Borrowing on credit cards at high interest rates might appear irrational. However, even low transactions costs can make credit cards attractive relative to bank loans. Credit cards also provide liquidity services by allowing consumers to avoid some of the opportunity costs of holding money. The effect of alternative interest rates on the demand for card debits can explain why credit card interest rates only partially reflect changes in the cost of funds. Credit card interest rates that are inflexible relative to the cost of funds are not inconsistent with a competitive equilibrium that yields zero profits for the marginal entrant.

Using synchronous transactions data for IBM from the New York, Pacific, and Midwest Stock Exchanges, we estimate an error correction model to investigate whether each of the exchanges is contributing to price discovery. Johansen's test yields two cointegrating vectors, which together verify the expected long-run equilibrium of equal prices across the three exchanges. Two error correction terms specified as the differences from IBM prices on the NYSE indicate that adjustments maintaining the long-run cointegration equilibrium take place on all three exchanges. That is, IBM prices on the NYSE adjust toward IBM prices on the Midwest and Pacific Exchanges, just as Midwest and Pacific prices adjust to the NYSE.

We examine evidence on omitted-ability bias in estimates of the economic return to schooling, using proxies for unobserved ability. We consider measurement error in these ability proxies and the potential endogeneity of both experience and schooling, and examine wages at labor market entry and later. Including ability proxies reduces the estimate of the return to schooling, and instrumenting for these proxies reduces the estimated return still further. Instrumenting for schooling leads to considerably higher estimates of the return to schooling, although only for wages at labor market entry. This estimated return generally reverts to being near (although still above) the OLS estimate if we allow experience to be endogenous. In contrast, for observations at least a few years after labor market entry, the evidence indicates that OLS estimates of the return to schooling that ignore omitted ability are, if anything, biased upward rather than downward.

Hostile takeovers may reduce the prevalence of long-term employment contracts if they facilitate the opportunistic expropriation of extramarginal wage payments. Our tests of two versions of the expropriation hypothesis improve on existing research by using firm- and establishment-level data from an employer salary survey, and by performing both ex ante and ex post tests. First, we study the relationship between proxies for extramarginal wage payments and subsequent hostile takeover activity, and find little evidence of an expropriation motive. Then. since we observe wage and employment structures both before and after takeovers. we investigate whether proxies for extramarginal wages drop after hostile takeovers. The ex post experiments provide evidence consistent with one version of the expropriation hypothesis. In particular, such takeovers appear to reduce extramarginal wage payments to more-tenured workers, mostly through flattening wage-seniority profiles in firms with relatively senior work forces.

This paper examines the effect of workers' compensation on time out of work. It introduces a "natural experiment" approach of comparing individuals injured before and after increases in the maximum weekly benefit amount. The increases examined in Kentucky and Michigan raised the benefit amount for high-earnings individuals by approximately 50 percent, while low-earnings individuals, who were unaffected by the benefit maximum, did not experience a change in their incentives. Time out of work increased for those eligible for the higher benefits and remained unchanged for those whose benefits were constant. The estimated duration elasticities are clustered around 0.3-0.4.

This article investigates market reactions to initiations and omissions of cash dividend payments. Consistent with prior literature, the authors find that the magnitude of short-run price reactions to omissions are greater than for initiations. In the year following the announcements, prices continue to drift in the same direction, though the drift following omissions is stronger and more robust. This postdividend initiation/omission price drift is distinct from and more pronounced than that following earnings surprises. A trading rule employing both samples earns positive returns in twenty-two out of twenty-five years. The authors find little evidence for clientele shifts in either sample.

The effects of various regulations on hospital costs are estimated using a two decade long panel data set which spans the initiation, and in some instances the repeal, of various forms of hospital regulation. The long panel fosters two improvements over previous research. First, as state hospital cost levels may affect states' incentive to regulate, fixed effect estimators alleviate omitted variable bias derived from the states' regulatory discretion. Second, the long panel permits the estimation of many different regulatory program effects, but also facilitates the analysis of potential regulatory program interaction. The empirical results suggest that previous studies have exaggerated regulatory cost savings: although some interaction effects are indicated, hospital costs appear unresponsive to most regulatory programs. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.