressive corporate policies: investing more and using more debt financing.

Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) document a positive trend in idiosyncratic volatility during the 1962–1997 period. We show that by 2003 volatility falls back to pre-1990s levels. Furthermore, we show that the increase and subsequent reversal is concentrated among firms with low stock prices and high retail ownership. This evidence suggests that the increase in idiosyncratic volatility through the 1990s was not a time trend but, rather, an episodic phenomenon, at least partially associated with retail investors. Results from cross-sectional regressions, conditional trend estimation, stock-split events, and “attention-grabbing” events are consistent with a retail trading effect.

We provide insights into earnings quality from a survey of 169 CFOs of public companies and in-depth interviews of 12 CFOs and two standard setters. CFOs believe that (i) above all, high-quality earnings are sustainable and repeatable; specific characteristics include consistent reporting choices, backing by actual cash flows, and absence of one-time items and long-term estimates; (ii) about 50% of earnings quality is driven by non-discretionary factors such as industry and macro-economic conditions; (iii) in any given period, about 20% of firms manage earnings to misrepresent economic performance, and for such firms 10% of EPS is typically managed; (iv) earnings manipulation is hard to unravel from the outside but peer comparisons and lack of correspondence between earnings and cash flows provide helpful red flags. In addition, CFOs disagree with current standard setting on a number of issues including the sheer number of promulgated rules, the top-down approach to rule-making, the neglect of the matching principle, and the emphasis on fair value accounting. They indicate that a rules-based culture makes the audit function centralized and mechanical, and hinders the development of audit professionals. A summary impression from our work is that CFOs view earnings quality as more of a single and unconditional characteristic, in contrast to current research where measures of earnings quality are strongly conditional on the decision setting. This CFO view is related to their idea of “one number” – a single earnings metric that shapes both their interactions with external stakeholders and internal decision-making.

We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find board independence increases at CEO turnover and falls with CEO tenure, with the decline stronger following superior performance. CEOs are also more likely to be appointed board chair as tenure increases, and we find evidence consistent with a substitution between board independence and chair duality. Other results suggest that these classes of models fail to capture important elements of board dynamics. First, the magnitude of the CEO tenure effect is economically small, much smaller, for example, than the strong persistence in board structure that we show. Second, when external CEOs are hired, board independence falls and subsequently increases. Third, event studies show a positive market reaction when powerful CEOs die in office, consistent with powerful CEOs becoming entrenched.

We study the role of firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time-invariant firm and, especially, manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many settings, it is important to include fixed effects to mitigate potential omitted variable bias. Furthermore, we find that compensation fixed effects are significantly correlated with management styles (i.e., manager fixed effects in corporate policies). Finally, the method used in the article has a number of potential applications in financial economics. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Using data from the 1976 and 1978 National Longitudinal. Surveys of young men and young women, this study examines racial differences in the magnitude and composition of wealth and the reasons for them. On average, young black families hold 18 percent of the wealth of young white families, and hold their wealth in proportionately different forms. Even after controlling for racial differences in income and other demographic factors, as much as three-quarters of the wealth gap remains unexplained. We speculate on the causes for this, concluding that racial differences in intergenerational transfers most likely play an important role.

We survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to directly assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global financial crisis of 2008. We study whether corporate spending plans differ conditional on this survey-based measure of financial constraint. Our evidence indicates that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital spending. Constrained firms also burned through more cash, drew more heavily on lines of credit for fear banks would restrict access in the future, and sold more assets to fund their operations. We also find that the inability to borrow externally caused many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, with 86% of constrained U.S. CFOs saying their investment in attractive projects was restricted during the credit crisis of 2008. More than half of the respondents said they canceled or postponed their planned investments. Our results also hold in Europe and Asia, and in many cases are stronger in those economies. Our analysis adds to the portfolio of approaches and knowledge about the impact of credit constraints on real firm behavior.