ABSTRACT The capital asset‐pricing model's (CAPM) primary empirical implication is a positively sloped linear relation between a security's expected rate of return and its relative risk (beta). Recent research indicates that inferences about the risk‐return relation are sensitive to the choice of the return measurement interval. We perform multivariate tests of the Sharpe‐Lintner CAPM using monthly and annual returns on market‐value‐ranked portfolios. The CAPM is rejected using monthly returns, a result consistent with previous research. In contrast, we fail to reject the CAPM when annual holding period returns are used.

We examine the specification and power of tests based on performance-matched discretionary accruals, and make comparisons with tests using traditional discretionary accrual measures (e.g., Jones and modified-Jones models). Performance matching on return on assets controls for the effect of performance on measured discretionary accruals. The results suggest that performance-matched discretionary accrual measures enhance the reliability of inferences from earnings management research when the hypothesis being tested does not imply that earnings management will vary with performance, or where the control firms are not expected to have engaged in earnings management.

ABSTRACT A substantial literature investigates conditional conservatism, defined as asymmetric accounting recognition of economic shocks (“news”), and how it depends on various market, political, and institutional variables. Studies typically assume the Basu [1997] asymmetric timeliness coefficient (the incremental slope on negative returns in a piecewise‐linear regression of accounting income on stock returns) is a valid conditional conservatism measure. We analyze the measure's validity, in the context of a model with accounting income incorporating different types of information with different lags, and with noise. We demonstrate that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient varies with firm characteristics affecting their information environments, such as the length of the firm's operating and investment cycles, and its degree of diversification. We particularly examine one characteristic, the extent to which “unbooked” information (such as revised expectations about rents and growth options) is independent of other information, and discuss the conditions under which a proxy for this characteristic is the market‐to‐book ratio. We also conclude that much criticism of the Basu regression misconstrues researchers’ objectives.

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average , delays the release of bad news to investors.

In competitive product markets, product prices and thus firms' revenues incorporate the cost of equity capital. In a competitive capital market, the cost of equity capital (the expected return on equity) increases with the risk of firms' Investments. Because accounting earnings are calculated without deducting the cost of equity capital, they are expected to be an increasing function of firms' investment risks. This simple competitive equilibrium analysis predicts a positive relation between changes in investment risk and expected earnings. The presence of corporate debt complicates the analysis because leverage effects seem likely to affect the relation between changes in investment risk and expected earnings. Using annual earnings and return data from 1950 to 1988, we document a statistically significant positive association between changes in equities' relative risks and in earnings. However, on average, only a small proportion of changes in earnings can be attributed to changes in risk. A much larger proportion is attributable to changes in economic rents (windfall gains and losses). The observed positive association between changes in earnings and changes in equities' risks suggests that leverage effects do not fully offset the effect of changes in investment risks. This association is robust with respect to subperiod analysis, alternative specifications of the earnings change variable, alternative data-availability requirements, and the number of portfolios formed.

We document problems in measuring raw and abnormal five-year contrarian portfolio returns. ‘Loser’ stocks are low-priced and exhibit skewed return distributions. Their 163% mean return is due largely to their lowest-price quartile position. A $18-th price increase reduces the mean by 25%, highlighting their sensitivity to micro-structure/liquidity effects. Long positions in low-priced loser stocks occur disproportionately after bear markets and thus induce expected-return effects. A contrarian portfolio formed at June-end earns negative abnormal returns, in contrast with the December-end portfolio. This conclusion is not limited to a particular version of the CAPM.

ABSTRACT CEOs of S&P 500 firms that report high non-GAAP earnings relative to GAAP earnings receive substantial unexplained pay. Crucially, this result remains even after controlling for the level of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings. These firms are relatively poor performers (i.e., low GAAP earnings and stock returns) and have less powerful CEOs, consistent with non-GAAP earnings being used as justification when high executive pay is more likely to cause outrage. Additionally, despite the lower GAAP and return performance, these firms are more likely to beat the earnings targets specified in their compensation plans, which likely increases investors' perceptions of core operating earnings and reduces outrage. Indeed, these firms face less dissent from shareholders and proxy advisors, and no additional media scrutiny. Our evidence suggests that the fraction of CEO pay that seems attributable to opportunistic non-GAAP reporting, while limited, is economically meaningful. JEL Classifications: G14; G34; G38; M12; M41.

ABSTRACT We assess the role of both accruals manipulation (AM) and real activities manipulation (RAM) in inducing overvaluation at the time of a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Our results reveal that earnings management is most consistently and predictably linked with post-SEO stock market underperformance when it is driven by RAM; in particular, the opportunistic reduction of expenditures on R&D and selling, general, and administrative activities. Thus, overvaluation at the time of the SEO is more likely when managers actively engage in more opaque channels to overstate earnings. Our findings are particularly relevant because managers exhibit a greater propensity for RAM at the time of SEOs, even though RAM is more costly in the long run. JEL Classifications: G14; G31; M4; M41