This study adds to the literature on accounting incompleteness and instability an understanding of how accounting acts upon an object that is practised as a multiple. It explores how accounting, in the form of a sales and operations planning (SO this adds new accountings onto existing ones, all of which exist simultaneously.

Relying on theories in which bank create private money by making loans that create deposits—a process we call “funding liquidity creation”—we measure how much funding liquidity the U.S. banking system creates. Private money creation by banks enables lending to not be constrained by the supply of cash deposits. During the 2001–2020 period, 92 percent of bank deposits were due to funding liquidity creation, and during 2011–2020 funding liquidity creation averaged $10.7 trillion per year, or 57 percent of GDP. Using natural disasters data, we provide causal evidence that better-capitalized banks create more funding liquidity and lend more even during times when cash deposit balances are falling or unchanged. Large banks as well as the top banks in Federal Reserve districts create more liquidity.

Does the early-career exposure of bank CEOs to the 1980s savings and loans (S&L) crisis affect the outcomes of banks they subsequently managed? We measure the S&L crisis exposure by the bank failure rate in the states where CEOs worked during the S&L crisis. Armed with this measure, we find that banks managed by CEOs with higher S&L crisis exposure took on less risk and that these banks better survived the financial crisis of 2008. In particular, CEOs adjusted risk attitudes in areas causing the S&L crisis: their more intense crisis experience reduced banks’ interest rate risk, exposure to risky financial innovation and credit risk. We establish the causal interpretation of the findings by evaluating the impact of crisis exposure via CEO hometown states and exploiting quasi-exogenous turnovers due to CEO retirement. Overall, CEOs learned from the past industry crisis which helped curtail their institutions’ risk exposures and enhance later crisis performance.

We find that corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. Despite the rise in term loans without financial covenants—so-called covenant-lite loans—borrowing firms’ revolving lines of credit almost always retain traditional financial covenants. This split structure gives revolving lenders the exclusive right and ability to monitor and to renegotiate the financial covenants, and we confirm that loans with split control rights are still subject to the discipline of financial covenants. We provide evidence that split control rights are designed to mitigate bargaining frictions that have arisen with the entry of nonbank lenders and became apparent during the financial crisis.

What is the role of information intermediaries in corporate governance? This paper examines equity analysts’ influence on managers’ earnings management decisions. Do analysts serve as external monitors to managers, or do they put excessive pressure on managers? Using multiple measures of earnings management, I find that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less. To address the potential endogeneity problem of analyst coverage, I use two instrumental variables based on change in broker size and on firm's inclusion in the Standard & Poor's 500 index, and I find that the results are robust. Finally, given the number of covering analysts, analysts from top brokers and more experienced analysts have stronger effects against earnings management.

[We conduct an analysis of the risk and return characteristics of a number of widely used fixed-income arbitrage strategies. We find that the strategies requiring more "intellectual capital" to implement tend to produce significant alphas after controlling for bond and equity market risk factors. These positive alphas remain significant even after taking into account typical hedge fund fees. In contrast with other hedge fund strategies, many of the fixed-income arbitrage strategies produce positively skewed returns. These results suggest that there may be more economic substance to fixedincome arbitrage than simply "picking up nickels in front of a steamroller."]

[We use a cost of carry model with nonzero transaction costs to motivate estimation of a nonlinear dynamic relationship between the S&P 500 futures and cash indexes. Discontinuous arbitrage suggests that a threshold error correction mechanism may characterize many aspects of the relationship between the futures and cash indexes. We use minute-by-minute data on the S&P 500 futures and cash indexes. The results indicate that nonlinear dynamics are important and related to arbitrage, and suggest that arbitrage is associated with more rapid convergence of the basis to the cost of carry than would be indicated by a linear model.]

This paper examines how culture affects information asymmetry in financial markets. We extract firms traded in the United States but headquartered in regions sharing Chinese culture (“Chinese firms”), and we manually identify a group of U.S. analysts of Chinese ethnic origin (“Chinese analysts”). We find that Chinese analysts issue more accurate forecasts on Chinese firms than non-Chinese analysts. The effect is stronger among firms with less transparent information environments. Further evidence suggests that cultural proximity can go beyond language commonality and analysts’ pre-existing channels for information. Market reaction is stronger when Chinese analysts issue favorable forecast revisions or upgrades about Chinese firms.