This paper uncovers a novel component for exchange rate predictability based on the price difference between sovereign credit default swaps denominated in different currencies. This new forecasting variable – the credit-implied risk premium – captures the expected currency depreciation conditional on a severe but rare credit event. Using data for 16 Eurozone countries, we find that the credit-implied risk premium positively forecasts the dollar-euro exchange rate return at various horizons. Moreover, a currency strategy that exploits the informative content of our predictor generates substantial out-of-sample economic value against the naïve random walk benchmark.

We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single‐peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The proposer cannot commit to future proposals. When players are patient, there can be equilibria with Coasian dynamics: the veto player's private information can largely nullify proposer's bargaining power. Our main result, however, is that under some conditions there also are equilibria in which the proposer obtains the high payoff that he would with commitment power. The driving force is that the veto player's single‐peaked preferences give the proposer an option to “leapfrog,” that is, to secure agreement from only low‐surplus types early on to credibly extract surplus from high types later. Methodologically, we exploit the connection between sequential bargaining and static mechanism design.

We find that the tail risk of a firm's stock returns is positively affected by the tail risk of other firms held by the same common institutional blockholder (CIB). The CIB peer effect on tail risk increases (decreases) after exogenous initiations (terminations) of peer connections via CIB ownership, consistent with a causal interpretation. Our findings support the disclosure herding hypothesis, which predicts that firms release bad news after other firms’ bad news announcements. In addition, commonality in the real investment decisions of a firm and its CIB peers, along with the common trading pressure of these firms, contribute to the positive relationship between firms’ tail risk, highlighting the multifaceted roles of institutional investors in the contagion of firms’ tail risk. Finally, the CIB peer effect on tail risk is stronger when the CEO is more risk averse, CIBs hold more shares, or CIBs are pressure-sensitive (i.e., banks and insurance companies).

Using novel supervisory data reported in the Volcker metrics, we examine how the internal risk limits of bank-affiliated corporate bond dealers evolved from 2017 to 2020 as indication of capacity constraints on their market making activity. We document that dealers’ internal risk limits came closer to binding during the March 2020 market turmoil. Although dealers eased their limits to accommodate increased liquidity demand, limit adjustments were not enough to offset the increase in risk exposures. We find limit tightness is negatively associated with subsequent inventory growth at dealers’ bond trading desks, especially during the COVID-19 crisis or on days with limit changes. Overall, our results indicate the importance of internal risk limits in driving dealers’ liquidity provision in time of stress.

We document a novel strategic motive for family business groups to utilize their internal capital markets (ICMs) during financial crises. We find that crisis-period group ICM activity is targeted toward exerting product market dominance over standalone rivals. Groups make significant post-crisis gains in market share that are concentrated among affiliates (and industry segments within affiliates) operating in highly competitive product markets, where capturing such gains is difficult in normal times. These patterns are observed only in emerging markets, suggesting that ICMs enable groups to exploit crises to realize long-term competitive advantages only when rivals face chronic financing frictions.

The world has 1.4 billion passenger vehicles. How should governments regulate their air pollution emissions? A Pigouvian tax is technologically infeasible. Most countries instead rely on exhaust standards that limit air pollution emissions per mile for new vehicles. We assess the effectiveness and efficiency of these standards, which are the centerpiece of U.S. Clean Air Act regulation of transportation, and counterfactual policies. We show that the air pollution emissions per mile of new U.S. vehicles has fallen spectacularly, by over 99%, since standards began in 1967. Several research designs with a half century of data suggest that exhaust standards have caused most of this decline. Yet exhaust standards are not cost-effective in part because they fail to encourage scrap of older vehicles, which account for the majority of emissions. To study counterfactual policies, we develop an analytical and a quantitative model of the vehicle fleet. Analysis of these models suggests that tighter exhaust standards increase social welfare and increasing registration fees on dirty vehicles yields even larger gains by accelerating scrap, although both reforms have complex effects on inequality.

We present theory and empirical evidence that greater financial reporting quality can incentivize myopic investments. In the model, greater financial reporting quality increases investor response to earnings, elevating the manager’s incentive to invest myopically to improve earnings. Using the setting of Big N auditors’ acquisitions of non-Big Ns, which increased investor response to earnings for the acquired client firms, we find evidence supporting myopic investments. Specifically, acquired clients decrease intangible investments, particularly when (1) the increase in investor response to earnings is larger and (2) the horizon of shareholders is shorter. The investment decrease is inefficient, as evidenced by reduced profitability, fewer exploratory innovations, and other measures.

Existing research suggests that retail trading is associated with volatility in financial markets. To extend the literature, we study the dynamic effects of retail trading on volatility during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using marketable retail trades identified from the Boehmer et al. (2021) algorithm and novel empirical methods discussed in Jordá (2005), we document a negative, persistent impact of retail trading on the stability of stock prices that is particularly stronger during the pandemic than during the pre-pandemic period. These results highlight how periods of crises – like the pandemic – affect the destabilizing influence of retail trading. To provide additional evidence, we replicate our empirical exercise during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Consistent with the COVID-19 period, we again find that retail trading leads to more volatility during the financial crisis vis-á-vis the pre-crisis period. These results again support the idea that periods of crises strengthen the link between retail trading and volatility.

We study return predictability using a model of speculative trading among competitive traders who agree to disagree about the precision of private information. Although traders apply Bayes' Law consistently, returns are predictable. In addition to trading on long‐term fundamental value, traders also trade on perceived short‐term opportunities arising from foreseen future disagreement, as in a Keynesian beauty contest. Contradicting conventional wisdom, this short‐term speculation dampens price fluctuations and generates time‐series momentum. Model calibration shows quantitatively realistic patterns of return dynamics. Consistent with empirical evidence, our model predicts more pronounced momentum for stocks with higher trading volume.

We examine the contribution of trade to the rise of modern agriculture, taking into account interactions between trade, input requirements, and technology adoption. We develop and estimate a new multicountry general equilibrium model that incorporates producers’ choices of which crops to produce and with which technologies at the level of grid cells covering the earth’s surface. We find that trade cost reductions in agricultural inputs and the international transmission of productivity growth in the agricultural input sector since the 1980s induced large shifts from traditional, labor-intensive technologies to modern, input-intensive ones, with important global and distributional implications for productivity and welfare.