Nagesh S. Revankar, Naoyuki Yoshino, An `Expanded Equation' Approach to Weak-Exogeneity Tests in Structural Systems and a Monetary Application, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 173-177

A variance components model explains wage dispersion with a specific version of generalized least squares. The estimation preserves individual data while examining the influence of union penetration on dispersion in both the union and nonunion sectors. Controlling for both individual and industry characteristics and for the endogeneity of wages, union penetration correlates strongly with reduced dispersion in the union sector but not in the nonunion sector. A decomposition reveals the relative importance of the influences of union penetration and of union membership. Copyright 1990 by MIT Press.

This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural extension of the folk theorem to games of this sort would simply include this constraint in the definitions of the feasible payoffs and minmax values. In fact, this extension does obtain under the assumption that each player's choice of a mixed strategy for the stage game is publicly observable but, in contrast to standard repeated games, the set of equilibrium payoffs is different if players can observe only their opponents' realized actions.

Historical evidence indicates that hyperinflations can disrupt individuals' normal trading patterns and impede the orderly functioning of markets. To explore these issues, we construct a theoretical model of hyperinflation that focuses on individuals and their process of economic exchange. In our model buyers must carry cash while shopping, and some transactions take place in a decentralized setting in which buyer and seller negotiate over the terms of trade of an indivisible good. Since buyers face the constant threat of incoming younger (hence richer) customers, their bargaining position is weakened by inflation, allowing sellers to extract a higher real price. However, we show that higher inflation also reduces buyers' search, increasing sellers' wait for customers. As a result, the volume of transactions concluded in the decentralized sector falls. At high enough rates of inflation, all agents suffer a welfare loss.

Historical evidence indicates that hyperinflations can disrupt individuals' normal trading patterns and impede the orderly functioning of markets. To explore these issues, we construct a theoretical model of hyperinflation that focuses on individuals and their process of economic exchange. In our model buyers must carry cash while shopping, and some transactions take place in a decentralized setting in which buyer and seller negotiate over the terms of trade of an indivisible good. Since buyers face the constant threat of incoming younger (hence richer) customers, their bargaining position is weakened by inflation, allowing sellers to extract a higher real price. However, we show that higher inflation also reduces buyers' search, increasing sellers' wait for customers. As a result, the volume of transactions concluded in the decentralized sector falls. At high enough rates of inflation, all agents suffer a welfare loss.

This paper develops and empirically tests a two-factor model for pricing financial and real assets contingent on the price of oil. The factors are the spot price of oil and the instantaneous convenience yield. The parameters of the model are estimated using weekly oil futures contract prices from January 1984 to November 1988, and the model's performance is assessed out of sample by valuing futures contracts over the period November 1988 to May 1989. Finally, the model is applied to determine the present values of one barrel of oil deliverable in one to ten years time.

Over the past decade, Sanford Grossman's contributions to the economics of information have significantly altered the way economists think about rational expectations. Here his articles are collected in one place, providing a uniform framework for understanding how prices convey information in securities markets. Grossman elaborates a new model of economic equilibrium that casts a dual role for prices both as constraints that affect the immediate costs or benefits of acts and as conveyers of information about the probable future costs and benefits of those acts. He points to the Wall Street panic of October 1987 as an example of the informational role of prices where volatility actually represented sophisticated trading strategies by relatively uninformed individuals.

Previous studies of owner-occupied housing typically ignore the taxation of capital gains because homeowners do not pay a capital gains tax if they buy up when they move. However, the capital gains tax code introduces a kink into the budget constraint of most previous homeowners, causing previous owners to face a different price of housing depending on whether they buy up or down. We control for the kinked budget constraint within a maximum likelihood model of owner-occupied housing demand. Results indicate that failure to model the capital gains tax provisions leads to inefficient estimates of the elasticities of demand. However, controlling for the kink did not lead to statistically different coefficient estimates relative to a linear budget constraint model.

Studies the effects of the disclosure of nonpublic information to explain target firms' runups prior to mergers. Criticisms on the disclosure system; US Securities and Exchange Commission's disclosure laws; Effects of ownership control structure on the dissemination of firms' acquisition-related information.