The annual proportion of U.S. public firms that reported a financial covenant violation fell roughly 70% between 1997 and 2019. To understand this trend, we develop an estimable model of covenant design that depends on the ability to differentiate between distressed and nondistressed borrowers and the relative costs associated with screening incorrectly. We find that the drop in violations is best explained by an increased willingness to forgo early detection of distressed borrowers in exchange for fewer inconsequential violations, which we attribute largely to a shift in the composition of public borrowers and partly to heightened investor sentiment during the 2010s.

Past studies document that incentive conflicts may lead issuer‐paid credit rating agencies to provide optimistically biased ratings. In this paper, we present evidence that investors question the quality of issuer‐paid ratings and raise corporate bond yields where the issuer‐paid rating is more positive than benchmark investor‐paid ratings. We also find that some firms with favorable issuer‐paid ratings substitute public bonds with borrowings from informed intermediaries to mitigate the “lemons discount” associated with poor quality ratings. Overall, our results suggest that the quality of issuer‐paid ratings has significant effects on borrowing costs and the choice of debt.

We show that collateral constraints restrict firm entry and postentry growth, using French administrative data and cross‐sectional variation in local house‐price appreciation as shocks to collateral values. We control for local demand shocks by comparing treated homeowners to controls in the same region that do not experience collateral shocks: renters and homeowners with an outstanding mortgage, who (in France) cannot take out a second mortgage. In both comparisons, an increase in collateral value leads to a higher probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Conditional on entry, treated entrepreneurs use more debt, start larger firms, and remain larger in the long run.

We report evidence on the determinants of whether the relationship between a firm and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is governed by an explicit (written) or an implicit agreement. We find that fewer than half of the CEOs of S&P 500 firms have comprehensive explicit employment agreements. Consistent with contracting theory, explicit agreements are more likely to be observed and are likely to have a longer duration in situations in which the sustainability of the relationship is less certain and where the expected loss to the CEO is greater if the firm fails to honor the agreement.

We test overreaction theories of short‐run momentum and long‐run reversal in the cross section of stock returns. Momentum profits depend on the state of the market, as predicted. From 1929 to 1995, the mean monthly momentum profit following positive market returns is 0.93%, whereas the mean profit following negative market returns is −0.37%. The up‐market momentum reverses in the long‐run. Our results are robust to the conditioning information in macroeconomic factors. Moreover, we find that macroeconomic factors are unable to explain momentum profits after simple methodological adjustments to take account of microstructure concerns.

What ties together the traditional commercial banking activities of deposit‐taking and lending? We argue that since banks often lend via commitments, their lending and deposit‐taking may be two manifestations of one primitive function: the provision of liquidity on demand. There will be synergies between the two activities to the extent that both require banks to hold large balances of liquid assets: If deposit withdrawals and commitment takedowns are imperfectly correlated, the two activities can share the costs of the liquid‐asset stockpile. We develop this idea with a simple model, and use a variety of data to test the model empirically.

Japanese stock returns are even more closely related to their book‐to‐market ratios than are their U.S. counterparts, and thus provide a good setting for testing whether the return premia associated with these characteristics arise because the characteristics are proxies for covariance with priced factors. Our tests, which replicate the Daniel and Titman (1997) tests on a Japanese sample, reject the Fama and French (1993) three‐factor model, but fail to reject the characteristic model.

This study assesses the stock return performance of 131 firms emerging from Chapter 11. Using differing estimates of expected returns, we consistently find evidence of large, positive excess returns in 200 days of returns following emergence. We also examine the reaction of our sample firms' equity returns to their earnings announcements after emergence from Chapter 11. The positive and significant reactions suggest that our results are driven by the market's expectational errors, not mismeasurement of risk. The results provide an interesting contrast, but not a contradiction, to previous work that has documented poor operating performance for firms emerging from Chapter 11.

We model the time‐series relation between price and intrinsic value as a cointegrated system, so that price and value are long‐term convergent. In this framework, we compare the performance of alternative estimates of intrinsic value for the Dow 30 stocks. During 1963–1996, traditional market multiples (e.g., B/P, E/P, and D/P ratios) have little predictive power. However, a V/P ratio, where V is based on a residual income valuation model, has statistically reliable predictive power. Further analysis shows time‐varying interest rates and analyst forecasts are important to the success of V. Alternative forecast horizons and risk premia are less important.