We test the hypothesis that low-visibility shocks to text-based network industry peers can explain industry momentum. We consider industry peer firms identified through 10-K product text and focus on economic peer links that do not share common Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Shocks to less visible peers generate economically large momentum profits and are stronger than own-firm momentum variables. More visible traditional SIC-based peers generate only small, short-lived momentum profits. Our findings are consistent with momentum profits arising partially from inattention to economic links of less visible industry peers.

House prices exhibit substantially more momentum, positive autocorrelation in price changes, than existing theories can explain. I introduce an amplification mechanism to reconcile this discrepancy. Sellers do not set a unilaterally high or low list price because they face a concave demand curve: increasing the price of an above-average-priced house rapidly reduces its sale probability, but cutting the price of a below-average-priced house only slightly improves its sale probability. The resulting strategic complementarity amplifies frictions because sellers gradually adjust their price to stay near average. I provide empirical evidence for concave demand using a quantitative search model that amplifies momentum two- to threefold.

Companies’ earnings conference calls are perceived to be venues for sell‐side equity analysts to ask management questions. In this study, we examine another important conference call participant—the buy‐side analyst—that has been underexplored in the literature due to data limitations. Using a large sample of transcripts, we identify 3,834 buy‐side analysts from 701 institutional investment firms who participated (i.e., asked a question) in 13,332 conference calls to examine the determinants and implications of their participation. Buy‐side analysts are more likely to participate when sell‐side analyst coverage is low and dispersion in sell‐side earnings forecasts is high, consistent with buy‐side analysts participating when a company's information environment is poor. Institutional investors trade more of a company's stock in the quarters in which their buy‐side analysts participate in the call. Finally, we find evidence that buy‐side analyst participation is associated with company‐level absolute changes in future stock price, trading volume, institutional ownership, and short interest.

This study examines the effects of audit partner tenure and audit partner changes on internal control reporting quality for large U.S. not‐for‐profit ( NFP ) organizations. Regulators contend that audit partners lose their objectivity over successive audits, reducing audit quality. A large body of research has examined this issue, primarily in non‐U.S. jurisdictions, with mixed results. We examine the associations between audit partner tenure and audit partner changes and the incidence of reported internal control deficiencies ( ICD s), the quality of internal control reports (following PCAOB audit quality indicators), and the severity of reported ICD s. We find negative associations between audit partner tenure and the incidence of reported ICD s, the quality of internal control reports, and the severity of reported ICD s. Together, these findings indicate that internal control reporting quality deteriorates with audit partner tenure. However, we find no association between audit partner changes and internal control reporting, which is consistent with partners lacking client specific knowledge in their first year with a client. Finally, we find no association between either audit partner tenure or changes and the likelihood of remediation. Our findings contribute large‐sample U.S. evidence on the association between audit partner tenure and internal control reporting quality and provide useful information to government regulators, NFP boards charged with the oversight of the external auditor and internal controls, and NFP stakeholders.

Increasing financial statement complexity along with an intense focus on audit quality has created challenges for today's auditors. As a result, audit firms are increasingly relying on various specialists to help them perform their audits. To better understand why and how audit firms are using forensic specialists on their audits, we conduct an exploratory survey of experienced audit and forensic professionals. Our results suggest auditors are largely relying on forensic specialists to provide them with additional comfort beyond that obtained from traditional audit procedures. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that the usage of forensic specialists occurs primarily on riskier engagements, such as those involving restatements, initial public offerings, and investigations by regulators or law enforcement agencies. Although their involvement varies, forensic specialists assist audit teams by providing both guidance and direct assistance across the audit in areas including fraud brainstorming, design of procedures to test for fraud, and review of results of fraud‐related testing. In addition, our findings indicate forensic specialist involvement may lead to greater comfort as evidenced by the perceived identification by forensic specialists of additional audit findings related to material misstatements, financial reporting fraud, misappropriation of assets, and internal control deficiencies. Our results also reveal the majority of auditor and forensic specialist participants believe the value of forensic involvement on audits outweighs the associated costs, even in the absence of such additional audit findings. We conclude our paper by offering a theoretical discussion of our findings based on the audit comfort framework and suggestions for future research. In summary, our findings suggest that the discomfort some auditors feel in the contemporary auditing environment is leading to changes in the rituals that underlie traditional audits such that they seek comfort afforded them through forensic specialist involvement.

We investigate whether attitudes toward gambling help explain the occurrence of intentional misreporting. Similar to gambling, some financial reporting choices involve taking deliberate, speculative risks. We predict that in places where gambling is more socially acceptable, managers will be more likely to take financial reporting risks that increase the likelihood the financial statements will need to be restated. To test this prediction, we exploit geographic variation in local gambling attitudes and find that restatements due to intentional misreporting are more common in areas where gambling is more socially acceptable. This association is even stronger in situations where management is under greater pressure to misreport, including when the firm is close to meeting a performance benchmark, experiencing poor financial performance, or under investment‐related pressure. Furthermore, these results are robust to numerous tests to address omitted variables and endogeneity. Collectively, these findings suggest gambling attitudes help explain the incidence of intentional misreporting.

We find that the level of short interest in a firm's stock significantly predicts future seasoned equity offers (SEOs). The probability of an SEO announcement increases by 34% (decreases by 49%) for firms in the top (bottom) quintile of short interest. We identify a causal impact of short interest on SEO issuance using a novel instrument for short interest based on future litigation filings in close geographical proximity to hedge fund centers. Our findings suggest that corporate decisions can be triggered by the aggregate trading activity of sophisticated outside investors.

We propose a criterion of approximate incentive compatibility, strategy-proofness in the large (SP-L), and argue that it is a useful second-best to exact strategy-proofness (SP) for market design. Conceptually, SP-L requires that an agent who regards a mechanism’s “prices” as exogenous to her report—be they traditional prices as in an auction mechanism, or price-like statistics in an assignment or matching mechanism—has a dominant strategy to report truthfully. Mathematically, SP-L weakens SP in two ways: (1) truth-telling is required to be approximately optimal (within epsilon in a large enough market) rather than exactly optimal, and (2) incentive compatibility is evaluated ex interim, with respect to all full-support i.i.d. probability distributions of play, rather than ex post with respect to all possible realizations of play. This places SP-L in between the traditional notion of approximate SP, which evaluates incentives to manipulate ex post and as a result is too strong to obtain our main results in support of SP-L, and the traditional notion of approximate Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility, which, like SP-L, evaluates incentives to manipulate ex interim, but which imposes common knowledge and strategic sophistication assumptions that are often viewed as unrealistic.

Policymakers are often interested in estimating how policy interventions affect the outcomes of those most in need of help. This concern has motivated the practice of disaggregating experimental results by groups constructed on the basis of an index of baseline characteristics that predicts the values of individual outcomes without the treatment. This paper shows that substantial biases may arise in practice if the index is estimated by regressing the outcome variable on baseline characteristics for the full sample of experimental controls. We propose alternative methods that correct this bias and show that they behave well in realistic scenarios.

When investors sell one asset and quickly buy another (“reinvestment days”), their trades suggest the original mental account is not closed, but is instead rolled into the new asset. Retail investors trading on their own accounts display a rolled disposition effect, selling the new position when its value exceeds the initial investment in the original position. On reinvestment days, these investors display no disposition effect (consistent with no disutility from realizing a loss) and make better selling decisions. Using a laboratory experiment, we show that reinvestment causally reduces the disposition effect and improves trading. Received April 10, 2016; editorial decision January 28, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.