A non-parametric analysis of technology, technical change, and productivity is presented in the context of cost minimizing behavior. A number of non-parametric tests concerning the existence and nature of technical change are applied to U.S. and Japanese manufacturing data. Non-parametric measures of technical change are presented.

This study tests the hypothesis that price expectations differ across individuals because they acquire different information about inflation. If price information is a normal good, then the amount of price information acquired will vary across individuals according to income, education, and other demand-specific variables, causing price expectations to be heteroscedastic with respect to these variables. Utilizing monthly household survey data, the authors test the heteroscedasticity hypothesis and find support for the differential information model. In addition, they develop a novel method of incorporating the "don't know" response to questions about inflation into the estimation of price expectations. Copyright 1990 by MIT Press.

ABSTRACT This paper presents an information‐theoretic, infinite horizon model of the equity issue decision. The model predicts that (a) equity issues on average are preceded by an abnormal positive return on the stock, although for some firms the issue is preceded by a loss; (b) equity issues on average are preceded by an abnormal rise in the market; and (c) the stock price drops at the announcement of an issue. The model provides a measure of the welfare cost of asymmetric information; the welfare loss may be small even if the price drop at issue announcement is large.

This paper presents an information-theoretic, infinite-horizon model of the equity issue decision. The model predicts that equity issues on average are preceded by an abnormal positive return on the stock, although for some firms the issue is preceded by a loss; equity issues on average are preceded by an abnormal rise in the market; and the stock price drops at the announcement of an issue. The model provides a measure of the welfare cost of asymmetric information; the welfare loss may be small even if the price drop at issue announcement is large.

Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual's payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors. Academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions, tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide. Our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses. We focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure (prize distribution) and measures of individual output (players' scores) are both available. We find strong support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in PGA tournaments influence players' performance.

Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual's payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors. Under certain sets of assumptions, tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide. Our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses. We focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure (prize distribution) and measures of individual output (players' scores) are both available. We find string support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in PGA tournaments influence players performance. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.