Accepting the hypothesis that the time-series “facts” of the aggregate labour market may be summarized by the linear autoregressive and moving average representations of wages, prices, unemployment, and interest rates implies that a useful theory ought to lead to predictions about these representations. Following this approach, this paper first catalogues many of the time-series facts about the aggregate labour market and then compares them against alternative models of the labour market based on the intertemporal substitution and staggered contract hypotheses.

[This paper contains the formulation of the theoretical restrictions on the labor supply functions of the husband and wife in a model of family labor supply in a manner that makes them readily amenable to test and, if they are not rejected, to imposition onto the data. It also contains an application of the proposed empirical counterparts of the theoretical equations to cross-sectional data from the 1960 U.S. Census of Population.]

Thanks to standardized work protocol and technology of McDonald's restaurants, the hourly wage of McDonald's Basic Crew enables wage comparisons under near-identical skill inputs and hedonic job conditions. McWages capture labor costs in entry-level jobs, while the Big Macs (earned) Per Hour (BMPH) index measures corresponding purchasing power of wages. We document large and growing geographical wage differences in standardized jobs using data covering most U.S. counties during 2016-2023. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, there was no BMPH growth where minimum wages stayed constant, but the pandemic wage increase, which diminished the importance of minimum wages, was stronger in these areas.

Orley Ashenfelter, David Card, Using the Longitudinal Structure of Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Nov., 1985), pp. 648-660

The failure of many paintings to sell in art auctions indicates the presence of reserve prices set by sellers. This paper examines the relationship between sale rates and price surprises over time in art auctions. Using data on contemporary and impressionist art, we show that while sale rates appear to have little relationship to current prices, there exists a strong positive relationship of sale rates to unexpected aggregate price changes, which is reminiscent of a Phillips curve. As a result, sale rates provide a useful quantity indicator of the strength of the art market. The data also indicate that sale rates revert to "normal" very quickly following a price surprise. We estimate an empirical model to measure normal sale rates. We also find evidence that the reserve price is set on average at about 70% of the auctioneer's low estimate, as published in the auction catalog.

Estimating the Value of a Statistical Life: The Importance of Omitted Variables and Publication Bias by Orley Ashenfelter and Michael Greenstone. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 454-460 of American Economic Review, May 2004

A special exemption from the 1986 Age Discrimination Act allowed colleges and universities to enforce mandatory retirement of faculty at age 70 until 1994. We construct a survey that permits us to compare faculty turnover rates before and after the law changed at a large sample of institutions with defined contribution pension plans. After the elimination of compulsory retirement the retirement rates of 70- and 71-year-olds fell by two-thirds and were comparable to rates of 69-year-olds. These findings indicate that U.S. colleges and universities will experience a rise in the number of older faculty over the coming years.

It is generally recognized that possible gains from cooperation are not always realized because negotiating parties sometimes fail to reach agreement. Such negotiation failures are ex post inefficient and have long defied economist's attempts to explain them. In this paper we discuss breakdowns in collective bargaining when disputes are resolved by compulsory arbitration. We argue that the study of arbitration offers insights into the nature of negotiation failures which may be of general interest.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

In 1987 the federal government permitted states to raise the speed limit on their rural interstate roads, but not on their urban interstate roads, from 55 mph to 65 mph. Since the states that adopted the higher speed limit must have valued the travel hours they saved more than the fatalities incurred, this institutional change provides an opportunity to estimate an upper bound on the public’s willingness to trade off wealth for a change in the probability of death. Our estimates indicate that the adoption of the 65‐mph limit increased speeds by approximately 4 percent, or 2.5 mph, and fatality rates by roughly 35 percent. Together, the estimates suggest that about 125,000 hours were saved per lost life. When the time saved is valued at the average hourly wage, the estimates imply that adopting states were willing to accept risks that resulted in a savings of $1.54 million (1997 dollars) per fatality, with a sampling error roughly one‐third this value. We set out a simple model of states' decisions to adopt the 65‐mph limit that turns on whether their savings exceed their value of a statistical life. The empirical implementation of this model supports the claim that $1.54 million is an upper bound, but it provides imprecise estimates of the value of a statistical life.

Expert agents, such as lawyers, play a prominent role in conflict resolution, yet little is known about how they affect outcomes. We construct a model that permits us to estimate the influence of agents and test whether the parties in a dispute face prisoner's dilemma incentives. Using eighteen years of final-offer arbitration data from New Jersey, we find the parties do significantly better when they retain agents and that the parties learn about this benefit over time. However, we also find that the gain to using an agent is fully offset when the opposing party also hires an agent. Since agents are costly, this noncooperative equilibrium is Pareto inferior.