This paper examines the wealth effects of a decision by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) to permit interstate branching for federally chartered savings and loan associations (SLAs). An event study of key OTS announcements in 1991 and 1992 is conducted based on samples of 38 federally chartered SLAs and 88 commercial banks. Large SLAs and commercial banks generally experienced significant positive wealth effects but little or no reaction was found for smaller depository institutions. These findings provide early evidence that interstate branching powers for depository institutions under the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 will tend to benefit large institutions accelerating the trend toward consolidation, though without necessarily compromising the viability of smaller institutions.

We examine voluntary acquisitions of solvent stock-held thrift institutions since 1979, and find that bidding firms suffered losses, target firms gained, and the impact of the merger on the bidder-target pair was positive on average. During the post-FIR-REA period acquirers experienced smaller losses and targets experienced smaller gains relative to the pre-FIRREA period. An investigation into the motives of bidding firm management provides evidence indicating the presence of synergy, agency, and hubris motivations in the pre-FIRREA period. Although the acquisitions environment underwent substantial changes in the post-FIRREA period, we find no evidence of corresponding changes in acquisition motivations.

This paper proposes a methodology to investigate the process of technical change with a focus on the dynamic effects of R&D investments on productivity, and on the induced innovation hypothesis for both inputs and outputs. The approach builds on a nonparametric representation of the underlying technology. An application to U.S. agriculture is presented. By distinguishing between private and public R&D investments, the analysis provides useful insights into the source and the dynamic nature of technical progress.

This paper discusses the prevalence of Silicon Valley-style localizations of individual manufacturing industries in the United States. A model in which localized industry-specific spillovers, natural advantages, and random chance contribute to geographic concentration motivates new indices of geographic concentration and coagglomeration. The indices contain controls that facilitate cross-industry and cross-country comparisons. The authors find almost all industries to be more concentrated than a random dart-throwing model predicts but the degree of localization is often slight. They also discuss which industries are concentrated, the geographic scope of localization, coagglomeration patterns, and other topics. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Life-cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages. We tested this prediction using three samples of wages and hours of New York City cabdrivers, whose wages are correlated within days but uncorrelated between days. Estimated wage elasticities are significantly negative in two out of three samples. Elasticities of inexperienced drivers average approximately −1 and are less than zero in all three samples (and significantly less than for experienced drivers in two of three samples). Our interpretation of these findings is that cabdrivers (at least inexperienced ones): (i) make labor supply decisions “one day at a time” instead of intertemporally substituting labor and leisure across multiple days, and (ii) set a loose daily income target and quit working once they reach that target.

ABSTRACT We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross‐sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment‐reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO replacements, and the addition to the board of major stockholders.