Analyzing a sample of Chinese firms, we find that when companies receive more coverage from FinTech advisory firms, their stock prices move less in tandem with the overall market. This suggests that FinTech coverage improves how accurately stock prices reflect firm-specific information. Our results hold true across multiple testing methods and alternative ways of measuring stock price synchronicity. Further analysis shows that FinTech coverage reduces stock price synchronicity primarily by addressing information gaps between companies and investors. Additionally, greater FinTech coverage improves stock liquidity and lowers the costs of raising debt or equity financing. When examining the topics covered by FinTech firms, we find that diverse coverage topics are linked to lower stock price synchronicity, with discussions on finance, corporate governance, and negative sentiment playing a particularly effective role. Finally, a textual analysis reveals that FinTech coverage includes significantly more firm-specific information than traditional analyst reports.

We estimate the term structures of risk-neutral forward variance and skewness, and examine their predictive power for equity market excess returns and variance. We use Partial Least Squares to extract a single predictive factor from each term structure that is motivated by the theoretical implications of affine no-arbitrage models. The empirical analysis shows that an increased forward variance factor, FVF (forward skewness factor, FSF) corresponds to a more negatively sloped forward variance (more U-shaped forward skewness) term structure, and significantly forecasts higher future market excess returns and variance. More importantly, FSF exhibits predictive power for market returns that is stronger than, and incremental to, that provided by FVF. However, it does not outperform FVF in terms of excess variance predictability.

We provide strong evidence that the dispersion of individual stock options trading volume across moneynesses (IDISP) contains valuable information about future stock returns. Stocks with high IDISP consistently underperform those with low IDISP by more than 1% per month. In line with the idea that IDISP reflects dispersion in investors’ beliefs, we find that the negative IDISP-return relationship is particularly pronounced around earnings announcements, in high sentiment periods and among stocks that exhibit relatively high short-selling impediments. Moreover, the IDISP effect is highly persistent and robustly distinct from the effects of a large array of previously documented cross-sectional return predictors.

We propose and test a social outreach hypothesis of family firm succession. We argue that family firms proactively engage in social outreach activities as a strategy to ensure smooth succession. We focus on corporate philanthropy (CP), a social outreach activity, in a family firm succession to test our hypothesis. The results show that family firms engage in a strategy of using more CP in connection to family firm succession, especially when the successor is from the second generation. The findings are robust to alternative specifications of CP activities, various sub-sample analyses, using a difference-in-differences analysis, a two-stage least square approach, strategic choice on timing of succession, and accounting for the successor's education and experience of working for the family firm before succession. We document that despite generally poorer performance after succession, a family firm with a second-generation CEO that engages in CP exhibits better market and accounting performance relative to other types of transitions, suggesting a strategy in which CP reduces the magnitude of poor performance after succession.

A large number of newly listed firms have significant involvement in international business activity. In this paper, we examine the effect of international business activity on the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs), post-IPO performance, and survival. In a large sample of U.S. IPOs over 1981–2012, we find that firms with exports and/or foreign sales prior to going public have significantly lower underpricing than firms without international business activity. Furthermore, firms with international business activity significantly outperform purely domestic IPO firms over 3- and 5-year periods after going public and have a significantly higher survival rate. Overall, we provide strong evidence that global diversification has an economically significant effect on the valuation and subsequent performance of firms going public.

Defaults often have a large influence on consumer decisions. We identify an overlooked but practical alternative to defaults: requiring individuals to make an explicit choice for themselves. We study such "active decisions" in the context of 401(k) saving. We find that compelling new hires to make active decisions about 401(k) enrollment raises the initial fraction that enroll by 28 percentage points relative to a standard opt-in enrollment procedure, producing a savings distribution three months after hire that would take 30 months to achieve under standard enrollment. We also present a model of 401(k) enrollment and derive conditions under which the optimal enrollment regime is automatic enrollment (i.e., default enrollment), standard enrollment (i.e., default non-enrollment), or active decisions (i.e., no default and compulsory choice). Active decisions are optimal when consumers have a strong propensity to procrastinate and savings preferences are highly heterogeneous. Financial illiteracy, however, favors default enrollment over active decision enrollment.

Using an experiment in which 3.1 million bank customers were encouraged to save, we explore the mechanisms behind coholding liquid savings and credit card debt. Theoretically, we show that the joint responses of spending, saving, and borrowing to the nudge differ across economic models of coholding. Using machine learning techniques, we find that the most responsive individuals reduce spending and increase savings by 4.9% (206 USD PPP per month) while their credit card debt remains unchanged. These individuals' marginal responses to the nudge are consistent with our model of coholding for the purpose of self‐ or partner‐control.

We use events related to a proxy access rule passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010 as natural experiments to study the valuation effects of changes in shareholder control. We find that valuations increase (decrease) following increases (decreases) in perceived control, especially for firms that are poorly performing, have shareholders likely to exercise control, and where acquiring a stake is relatively inexpensive. These results suggest that an increase in shareholder control from its current level would generally benefit shareholders. However, we find that the benefits of increased control are muted for firms with shareholders whose interests may deviate from value maximization.

CEO compensation can influence the kinds of strategies that firms adopt. We argue that performance‐related compensation creates an incentive to look for overly ambitious, hard to implement strategies. At a cost, shareholders can curb this tendency by precommitting to a regime of CEO overcompensation in highly changeable environments. Alternatively shareholders can commit to low CEO pay, although this requires a commitment mechanism (either by the board of the individual company, or by the society as a whole) to counter the incentive to renegotiate upwards. We study the conditions under which the different policies for CEO compensation are preferred by shareholders.