We propose a novel approach to measuring long-run returns to mergers. In a new data set of close bidding contests we use losers‘ post-merger performance to construct the counterfactual performance of winners had they not won the contest. Stock returns of winners and losers closely track each other over the 36 months before the merger, and bidders are also very similar in terms of Tobin’s Q, profitability and other accounting measures. Over the three years after the merger, however, losers outperform winners by 24 percent (14 percent internationally). Commonly used methodologies such as announcement returns fail to identify acquirors‘ underperformance.

Most firms deleverage from their historical peak market-leverage (ML) ratios to near-zero ML, while also markedly increasing cash balances to high levels. Among 4, 476 nonfinancial firms with five or more years of post-peak data, median ML is 0.543 at the peak and 0.026 at the later trough, with a six-year median time from peak to trough and with debt repayment and earnings retention accounting for 93.7% of the median peak-to-trough decline in ML. The findings support theories in which firms deleverage to restore ample financial flexibility and are difficult to reconcile with most firms having materially positive leverage targets. Received November 17, 2016; editorial decision November 9, 2017 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web Site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We study the effect of corporate cultural similarity on merger decisions and outcomes. Using the similarity in firms’ corporate social responsibility characteristics to proxy for cultural similarity, we find that culturally similar firms are more likely to merge. Moreover, these mergers are associated with greater synergies, superior long-run operating performance, and fewer write-offs of goodwill. Our evidence is consistent with the notion that cultural similarity eases post-deal integration. Our results contribute to the literature on the determinants of merger success, provide new evidence on the impact of corporate culture, and offer a new approach to defining firms’ cultural similarity.

This paper uses new data from the PSID to quantify the relative importance of negative equity versus ability to pay, in driving mortgage defaults between 2009 and 2013. These data allow us to construct household budgets sets that provide better measures of ability to pay. Changes in ability to pay have large estimated effects. Job loss has an equivalent effect on the propensity to default as a 35% decline in equity. Strategic motives are also found to be quantitatively important, as we estimate more than 38% of households in default could make their mortgage payments without reducing consumption.

Over 20 percent of prison and jail inmates in the United States are currently awaiting trial, but little is known about the impact of pretrial detention on defendants. This paper uses the detention tendencies of quasi-randomly assigned bail judges to estimate the causal effects of pretrial detention on subsequent defendant outcomes. Using data from administrative court and tax records, we find that pretrial detention significantly increases the probability of conviction, primarily through an increase in guilty pleas. Pretrial detention has no net effect on future crime, but decreases formal sector employment and the receipt of employment- and tax-related government benefits. These results are consistent with (i) pretrial detention weakening defendants' bargaining positions during plea negotiations and (ii) a criminal conviction lowering defendants' prospects in the formal labor market. (JEL J23, J31, J65, K41, K42)

ABSTRACT Often, firms reveal oversights and bad decisions publicly through their financial reporting (for instance, restating earnings, impairing goodwill, etc.). These “confessions,” which usually lead to immediate reputation losses, may be attributed to attempts to be perceived as transparent or to attempts to avoid likely litigation costs. In this paper, however, we argue that reputational concerns about perceived ability alone can provide firms with strong enough incentives to confess their mistakes, even in the absence of other non-reputational disciplinary mechanisms. Analyzing the repeated interaction between a firm and an external evaluator who may detect the firm's mistakes, we show that, in equilibrium, a confession places the firm under higher future scrutiny, which is more costly for lower-quality firms. Consequently, in equilibrium, higher-quality firms confess mistakes more often.

ABSTRACT We examine the role of the chief marketing officer (CMO) in corporate voluntary disclosure of future revenues. Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms for the period from 2003 to 2011, we find that the presence of an influential CMO in top management is positively associated with the likelihood of a firm issuing a management revenue forecast. We also find that firms with an influential CMO provide more accurate revenue forecasts than other firms. These findings extend to long-window change analyses and are robust to the use of a propensity score matched-pair approach. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that CMO influence in top management appears to play an important role in voluntary revenue disclosures. JEL Classifications: M12; M31; M41. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the paper.

ABSTRACT We find that option returns are significantly lower over nontrading periods, the vast majority of which are weekends. Our evidence suggests that nontrading returns cannot be explained by risk, but rather are the result of widespread and highly persistent option mispricing driven by the incorrect treatment of stock return variance during periods of market closure. The size of the effect implies that the broad spectrum of finance research involving option prices should account for nontrading effects. Our study further suggests how alternative industry practices could improve the efficiency of option markets in a meaningful way.

We study trading behavior and the properties of prices in informationally complex markets. Our model is based on the single‐period version of the linear‐normal framework of Kyle (1985). We allow for essentially arbitrary correlations among the random variables involved in the model: the value of the traded asset, the signals of strategic traders and competitive market makers, and the demand from liquidity traders. We show that there always exists a unique linear equilibrium, characterize it analytically, and illustrate its properties with a number of applications. We then use this characterization to study the informational efficiency of prices as the number of strategic traders becomes large. If liquidity demand is positively correlated (or uncorrelated) with the asset value, then prices in large markets aggregate all available information. If liquidity demand is negatively correlated with the asset value, then prices in large markets aggregate all information except that contained in liquidity demand.

ABSTRACT Estimating expected credit losses on banks' portfolios is difficult. The issue has become of increasing interest to academics and regulators with the FASB and IASB issuing new regulations for loan impairment. We develop a measure of the one-year-ahead expected rate of credit losses (ExpectedRCL) that combines various measures of credit risk disclosed by banks. It uses cross-sectional analyses to obtain coefficients for estimating each period's measure of expected credit losses. ExpectedRCL substantially outperforms net charge-offs in predicting one-year-ahead realized credit losses, and reflects nearly all the credit loss-related information in the charge-offs. ExpectedRCL also contains incremental information about one-year-ahead realized credit losses relative to the allowance and provision for loan losses and the fair value of loans. It is a better predictor of the provision for loan losses than analyst provision forecasts, and is incrementally useful beyond other credit risk metrics in predicting bank failure up to one year ahead.