Many leading asset pricing models are specified so that the term structure of dividend volatility is either flat or upward sloping. These models predict that the term structures of expected returns and volatilities on dividend strips (i.e., claims to dividends paid over a prespecified interval) are also upward sloping. However, the empirical evidence suggests otherwise. This discrepancy can be reconciled if these models replace their proposed dividend dynamics with processes that generate stationary leverage ratios. Under such policies, shareholders are forced to divest (invest) when leverage is low (high), which shifts risk from long‐ to short‐horizon dividend strips.

We investigate a structural model of market and firm‐level dynamics in order to jointly price long‐dated S&P 500 index options and CDO tranches of corporate debt. We identify market dynamics from index option prices and idiosyncratic dynamics from the term structure of credit spreads. We find that all tranches can be well priced out‐of‐sample before the crisis. During the crisis, however, our model can capture senior tranche prices only if we allow for the possibility of a catastrophic jump. Thus, senior tranches are nonredundant assets that provide a unique window into the pricing of catastrophic risk.

Our examination of the cross‐section of expected returns reveals economically and statistically significant compensation (about 6 to 9 percent per annum) for beta risk when betas are estimated from time‐series regressions of annual portfolio returns on the annual return on the equally weighted market index. The relation between book‐to‐market equity and returns is weaker and less consistent than that in Fama and French (1992). We conjecture that past book‐to‐market results using COMPUS‐TAT data are affected by a selection bias and provide indirect evidence.

Our examination of the cross-section of expected returns reveals economically and statistically significant compensation (about 6 to 9% per annum) for beta risk when betas are estimated from time-series regressions of annual portfolio returns on the annual return on the equal-weighted market index. The relation between book-to-market equity and returns is weaker than that in Fama and French (1992a). We conjecture that book-to-market results using COMPUSTAT data are affected by a selection bias and provide indirect evidence.

Applying Fishburn's [4] conditions for convex stochastic dominance, exact linear programming algorithms are proposed and implemented for assigning discrete return distributions into the first‐ and second‐order stochastic dominance optimal sets. For third‐order stochastic dominance, a superconvex stochastic dominance approach is defined which allows classification of choice elements into superdominated, mixed, and superoptimal sets. For a choice set of 896 security returns treated previously in the literature, 454, 25, and 13 distributions are in the first‐, second‐, and third‐order convex stochastic dominance optimal sets, respectively. These optimal sets compare with admissible first‐, second‐, and third‐order stochastic dominance sets of 682, 35, and 19 distributions, respectively. The applicability of superconvex stochastic dominance for continuous distributions defined over a bounded interval is then shown. The difficulties in identifying the elements of the superdominated set for distributions defined over the entire real line are demonstrated in the determination of the dominated choices for a set of normally distributed mutual fund returns previously examined by Meyer [9]. Specifically, we find that the dominated set determined by Meyer is too large.

In empirical studies of differences between firms which are acquired and those which are not, researchers typically divide firms into two groups‐acquired and nonacquired. In this paper, we argue that cash takeovers may be sufficiently different from noncash acquisitionst hat failure to distinguish between them may lead to inappropriateg eneralizations. We provide evidence from the mid 1970s that three categories of firms can be distinguished:n onacquireda, cquiredi n a cash takeover, and acquired in an exchange of securities.