Reviews the book "Surviving Your Dissertation: A Comprehensive Guide to Content and Process," by Kjell Erik Rudestan and Rae R. Newton.

Reviews the book "The FASB Conceptual Framework 1973-1985: An Analysis," by Pelham Gore.

[Auditor liability is a growing concern of public accounting firms (Collins 1985; Flynn et al. 1990; Mednick 1987; Minow 1984). In lawsuits brought by clients for breach of contract and tort actions for negligent execution of an audit, as well as in an increasing number of lawsuits brought by third parties, a common defense is the auditor's compliance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). In this study, the source of professional auditing standards was manipulated to examine its influence on jurors' decisions. Four fact patterns were presented to members of jury pools called to jury duty. Prospective jurors responded to a fact pattern by voting in favor of either the plaintiff/client or the defendant/auditor. The fact patterns were manipulated to compare jurors' responses to standards of auditing performance established by the federal government versus those established by the auditing profession. In addition, a comparison was made of jurors' responses to two sets of instructions provided by the judge: either that standards alone set the required level of performance or that standards are only a part of the evidence to be considered in establishing the required level of performance. At trial, a judge's instructions to the jury before its deliberations can be influenced by counsel for the public accounting firm as to the evidentiary weight assigned to professional standards. The results that follow indicate that jurors are more likely to rule against a CPA firm when the profession's standards are offered in defense and less likely to rule against it when government standards of performance are offered in defense. Also, as expected, jurors are more likely to accept standards in defense, whether established by the government or the profession, if the judge identifies the standards as the only criterion for an expected level of performance rather than as only part of the evidence.]

Despite selling at substantial discounts, private placements of equity are associated with positive abnormal returns. The authors find evidence that discounts reflect information costs borne by private investors and abnormal returns reflect favorable information about firm value. Results are consistent with the role of private placements as a solution to the Myers and Majluf (1984) underinvestment problem and with the use of private placements to signal undervaluation. The authors also find some evidence of anticipated monitoring benefits from private sales of equity. For the smaller firms that comprise their sample, information effects appear to be relatively more important than ownership effects.

Maureen L. Cropper, Leland Deck, Nalin Kishor, Kenneth E. McConnell, Valuing Product Attributes Using Single Market Data: A Comparison of Hedonic and Discrete Choice Approaches, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 75, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 225-232

This paper examines the weapons-accumulation decisions of two adversarial countries in the context of a deterrence/conflict initiation game embedded in an overlapping-generations model. The demographic structure permits analysis of both within- and between-country intergenerational externalities caused by past weapons-accumulation decisions, as well as of intragenerational externalities from the adversary's current weapons accumulation. Zero accumulation is a possible equilibrium with both noncooperative and cooperative behavior. Countries may also accumulate weapons to the point where conflict initiation never occurs. Pareto-improving policies are generally available, but international cooperation need not be Pareto-improving.

This paper characterizes contingent claim formulas that are independent of parameters governing the probability distribution of asset returns. While these parameters may affect stock, bond, and option values, they are “invisible” because they do not appear in the option formulas. For example, the Black‐Scholes ( 1973 ) formula is independent of the mean of the stock return. This paper presents a new formula based on the log‐negative‐binomial distribution. In analogy with Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein's ( 1979 ) log‐binomial formula, the log‐negative‐binomial option price does not depend on the jump probability. This paper also presents a new formula based on the log‐gamma distribution. In this formula, the option price does not depend on the scale of the stock return, but does depend on the mean of the stock return. This paper extends the log‐gamma formula to continuous time by defining a gamma process. The gamma process is a jump process with independent increments that generalizes the Wiener process. Unlike the Poisson process, the gamma process can instantaneously jump to a continuum of values. Hence, it is fundamentally “unhedgeable.” If the gamma process jumps upward, then stock returns are positively skewed, and if the gamma process jumps downward, then stock returns are negatively skewed. The gamma process has one more parameter than a Wiener process; this parameter controls the jump intensity and skewness of the process. The skewness of the log‐gamma process generates strike biases in options. In contrast to the results of diffusion models, these biases increase for short maturity options. Thus, the log‐gamma model produces a parsimonious option‐pricing formula that is consistent with empirical biases in the Black‐Scholes formula.