Prior research finds that clients of high-quality auditors report higher-quality GAAP earnings. We extend this research to investigate whether auditor quality is associated with the quality of voluntarily disclosed non-GAAP earnings measures. Using a sample of Australian firms disclosing annual non-GAAP metrics, we find that clients of high-quality auditors are more likely to voluntarily disclose non-GAAP earnings numbers. However, clients of high-quality auditors make adjustments in calculating non-GAAP earnings (non-GAAP exclusions) that are less predictive of future earnings and less value relevant than those of other firms. These results indicate that their adjustments are of higher quality. We also find similar results for U.S. firms using a sample of quarterly non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Overall, our evidence indicates that commonly used indicators of audit quality for GAAP reporting are positively associated with the quality of voluntarily disclosed non-GAAP earnings measures.

The stylized fact that volatility is not priced in individual equity options does not withstand scrutiny. First, we show that the average return of heavily traded deep out‐of‐the‐money call options on stocks is −116 basis points per day. Second, Fama‐MacBeth estimates of the volatility risk premium in stock options are similar to those in S&P 500 Index call options. Third, the mean return of heavily traded delta‐hedged at‐the‐money calls (puts) is −23 (−30) basis points. Fourth, the variance risk premium in stock options is negative. Our analysis highlights the importance of microstructure biases and robustness in empirical work with options.

We empirically investigate one form of illegal investor‐level tax evasion and its effect on foreign portfolio investment. In particular, we examine a form of round‐tripping tax evasion in which U.S. individuals hide funds in entities located in offshore tax havens and then invest those funds in U.S. securities markets. Employing Becker's ( ) economic theory of crime, we identify the tax evasion component by examining how foreign portfolio investment varies with changes in the incentives to evade and the risks of detection. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence of investor‐level tax evasion affecting cross‐border equity and debt investment.

Motivated by the literature on investment flows and optimal trading, we examine intraday predictability in the cross‐section of stock returns. We find a striking pattern of return continuation at half‐hour intervals that are exact multiples of a trading day, and this effect lasts for at least 40 trading days. Volume, order imbalance, volatility, and bid‐ask spreads exhibit similar patterns, but do not explain the return patterns. We also show that short‐term return reversal is driven by temporary liquidity imbalances lasting less than an hour and bid‐ask bounce. Timing trades can reduce execution costs by the equivalent of the effective spread.

We examine the impact of political, institutional, and economic factors on the choice between selling a state‐owned enterprise in the public capital market through a share issue privatization (SIP) and selling it in the private capital market in an asset sale. SIPs are more likely in less developed capital markets, for more profitable state‐owned enterprises, and where there are more protections of minority shareholders. Asset sales are more likely when there is less state control of the economy and when the firm is smaller. Our results suggest the importance of privatization activities in developing the equity markets of privatizing countries.

Performance measure noise can be a critical barrier to employees' learning. Using an experiment, we examine whether the effects of performance measure noise on employees' learning depends on the type of learning in which employees engage: experiential versus vicarious. We predict and find performance measure noise has a more deleterious effect on learning when such learning occurs experientially rather than vicariously. Specifically, we find experiential learners demonstrate less learning as performance measure noise increases, but vicarious learners show no such effect of performance measure noise. Collectively, our findings suggest performance measure noise and learning type play important roles in the extent to which firms realize the decision-facilitating benefits of performance measurement systems. In particular, since much of the learning in modern organizations occurs vicariously, our findings suggest performance measure noise may not be as detrimental to employees' learning as previously thought.

Employee contracts often allow for managerial discretion, such that the manager decides after observing an employee's performance how that employee will be rewarded or penalized. Importantly, the effects of such evaluation outcomes can extend beyond the employee(s) directly affected, because such outcomes can be observed by other employees within the firm. The net effect of such vicarious learning as an indirect control depends on the inferences employees make after observing a peer's evaluation outcome. In this study, we use an experiment to investigate whether the inferences observer-employees make about how managers evaluate and reward employee behavior depend on whether the valence of the observed outcome is positive or negative. Using the setting of a strategic performance measurement system, we test and find support for a causal model, in which the valence of the observed outcome influences observer-employees' inferences and subsequent behavioral focus via their psychological distance from, and their construal of, the observed outcome. Our results suggest that how observer-employees respond after observing a peer employee's evaluation outcome is asymmetric. Specifically, when contemplating their own behavior, employees who observe positive outcomes focus on the performance measures within the strategic performance measurement system, whereas those who observe negative outcomes focus on the underlying strategic construct.

In recent years, many companies have emphasized adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers in their quarterly press releases. While managers use different names to describe these nonstandard earnings metrics, the financial press frequently refers to them as “pro forma” earnings. Managers and other advocates of pro forma reporting argue that these disclosures provide a clearer picture of companies' core earnings. On the other hand, regulators, policymakers, and the financial press often allege that managers' pro forma earnings disclosures are opportunistic attempts to mislead investors. Recent evidence suggests that while many pro forma earnings disclosures are altruistically motivated, some may represent managers' attempts to portray overly optimistic financial performance. If this is the case, then less wealthy, less sophisticated, individual investors are arguably the most at risk of being misled. Consequently, this study investigates who trades on pro forma earnings information. Our intraday investigation of transactions around earnings announcements containing pro forma earnings information reveals that less sophisticated investors' announcement-period abnormal trading is significantly positively associated with the magnitude and direction of the earnings surprise based on pro forma earnings. In contrast, we find no association between sophisticated investors' trading and manager-reported pro forma information. Overall, our analyses and numerous robustness tests suggest that the segment of the market that relies on pro forma earnings information is populated predominantly by less sophisticated individual investors. This evidence is particularly relevant to standard-setters and regulators given that Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and subsequent SEC regulations are specifically designed to protect ordinary investors from misleading pro forma information.

The article presents a report of the Committee on Educational Standards. The purpose of accounting education is to prepare students for careers in accounting and in related fields and to prepare them to deal effectively with problems they will face as practicing members of their profession and as responsible citizens of the social and economic community in which they live. In recent years, the pattern of collegiate education for business in the U.S. has received considerable attention. The resulting re-examination of objectives, evaluations of course content, and revisions of curricula have had a major impact on accounting education as an element in the business school program. As the accounting function in modern society grows, the role of the accountant inevitably becomes larger and more important. The demand for well-educated accountants is currently high and promises to remain strong in the foreseeable future. The purpose of this study is to formulate some guidelines pointing to the educational standards that should prevail in any institution of higher education that offers degree programs involving a major in accounting, to the end that one or more degrees in accounting will indicate a standard of educational background and qualification for a professional field.

A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice. We present a model of a polluter whose discharges harm multiple owners, and we compare property rules, liability rules, and regulation on efficiency grounds. We provide conditions under which property rules are preferred to liability rules, thus verifying the Calabresi-Melamed conjecture. Regulation that enforces partial abatement may be preferred to either of the extreme rules. An empirical analysis of water quality in the United States before and after the Clean Water Act shows that the effects of regulation are consistent with several predictions of the model.