This paper investigates the optimal sequencing of debt issues. Our theoretical model suggests that once firms issue debt with one level of seniority, they may have an incentive to alternate seniorities, because of violations of the priced absolute priority rule (APR). When we introduce explicit costs of class conflict, the model yields cases of alternating seniorities and other cases in which firms issue only one class of debt. The implications of the model are consistent with the observed regularities in a large database of debt issues. We test several other implications of our model as well.

This paper studies the linkages between bank performance, connections to powerful politicians, and the degree of economic freedom in a bank’s home state. We find that bank performance is positively related to state economic freedom. We also reconfirm the finding of Gropper et al. (2013) that bank performance is improved by political connections. However, the positive effect of political connections appears to be significantly reduced when there is a higher degree of economic freedom in the state, indicating that political connections may matter less to banks when there is more economic freedom. Economic freedom in a state can have a beneficial effect on state economic growth and hence may outweigh any political connection benefits. However, the declines in state economic freedom in recent years could make political connections potentially more valuable to banks.

We examine the link between the threat of violence and democratization in the context of the Great Reform Act passed by the British Parliament in 1832. We geo-reference the so-called Swing riots, which occurred between the 1830 and 1831 parliamentary elections, and compute the number of these riots that happened within a 10 km radius of the 244 English constituencies. Our empirical analysis relates this constituency-specific measure of the threat perceptions held by the 344,000 voters in the Unreformed Parliament to the share of seats won in each constituency by pro-reform politicians in 1831. We find that the Swing riots induced voters to vote for pro-reform politicians after experiencing first-hand the violence of the riots.

Reduced-form models of default that attribute a large fraction of credit spreads to compensation for credit-event risk typically preclude the most plausible economic justification for such risk to be priced, namely, a contemporaneous drop in the market portfolio. When this “contagion” channel is introduced within a general equilibrium framework for an economy comprising a large number of firms, credit-event risk premia have an upper bound of a few basis points, and are dwarfed by the contagion premium. We provide empirical evidence that indicates credit-event risk premia are less than 1 bp, but contagion risk premia are significant.

We analyse the causal impact of competition on managerial quality and hospital performance. To address the endogeneity of market structure we analyse the English public hospital sector where entry and exit are controlled by the central government. Because closing hospitals in areas where the governing party is expecting a tight election race (“marginals”) is rare due to the fear of electoral defeat, we can use political marginality as an instrumental variable for the number of hospitals in a geographical area. We find that higher competition results in higher management quality, measured using a new survey tool, and improved hospital performance. Adding a rival hospital increases management quality by 0.4 standard deviations and increases survival rates from emergency heart attacks by 9.7%. We confirm the robustness of our IV strategy to “hidden policies” that could be used in marginal districts to improve hospital management and to changes in capacity that may follow from hospital closure.

ABSTRACT Prior archival studies find that firms that voluntarily adopted clawback policies have experienced a reduction in restatements. I experimentally examine this outcome by investigating the influence of two key factors (i.e., executive compensation structure and auditor quality) on financial reporting executives' (hereafter, “executives”) decision-making regarding a proposed restatement that will lead to a clawback of their incentives. I find that executives (i.e., CFOs, controllers, and treasurers) facing a lower quality auditor are less likely to agree with amending prior financial statements when a higher proportion of their pay is incentive-based. However, this tendency is reduced when executives face a higher quality auditor, indicating that higher quality auditors can act as effective monitors. My results identify an ex post unintended consequence of clawback regulation that could at least partially offset the benefits of the ex ante deterrent effects of clawbacks, and that could contribute to findings of less frequent restatements when clawback policies are in place. I discuss potential implications regarding the role of executives during restatement decisions and auditors' risk assessments in a clawback environment. Data Availability: Data are available from the author upon request.

ABSTRACT Standard-setters believe high-quality internal audit functions (IAFs) serve as a key resource to audit committees for monitoring senior management. However, regulators do not enforce IAF quality or require disclosures relating to IAF quality, which is in stark contrast to regulatory requirements placed on boards, audit committees, and external auditors. Using proprietary data, I find that a composite measure of IAF quality is negatively associated with the likelihood of management misconduct even after controlling for board, audit committee, and external auditor quality. This result is robust to a variety of other specifications, including controlling for internal control quality and separate estimation during the pre- and post-SOX time periods. A difference-in-differences analysis indicates that misconduct firms have low IAF quality and competence during misconduct years and improve IAF quality and competence in the post-misconduct years. These findings suggest that regulators, audit committees, and other stakeholders should consider ways to improve IAF quality.

Volatility clustering is a well-known stylized feature of financial asset returns. This paper investigates asymmetric pattern in volatility clustering by employing a univariate copula approach of Chen and Fan (2006). Using daily realized kernel volatilities constructed from high frequency data from stock and foreign exchange markets, we find evidence that volatility clustering is highly nonlinear and strongly asymmetric in that clusters of high volatility occur more often than clusters of low volatility. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one to address and uncover this phenomenon. In particular, the asymmetry in volatility clustering is found to be more pronounced in the stock markets than in the foreign exchange markets. Further, the volatility clusters are shown to remain persistent for over a month and asymmetric across different time periods. Our findings have important implications for risk management. A simulation study indicates that models which accommodate asymmetric volatility clustering can significantly improve the out-of-sample forecasts of Value-at-Risk.

We ask whether past macro-economic and bank-specific shocks experienced and survived by a bank affect its current capitalization and risk-taking. Using Call Report data from 1984 to 2010, we find that a bank's experience shapes its capital structure and risk appetite. Banks that have survived periods of undercapitalization tend to implement higher equity ratios and take less risk in the periods following such crises, as measured by net charge-offs, non-performing loans, or earnings volatility 10-25 years later. However, observing high rates of failure among other banks stirs banks in the opposite direction. The evidence is suggestive of institutional memory affecting banks' capital and risk-taking.

During the financial crisis, life insurers sold long-term policies at deep discounts relative to actuarial value. The average markup was as low as −19 percent for annuities and −57 percent for life insurance. This extraordinary pricing behavior was due to financial and product market frictions, interacting with statutory reserve regulation that allowed life insurers to record far less than a dollar of reserve per dollar of future insurance liability. We identify the shadow cost of capital through exogenous variation in required reserves across different types of policies. The shadow cost was $0.96 per dollar of statutory capital for the average company in November 2008. (JEL G01, G22, G28, G32)