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Animal Spirits

American Economic Review 1992 82(3), 493-507
This paper constructs a stationary rational-expectations equilibrium in which an extraneous random variable, called animal spirits, causes fluctuations in unemployment. The model assumes costly matching in the labor market and a thin-market externality in the output market that makes the profitability of hiring depend positively on the number of firms hiring. The equilibrium does not rely on any effect of expected inflation on labor supply. It is also stable under learning; Bayesian updating induces convergence to the equilibrium with positive probability even if people start with no definite belief that animal spirits affect the profitability of hiring.

Bidding Rings

American Economic Review 1992 82(3), 579-599
We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members.

Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1992 107(2), 439-479
Using longitudinal data, we study the processes of job mobility and wage growth among young men. During the first ten years in the labor market, a typical worker will hold seven jobs, about two thirds of his career total. The evolution of wages plays a key role in this transition to stable employment: wage gains at job changes account for at least a third of early-career wage growth, and the wage is the key determinant of job changing decisions among young workers. Job changing is a critical component of workers' movement toward the stable employment relations of mature careers.