We analyze several hundred firms that expand via acquisition and/or increase their number of business segments. The combined market reaction to acquisition announcements is positive but acquiring firm excess values decline after the diversifying event. Much of the excess value reduction occurs because our sample firms acquire already discounted business units, and not because diversifying destroys value. This implies that the standard assumption that conglomerate divisions can be benchmarked to typical stand‐alone firms should be carefully reconsidered. We also show that excess value does not decline when firms increase their number of business segments because of pure reporting changes.

Spot power prices are volatile and since electricity cannot be economically stored, familiar arbitrage‐based methods are not applicable for pricing power derivative contracts. This paper presents an equilibrium model implying that the forward power price is a downward biased predictor of the future spot price if expected power demand is low and demand risk is moderate. However, the equilibrium forward premium increases when either expected demand or demand variance is high, because of positive skewness in the spot power price distribution. Preliminary empirical evidence indicates that the premium in forward power prices is greatest during the summer months.

In this paper, we investigate the impact of economic incentives on the international supply of big-screen movies. More particularly, we also study the impact of a 1998 increase in the term of copyright on U.S. movie production.

This paper examines the relationship between book‐to‐market equity, distress risk, and stock returns. Among firms with the highest distress risk as proxied by Ohlson's (1980) O‐score, the difference in returns between high and low book‐to market securities is more than twice as large as that in other firms. This large return differential cannot be explained by the three‐factor model or by differences in economic fundamentals. Consistent with mispricing arguments, firms with high distress risk exhibit the largest return reversals around earnings announcements, and the book‐to‐market effect is largest in small firms with low analyst coverage.

Lab experiments have gone to extremes to isolate and repress other-regarding behavior in extensive-form bargaining games, with limited success. Consider, for example, Elizabeth Hoffman et al.’s (1996; hereafter HMS) Anonymous Dictator game. This game controls self-interested strategic behavior by giving a person complete control over the distribution of wealth, and complete anonymity from all others including the experimenter. While theory predicts people with complete control and complete anonymity will offer up nothing to others, in fact they still share the wealth in about 40 percent of the observed bargains. Such other-regarding choice is another example in which individual behavior differs from that predicted by subgame perfection, and supports the call for a new “behavioral game theory” (Colin F. Camerer, 1997). Herein we extend the work of HMS to reveal a setting in which 95 percent of dictators follow game-theoretic predictions. In contrast to previous studies, our design has people bargain over earned wealth rather than unearned wealth granted by the experimenter. We argue that just as rewards must be salient (Kyung Hwan Baik et al., 1999), the assets in a bargain must be legitimate to produce rational behavior. Our results support this conjecture. Dictators bargaining over earned wealth were more selfinterested than observed in previous studies; and when they had complete anonymity, selfless behavior is essentially eliminated.

We use the Ohlson (1995, 1999) and Feltham and Ohlson (1999) valuation models to investigate the market's perception of the economic effect of employee stock options (ESOs) on firm value for a sample of 85 profitable computer software companies. Our results suggest that the market appears to value these firms' ESO expense not as an expense but as an intangible asset (even after controlling for the endogeneity bias arising from the mechanical relation between ESOs and the underlying stock prices). However, we also find a conflict between: (1) the positive manner in which investors appear to value ESO expense, and (2) the negative relation between current ESO expense and future abnormal earnings. This conflict not only could be an artifact of the restrictiveness of the abnormal earnings forecasting equation we estimate, but it also calls into question whether investors assess correctly the effect of ESOs on profitable software firm value.