There has been a great deal of discussion about whether the marginal utility of income rises with income. Most notably, Milton Friedman and Leonard J. Savage argued in their classic paper that the willingness to gamble implies that the marginal utility of income is rising over a range. The discussions of rising marginal utility and of Friedman-Savage gambles have proceeded independently of the literature on time preference, although the issues are in fact related logically. Drawing on this logical relationship we shall show 1) that at least when intertemporal utility is separable, the stable levels of consumption that are usually observed imply that the marginal utility of income decreases as income rises. 2) Even if the marginal utility of income does increase, Friedman-Savage gambles normally will not maximize utility; saving and dissaving can attain the levels of consumption which generate the most utility per dollar of income at a lower cost than gambles unless imperfections in the capital market are severe. 3) Even when the utility function is not temporally separable, repeated gambling cannot be a rational way of dealing with a rising marginal utility of income. We therefore conclude that observed gambling is seldom if ever explained by the logic set out in Friedman and Savage's seminal paper. In view particularly of the stability of consumption levels and the lack of FriedmanSavage gambles, we conclude that marginal utility of income does not rise with income. I. A Conceptual Framework

We examine monthly variation in weekly work hours using data from 2003 to 2010. The data sources include the Current Population Survey (CPS) on hours/worker, the Current Employment Survey (CES) on hours/job, and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) on both. The ATUS data minimize recall difficulties and constrain hours of work to accord with total available time. The ATUS hours/worker are less cyclical than the CPS series, but the hours/job are more cyclical than the CES series. We present alternative estimates of productivity based on ATUS data, and find that it is more pro-cyclical than other productivity measures.

Liberalization of the European automobile distribution system in 2002 limits the ability of manufacturers to impose vertical restraints, leading to a substantial increase in competitive pressure among dealers. We estimate an equilibrium model of profit maximization to evaluate how dealers change their innovation adoption strategies following the elimination of exclusive territories. Using French data we evaluate the existence of complementarities between the adoption of software applications and the scale of production. Firms view these innovations as substitutes and concentrate their effort in one type of software as they expand their scale of production. Results are robust to the existence of unobserved heterogeneity.

A common view is that cross-border vertical linkages played a key role in the 2008–2009 collapse of global trade. This paper presents two accounting results from a global input-output framework that shed light on this channel. We feed in observed changes in final demand and find that trade in final goods fell by twice as much as trade in intermediate goods. Nevertheless, intermediate goods account for more than two-fifths of the trade collapse. We also find that vertical specialization trade fell 13 percent, while value-added trade fell by 10 percent, because declines in demand were largest in highly vertically-specialized sectors.

Financial Instability, Reserves, and Central Bank Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008 by Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh and Alan M. Taylor. Published in volume 99, issue 2, pages 480-86 of American Economic Review, May 2009

Consistent with mental accounting, we document that investors sometimes choose the asset allocation for one account without considering the asset allocation of their other accounts. The setting is a firm that changed its 401(k) matching rules. Initially, 401(k) enrollees chose the allocation of their own contributions, but the firm chose the match allocation. These enrollees ignored the match allocation when choosing their own-contribution allocation. In the second regime, enrollees simultaneously selected both accounts' allocations, leading them to mentally integrate the two. Own-contribution allocations before the rule change equal the combined own- and match-contribution allocations afterwards, whereas combined allocations differ sharply across regimes.

Inexperienced women, along with economics and business majors, are much more susceptible to the winner’s curse, as are subjects with lower SAT/ACT scores. There are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced subjects. These selection effects are not identified using standard econometric techniques but are identified through experimental treatment effects. Ignoring these selection effects leads to misleading estimates of learning.

Will U.S. Agriculture Really Benefit from Global Warming? Accounting for Irrigation in the Hedonic Approach by Wolfram Schlenker, W. Michael Hanemann and Anthony C. Fisher. Published in volume 95, issue 1, pages 395-406 of American Economic Review, March 2005

The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and Why Such Failures Are Rare) by C. Nicholas McKinney, Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth. Published in volume 95, issue 3, pages 878-889 of American Economic Review, June 2005

We examine the effect of the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services system. This program “profiles” Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants to determine their probability of benefit exhaustion and then provides mandatory employment and training services to claimants with high predicted probabilities. Using a unique experimental design, we estimate that the program reduces mean weeks of UI benefit receipt by about 2.2 weeks, reduces mean UI benefits received by about $143, and increases subsequent earnings by over $1,050. Most of the effect results from a sharp increase in early UI exits in the treatment group relative to the control group.